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ABSTRACT 
Since the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry in 
1969 to consider the desirability or otherwise of 
introducing a televiision service in South Africa and 
the subsequent establishment of television in the 
Republic in 1976, no official policy statement has been 
announced on possible future television developments. 
This study's main contribution to knowledge is in 
attempting to provide a framework for such development, 
based on an evaluation of relevant television system 
experience. In addition, this dissertation attempts 
to measure public attitudes to television's performance, 
organisation and regulation after eight years of 
operation. To date, no published research exists on 
these aspects of television broadcasting in South 
Africa. 
In this dissertation, an historic and contemporary 
analysis of selected television systems, a social and i . 
economic justification for moving South Africa from 
its present monopoly broadcasting structure is 
presented. 
A synthesis of television experience with particular 
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(vi) 
reference to Australia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States is evolved, suggesting how this transition 
to a plural system, permitting independent television 
broadcasting, might be achieved. 
The resulting proposal recommends that the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) should remain the 
principal instrument of national broadcasting, but entry 
should be granted to a regional television service 
based on the major metropolitan centres. This 
independent service should have the capacity for national 
broadcasting of programmes through network arrangements. 
The alternative service would be formed by a partnership 
of state and private sector interests with the Afrikaans 
and English press groups having a significant role in 
the latter. The system calls for the utilisation of 
a domestic communications satellite for efficient 
distribution of both SABC and independent television 
channels. 
The late arrival of television in South Africa was due, 
in part, to serious misgivings and open hostility to 
what was seen by some politicians and community leaders 
as overseas excesses with the medium. Strong fears 
existed>causing television to be denounced as a subversive 
force and an insidious influence posing a particular 
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( i x ) 
form a major prerequisite in conforming with regulatory 
specifications. 
The conventionai social and economic criticisms levelled 
at advertising are re-examined and it is concluded that 
the costs in consumer welfare terms are not excessive. 
South Africa's existing advertising regulatory instru-
ments are thought to be sound and capable of adapting 
to media change. 
The role of the South African press in future television 
developments is seen as fundamental. Without the 
option of diversification into the electronic media, 
it is concluded that the press cannot ultimately survive 
in its present form. 
South Africa is considered to be well placed to benefit 
from the experience of other countries with television 
development. Chapter 10 is an attempt at synthesis 
of those aspects that appear realistic, bearing in mind 
the nation's limited resources and other social and 
economic priorities. 
The resulting model is offered as a po~sible framework 
and is not meant to imply a definitive solution. 
The model rests on the overriding assumption that 
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government, the SABC, the press groups and other private 
sector interests will be able to put aside past 
antagonisms in the public interest. 
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( vi i } 
threat to Afrikaner cultural values. This largely 
emotional response, combined with other factors and 
attitudes related to South Africa's complex demographic, 
socio-economic and political make-up, .has shaped the 
fledgling television service and imposed severe 
operational constraints. The central hy~othesis 
exp 1 ore d i S that : 11 monopoly -in television broadcasting 
is both socially and economically detrimental in the South 
African context". 
The author visited media institutions and universities 
in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Television developments in other countries considered 
relevant were reviewed through an extensive literature 
search. 
South African fieldwork comprised a three-part empirical 
investigation into White attitudes to tel~vision after 
six years of exposure to the medium. Phases 1 and 2 
were carried out in 1982, and Phase 3 in 1983. 
Phase 1 was a pilot study consisting of depth interviews 
with a convenience sample of 97 opinion leaders from the 
Cape Town area. 
Phase 2 took the form of a public opinion survey of 279 
White ABC viewers from the Cape Town area using a 
stratified area random sample, employing personal 
interviews by means of a structured questionnaire. 
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(viii) 
Phase 3 examined video penetration and domestic viewing 
patterns, utilising the same methodology as in Phase 2, 
but with an increased sample of 321 respondents from the 
same population. Data analysis for Phases 2 and 3 was 
facilitated by use of appropriate statistical packages, 
using the chi-square test for examining the relationship 
between variables. 
These empirical investigations indicated dis-
satisfaction with programme quality and choice, with 
the vast majority of both English and Afrikaans 
speaking respondents in favour of independent broad-
casting being permitted in South Africa, subject to 
suitable state regulation. The social implications 
of increased programme output and the concomitant 
increase in advertising are considered, with particular 
emphasis on research findings on televised violence 
and the effects of television on youth. 
The medium's educational and public information roles 
are examined with reference to possible new initiatives 
for South Africa. 
Regionalism in television broadcasting, as advocated 
in this dissertatfon,is seen to be in line with govern-
ment development priorities for devolution of power 
to South Africa's eight development regions. The study 
• 
shows that regionalism and indeed localism are now 
essential components in world television systems and 
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1-2 
1976, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). 
television service became operational. 
To the non-South African observer, the late arrival 
of the now seemingly indespensible medium of television 
would seem extraordinary, particularly when considered 
alongside the country's impressive economic and techno-
logical achievements as seen across the whole range 
of usual criteria for measuring national progress. 
It is necessary to take into account the more complex 
political and cultural attitudes, unique to South Africa, 
that have contributed to the late arrival of the medium, 
its centralised organ sational structure and its relation-
ship to the Nationalist government. These same attitudes 
are of such significance that they will inevitably 
determine television's future in South Africa, acting 
either as an inhibitor or as a stimulus to development. 
During the mid-1950's, the Nationalist government flatly 
declared that broadcast television for South Africa 
was not even· to be considered. Orlik3 summed up the 
government's arguments at the time as : 
(1) that reliance on American and British-produced 
features would be unavoidable and highly detrimental 
to the recently achieved broadcast equality of 
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1-3 
the English and Afrikaans languages; 
(2) that the potential political impact of television 
was unknown; and 
(3) that the psychological impact of the medium on 
the urbanised Bantu might be dangerous in a country 
where "Caucasians alone possess the vote but 
constitute only one-fifth of the population" 4 • 
Orlik further illustrates Nationalist reluctance when 
he states : 
II 
• • Prophesying cultural suicide, Minister 
of Posts and Telegraphs, Albert Hertzog, had 
long denounced 'that evil black box'. In 
1960 Prime Minister Verwoerd added his voice, 
but he stressed economics - the high riost of 
television and the number of competing 
systems still under development. Commercial 
interests, both within and without South 
Africa, offered financial inducements to 
the government throughout the 1960's, but 
the Nationalists stood firm behind the 
negativism of Hertzog. The political friends 
of television had no better luck in 1966 when 
the largely English stock United Party 
suffered a disastrous defeat, taking with 
it the slogan 'Want TV? Vote U.P.' ••• " 5 
The American entertainment industry's newspaper Variety 
of January 6, 1965 had this to say on South African 
government policy regarding television : 
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1-4 
"The government, dominated by Afrikaner 
White Nationalists, sees television as 
a 'subversive' force, 'an insidious 
influence that destroyed mighty empires' 
and one which threatens the destruction 
of white rule in South Africa. Tele-
vision films, showing mingling of the 
races, government officials have declared, 
would lead to crime, rape and political
holocaust 116 • 
Fears on the part of Afrikaner leaders concerning the 
dilution of the hard-earned broadca~t language parity, 
and the implications that the new found Afrikaner 
identity might be undermined, must have appeared 
justified considering the negligent treatment the 
Afrikaans radio programmes had received compared to 
that of the English service, .since the establishment 
of the SABC broadcasting monopoly in 1936. 
The antagonism between Afrikaans and English speaking 
South Africans has been a major constraint on the develop-
ment of broadcasting in the country and appears to have 
been, together with other factors mainly political 
in nature, largely responsible for what many consider 
to be television's failure to meet performance expectations 
to da~e, as a provider of information, entertainment 
and education. 
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1-5 
The Nationalist Party's victory in the 1948 election 
gave impetus to the task of improving the Afrikaans 
radio service. It also resulted in Afrikaner control 
of the SABC's board of governors. Nationalist political 
dominance since 1948 has meant, according to many South 
African media commentators, that the state controlled 
broadcasting monopoly of the SABC has largely pursued 
Afrikaner, and to some extent Nationalist party ideology. 
Accusations of spreading government propaganda, political 
bias, news slanting, etc. abound. Opposition politicians 
are quick to exploit any opportunity to emphasise what 
they see as the 'inseparable' nature of the union between 
the SABC and the government. 
The question of the degree of autonomy desirable for 
broadcasting monopolies is examined later in this 
dissertation, as it is fundamental to the concept of 
public service broadcasting. Certainly the South 
African example differs markedly in interpretation, 
at least in practice, from other western democracies 
and in some respects appears to resemble the more 
autocratic practices of the USSR and eastern Europe. 
1.2 PLURALISM AND REGIONALISM 
In spite of the fact that the SABC has many critics 
inside and outside South Africa, its achievements in 
radio broadcasting have been considerable by any standards. 
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1-6 
In the face of disparate and complex factors of race, 
culture and language, not to mention geographical and 
technological problems, it has provided a radio broad-
casting service national, regional and cultural in nature 
that has no equal in Africa and in many respects, compares 
with the best in the world. 
It is important at the outset to emphasise that this 
study, although focussing on much of the criticism levelled 
at broadcasting in South Africa, should not be interpreted 
, solely as a critical evaluation of the SABC per se; it 
should, rather, be seen as an evaluation of a proposal 
for a pluralistic broadcasting framework permitting the 
entry of an independent television service with regional 
broadcasting capability, financed by advertising and 
managed and operated by the private sector. The new 
service would be responsible to a minister and ultimately 
to Parliament through a new Act. The SABC would remain 
the principle instrument of national broadcasting. 
An equally important objective of this dissertation 
is to attempt to present a case for greater autonomy 
for the state broadcasting service, thus enabling South 
Africans to benefit from a truly pluralistic system 
of television broadcasting. 
There can be little doubt that the South African viewing 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
1-7 
public, having sampled eight years of television, will 
demand more quality and quantity on their screens and 
will wish to exercise their right to programme choice 
through the provision of more channels. Viewers will 
become increasingly dissatisfied with a single centralised 
national service and will look to broadcasters to provide 
alternatives, especially in terms of regional programming. 
Because of the ethnic nature of the TV2 and TV3 services, 
which began operation in 1982, they cannot be considered 
in the strict sense, as programme alternatives for most 
Afrikaans and English language viewers. 
It seems logical, therefore, in exploring new viewing 
alternatives, to turn to the private sector as a means 
of filling the gap, at no, or at least low, cost to the 
taxpayer. 
A major part of this study is the examination of evidence 
that an alternative television service could be provided 
by private enterprise, serving the regions from major 
metropolitan centres and thus the bulk of the urban 
population of South Africa. The study endeavours to 
show that there is more than sufficient advertising 
revenue in the South African economy to finance the 
service. South Africa still lags behind other 
industralised countries in advertising expenditure, 
spending 0,68% of GNP in 1980 on advertising, compared 
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1-8 
with, for example, Brazil's 1 percent, the United Kingdom's 
7 1,25 percent, and the United States with over 2 percent • 
Mr Pik Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Inform-
ation, speaking in the House of Assembly on his budget 
vote on September 19, 1981, said television could not 
meet the large demand for advertising. He also expressed 
concern for the future of newspapers, not only because 
advertisers were turning to television in increasing 
numbers, but also because "sophisticated technological 
communications media would slowly overtake newspapers 
in more and more fields 118 • 
The concern of the press regarding the growth of the 
electronic media, in particular, is another argument 
presented later in this dissertation for allowing the 
press to diversify into private sector television, 
subject to suitable controls. 
It is also argued that the need for regional Afrika_ans/ 
English language television, based on the major metro-
politan centres but with national networking capability, 
would be an unfair burden on the existing SABC structure 
committed, as it is, to the three services of TVl, TV2 
and TV3. (TV2 and TV3 are ethnic channels serving 
the Black communities.) 
Even if it was thought desirable to develop regional 
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1-10 
structures, a concession to smaller businesses that 
is used overseas and collectively acts as a spur to 
economic activity. 
Independent, regional television has much to offer all 
segments of the South African economy, consumers, marketers 
and the television industry infrastructure in the creation 
of new employment opportunities and fresh communication 
challenges. 
1.3 OUTLINE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ADVERTISING 
The social costs of television advertising are~examined 
in detail, along with moral and ethical considerations 
and their special significance in the South African 
context. Control mechanisms in use in Britain, the 
United States and Australia are discussed and compared 
with South African practice. Indeed, the social implic-
ations of advertising forming the foundation of an 
independent television system in South Africa, even 
with the most rigorous legislative and voluntary industry 
control mechanisms, is of such profound social magnitude 
that a considerable part of the study is given over 
to the examination of the sociological case for and 
against advertising and: television in society, 
regardless of advertising involvement. 
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1-11 
The cultural criticism that mass communication media 
supported by advertising satiate the public with the 
most superficial information and entertainment, encourag-
ing what is popular rather than spiritual in values 
is examined. Television is particularly prone to this 
criticism and according to Wright et al. 
"even the most ardent advocate of 
advertising has to strain to make a 
case for the cultural contributions 
of many situation comedies and 
programmes that dramatize murder and 
mayhem119 • 
Social arguments concerning advertising tend to take 
place between the advertising industry, represented 
by the advertising agencies and their clients the 
advertisers on the one hand and a variety of what can 
best be regarded as pressure groups in society usually 
political 'consumerist', 'environmentalist' or religious, 
on the other. 
Many academics also feel the need to make a stand against 
what appears to them to be the insidious attack on society 
by advertising. Although it is only comparatively 
recently that the social sciences have considered 
advertising sufficiently important to merit study at 
the highest levels, an impressive amount of work has 
been done, particularly in the US and Britain, much of 
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it relevant to this dissertation and the possible effects 
of advertising on South African society. 
The examination of the social aspects of advertising 
is centred around four main areas. The first is, quite 
simply, what advertising can claim to do for people, 
by calling their attention to products and services, 
explaining them and providing information about them. 
Criticism comes when advertising goes beyond this basic 
informational role and the question of justification 
for persuasive content needs to be considered. 
The other social areas considered are criticisms concern-
ing the 'manipulation' argument : that advertising 
makes people buy things they don't really want and can't 
afford; that by creating new needs they (the advertise-
ments) drive people to seek increasing quantities of 
even more trivial material objects; that by misrepresent-
ation and suppression of facts they lead people to 
irrational purchasing decisions. White and Lannon10 
also attempt to tackle the arguments that advertising 
leads to trivialisation and debasement of language and 
imagery; that advertisements are visual and aural 
pollution; that they are an irritating intrusion into 
people's privacy. They also consider the criticisms 
that advertising degrades women by talking down to them, 
portraying them in an unfavourable light, reinforcing 
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undesirable stereotypes and that advertising aimed at 
children produces a whole range of undesirable effects. 
South African television advertising content is strictly 
controlled by the SABC's interpretation of the Broadcasting 
Act, together with the industry's own voluntary mechanism 
the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). These and 
other control devices are evaluated when discussing 
the social aspects of advertising. 
In considering a proposal advocating more television 
exposure for South Africans, it is also appropriate 
to discuss some of the major research findings 
pertaining to broadcasting and society. 
For similar reasons, advertising's controversial image 
with economists is examined. From Borden to Baumol, 
Galbraith to Schumpter, with particularly significant 
contributions from Barnet, Black and Steiner on the 
economics of broadcasting] and advertising and also nonopoly 
I 
and competition in television. 
Other major contributors to advertising's controversial 
place in the economy and whose work is relevant to this 
dissertation are Alderson, Dorfman, Doyle, Kaldor, Kuehn, 
Lambin, Palda, Silverman and Telser. 
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The Brookings Institution's comprehensive analysis of 
the US broadcasting industry and its interaction with 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is of great 
importance to this dissertation as, in essence, the 
objectives of the analysis were to examine the industry's 
potential for improved performance, especially in the 
number, variety and quality of programmes offered, and 
to evaluate FCC regulation in light of its efforts to 
promote local programming. 
The Brookings Institute study was concerned with the 
economic, technical and institutional factors that 
determine the ind~stry's performance and the kinds of 
programmes available to viewers, and the value of television 
to viewers and society. It examines the costs, potential 
benefits and regulatory policy issues arising from several 
innovations such as pay-TV, cable television, video-
cassettes and direct satellite-to-home broadcasts. 
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the American 
FCC has made network stations enormously profitable 
by shielding them from competition and that its stated 
goal of increased local programming has largely failed. 
The report accuses the FCC of restraining the development 
of the US television industry, at a cost of several 
billion dollars in viewer satisfaction, for a purpose 
that has yielded little benefit. South African students 
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of broadcasting economics will be interested in the 
study's conclusion which urges the FCC and Congress 
to redefine broadcast policy to encourage competition 
. 
by lifting restraints on cable, pay-TV, and other 
promising means of increasing the number of viewer 
. 11 
options . 
Any research into broadcasting constantly emphasises 
the fact that radio and television systems, in every 
.country, have evolved to meet a particular set of needs 
that are peculiar to the country concerned. Objectives, 
problems, political philosophy, complexities of language 
and culture, levels of economic wealth and development, 
all contribute to the final result. This fact is worth 
stressing, as during the course of investigations a 
number of what appear to be highly commendable 'ready-
made' broadcasting systems, judged in terms of public 
service, levels of professionalism, etc. are to be found. 
The temptation, then, is to attempt to superimpose one 
of these 'proven' systems on the South African situation. 
This approach, of course, would be highly suspect, as 
it pays scant regard to the abovementioned socioeconomic 
and cultural problems, all of which are of the greatest 
relevance in South Africa. 
However, South Africa is in a unique position for 
" ' 
an industrial country, when specifically considering 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
1-16 
television development, in that it can benefit from 
many years of experience gathered by other, particularly 
western, countries. 
Television first started as a public service in a very 
small way in Britain in 1936, but the real growth explosion 
came in the post World War II years with American and 
western Europe realising the enormous potential of the 
medium and having the established technology and the 
experience gained with radio networks to ensure the 
new service would be economically viable. A great 
deal of the experience, good and bad, gained over the 
past 30 years, is examined in this study. 
Closely related to this, is the study of informed South 
African opinion leaders on the subject of television. 
Valuable contributions have come from not only broad-
casters but academics, politicians, sociologists, 
economists, religious leaders, businessmen, community 
leaders and others. In many cases, these opinion leaders 
are alarmed by and critical of what they judge to be the 
failures of the medium in overseas countries and they 
are concerned that only the best experience in public 
service broadcasting should be incorporated in future 
South African television developments. 
They are, in the main, aware of the medium's potential 
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benefits in the South African context, particularly 
with regard to education, information and entertainment. 
Many opinion leaders are critical of broadcasting's monopoly 
structure and support private sector involvement, 
especially as far as television is concerned. The 
autonomy of the SABC is, in many instances, seriously 
questioned, as is the centralised nature of the existing 
television service, i.e. its lack of regional flavour. 
These and other issues are examined in an attempt to 
formulate a proposal for an independent television net-
work, adapted to suit the individual and complex needs 
of South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEMOCRACY AND RESPONSIBLE BROADCASTING 
2.1 FUNDAMENTALS OF BROADCASTING SYSTEMS 
Regulation in broadcasting seems inevitable. Most 
media commentators agree that no country can afford 
to leave so powerful and persuasive a means of 
communication unregulated. Governments have to 
administer the use of radio and television frequencies 
in the national interest. It is the interpretation 
of this obligation that accounts for the diversity of 
broadcasting syst ms. 
According to Professor Head1 , a respected authority on 
world broadcasting systems, the differences revolve around 
three key questions that every national broadcasting system 
has to answer for itself 
1. " ••• How shall broadcasting be 
managed? Directly by the state? 
Indirectly by the state through a semi-
autonomous chartered organisation? 
By private operators subject to some 
degree of state regulation? Or by 
some combination of these? • n2 
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How shall broadcasting be 
financed? By state subsidy? By 
licence fees on receiving sets? 
By revenue from broadcast advertising? 
Or by some combination of these? •• 113 
3. "By what criteria shall programmes be 
controlled? By the desires of the 
generality of set owners, as determined 
by audience research? By judgements 
made by political leaders? By 
professional broadcasters? By 
committees representing major social 
institutions such as education, religion, 
and the arts? By regional interests as 
reflected in political subdivisions? 
By national subgroups with special 
ethnic, linguistic, or cultural identities? 
or by some combination of these? ••. 114 
Head further states that 
" ••• each of these alternatives has 
been adopted in practice in one country 
or another. Often local circumstances 
dictate the choice. For example, the 
economies of many countries could not 
finance a full-scale broadcasting 
service solely from advertising revenue, 
even if that was the desired form of 
support. Most developing countries 
have so many different linguistic and 
ethnic subgroups that it would be 
impossible to give each one its own 
broadcasting service ••• 115 
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• • • Nigeria broadcasts in 30 local 
languages, still far fewer than the 
number spoken by its 250 tribal groups. 
Nor is the problem of multilingualism 
restricted to developing countries. 
The widespread use of both English a~d 
French in Canada and of both Dutch and 
French in Belgium necessitate full-scale 
broadcast services in each language. 
Switzerland broadcasts in five domestic 
languages. Dutch suffices for all 
Holland, yet broadcasting there is 
nevertheless divided into seven distinct 
services, each representing a different 
religious or political affiliation • • " 6 
(One woµld naturally include South African broadcasting 
at this point, considering the diversity of languages. 
In addition to radio and television services in Afrikaans 
and English, Blacks are served by radio in Zulu, Xhosa, 
Southern Sotho, Northern Sotho, Tswana, Venda and Tsonga. 
Two television channels for Blacks, TV2 and TV3 entered 
service in 1982 and 1983 respectively, broadcasting 
in five African languages.*) 
2.2 HEAD'S VIEWS ON PHILOSOPHIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM, 
PATERNALISM AND PERMISSIVENESS 
As a general rule, a country's political philosophy 
is reflected in its broadcasting system(s). Head 7 
*Author's italics 
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discerns three basic orientations or attitudes that 
determine how broadcasting is managed, financed and 
programmed. He refers to these three orientations 
as authoritarianism, paternalism and permissivism. 8 
Head's views are considered to be so perceptive and relevant 
to this dissertation that they are included here, in 
summary form : 
2.2.1 Authoritarianism 
This attitude characterises the systems adopted in the 
USSR and other communist countries. The state operates 
broadcasting and harnesses it directly to the implement-
ation of government policies. In the USSR, broadcasting 
is a function of the Ministry of Culture, under the 
guidance of a special committee set up for the purpose 
by the Council of Ministries. In other communist 
countries, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of 
Information, or a special administration directly 
responsible to the top political level oversees broad-
casting~ 
The guiding philosophy of these systems disdains catering 
to frivolous tastes and wasting time on ideologically 
barren entertainment. Hence programming under such 
systems could hardly be called 'popular', and audiences 
are under constant temptation to seek satisfaction 
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elsewhere by tuning in (often illegally) to foreign 
broadcasts. For this reason, according to Vronitsyn 9, 
in recent years even the USSR's rigidly doctrinaire 
approach has been somewhat softened by the realisation 
that an appeal to popular tastes can serve as a wedge 
for propaganda. 
A somewhat different type of authoritarian attitude 
prevails in developing countries. A great culture 
gap separates the educated elite, who provide the 
political leadership, from the mass of the people, who 
remain largely untouched by modern education and out-
look. Governments in most developing countries vest 
programme control in departments or ministries that 
have control of such fields as education, culture or 
information generally; programme decisions must often 
be referred to top political leadership. The leaders, 
not trusting the native common sense of the illiterate 
and unsophisticated masses, dish up a spoonfed broadcast 
diet.· Authoritarianism of this type prevails even 
in developing countries that make no claim to socialistic 
h 'l h' d 11 d h 1 f . lO p 1 osop ies mo e e on t e examp e o communism • 
2.2.2 Paternalism 
The paternalistic attitude shows more faith in the basic 
intelligence of the masses and in their capacity to 
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deal with ideas. Its concern is not to suppress inform-
ation and to dictate co.nclusions but rather to maintain 
a healthily balanced programme diet, with neither too 
much spinach nor too much ice cream for social and 
psychological well-being. Paternalism assumes 
(1) that popular taste is by definition taste for 
frivolous entertainment, 
(2) that leaders have the duty to limit the extent 
to which such tastes are gratified and to 
balance them with programming of a more serious 
or cultivated nature, and 
(3) that this experience will gradually ameliorate 
the low level of popular taste. 
Most non-communist industrialised countries practise 
varying degrees of paternalism in their broadcasting 
systems. For purposes of comparison, the system of 
pre-television Great Britain is fitting, for it was 
originally designed explicitly to avoid the 'mistakes' 
the British felt had been made in America (Briggs 11). 
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is a public 
chartered corporation deriving its revenue from licence 
fees on receiving sets. Although the state appoints 
its board of governors and although it has many other 
links with officialdom, the corporation operates with 
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a recognisably independent scope of discretion in 
programme matters within the terms of its charter. 
~ (The BBC system of broadcasting has been admired in 
t 
many parts of the world and a number of countries, South 
Africa included, have modelled their own broadcasting 
systems along similar lines. However, the system does 
not always appear to travel well, du~ largely to the 
complex combination of economic, social, cultural and 
language problems previously mentioned. It is generally 
agreed that few public corporation broadcasting systems 
enjoy the level of autonomy afforded to the BBC.*) 
The BBC views its duty to society as a responsibility 
for basing programme judgements on its own conscientious 
evaluation of society's best interests. This 
evaluation has naturally been coloured by the paternal-
istic outlook of the social class from which the BBC 
leadership has been drawn. It is revealing, for example, 
to follow the reluctant acceptance by the BBC of the 
idea of audience research. In the earlier years, BBC 
officials simply refused to acknowledge that their own 
judgements needed to be qualified by objective facts. 
The discovery in the late 1930's that a large proportion 
of the BBC's supposed~y loyal audience was actually 
tuning to a foreign commerc~al station, Radio Luxembourg, 
... 
·1,,_ 
plus the insistent demand for audience facts by producers 
*Author's italics 
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of educational programmes, finally broke down the BBC's 
paternalistic isolationism from the reality of the mass 
listener's tastes and habits. But not until the 1940's 
~id the BBC seriously embark on systematic scientific 
audience research. lZ. Even so, in 1949, according to Head, 
a British government committee could report that if 
research indicated that the public disliked a BBC series, 
"· •. such findings would be considered 
with the utmost care and weighed with 
other considerations which were relevant. 
But the decision, when taken, would be 
a responsible decision, come to in the 
light of what was considered ultimately 
to be in the best interests of the 
public and the service." (Head quoting 
Madow13 ). 
As recently as 1960 a BBC official could write 
"The real degradation of the BBC started 
with the invention of the hellish depart~ 
ment which is called 'Listener Research'. 
That Abominable Statistic is supposed to 
show 'what the listeners like' - and, of 
course, what they like is the red-nosed 
comedian and the Wurlitzer organ. 1114 
The BBC philosophy of today holds that neither extreme 
paternalism nor extreme permissivism makes any sense. 
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The question remains however : Can a balance between 
the extremes be ideally attained by any single organis-
at ion? Or does effective balance require an interplay 
of two or more organisations representing alternative 
points of view? (This is an issue of direct relevance 
to broadcasting monopoly in South Africa and is a major 
argument in favour of competition.*) A BBC official 
told a government investigating committee that it 
recognised the "risk of paternalism" in its policy of 
"giving the lead" to public taste but that it was a 
risk that had to be taken15 . The risk could be 
eliminated - or at least the danger could be decreased 
- by the presence of another organisation representing 
another philosophy of programming16 
2.2.3 Permissiveness 
Broadcasting in America provides the major example of 
permissiveness. In the United States, government 
operation of broadcasting was briefly considered but 
quickly ruled out in favour of private operation subject 
to federal licensing and the general requirement that 
stations operate "in the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity". Interpretation of this phrase in 
practice is left largely to the broadcasters themselves, 
so government control over programming is minimal, in 
keeping with the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
*Author's italics 
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After a little more hesitancy, alternative ideas for 
financing tne new medium were ruled out in favour of 
allowing stations to support themselves through the 
sale of broadcast advertising. These two decisions 
automatically made the primary criterion of commercial 
programming whatever seems most popular with most people. 
The profit incentive, freed from independent standards 
of programme content, resulted in catering to the common 
denominators of popular taste. 
American commercial broadcasters have surpassed all 
others in skillfully producing mass entertainment and 
exploiting it as a vehicle of advertising. The result 
is a broadcast service characterised by an extra-
ordinarily high degree of technical competence devoted 
to programming of which an extraordinarily high 
proportion consists of light entertainment. The 
American commercial approach to programming has focused 
attention on finding out what the mass of the people 
want - or what they think they want,-or what they are 
most likely to accept (some critics argue that the people 
either do not really know what they 'want' or merely 
learn to 'want' what they are given). This approach 
has required, of course, intensive development of 
audience research. 
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The permissive system has been extraordinarily success-
ful in quantitative terms - partly because of its 
permissiveness but also because broadcasting developed 
at the critical moment in time to participate in 
America's mid-century economic boom. Broadcast 
advertising played a major role in the consumer 
revolution. It helped to create and has benefitted 
by the enormously expanding mass market for consumer 
goods and services. 
American broadcasting thus developed largely unhampered 
within the permissive framework of the free-enterprise 
system. The style of American broadcasting has been 
characterised by all the pragmatism, aggressiveness, 
materialism, improvisation, expansionism, and free-
swinging competitiveness of American marketing. What-
ever its critics may say, the overall result has been 
a more lively, inventive, and varied broadcasting system 
than can be found elsewhere in the world. 
Not only can America afford to support far more broad-
casting stations than other countries, but the dynamics 
of its system have also produced a far greater variety 
of stations. American broadcasting has responded to 
the infinitely varied demands of the marketplace so 
that despite an average sameness, a close look reveals 
at least some stations devoted to almost every kind 
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of special interest - not only stations of great size 
and reach in metropolitan areas but also tiny, localised 
stations within metropolitan areas and in small 
communities; not only stations motivated by profit 
but also non-prof it stations licensed to educational 
institutions, foundations, and municipalities; stations 
not only combined into massive networks but also operated 
independently; not only stations devoted to trashy 
entertainment but also stations devoted to education, 
culture and a wide range of minority tastes; stations 
using not only English but also many other languages. 
Even so, most governments disapprove of the extreme 
permissiveness of the American commercial system, with 
its emphasis on what people 'want' rather than what 
they 'need ' . They feel ~hat programming cannot be 
left entirely to the uncontrolled interaction of popular 
supply and demand but must be balanced in accordance 
with judgements about the need to preserve national 
cultural traditions and about the relative importance 
of information, education and entertainment. 
Americans in general, with their diverse ethnic origins 
and their carelessness about language, seem to feel 
no chauvinistic anxiety that broadcasting may undermine 
the national cultural identity or debase the purity 
17 
of the English tongue (see Newman ). Indeed, recent 
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trends have been towards preserving ethnic diversity, 
alternative lifestyles, dialects of English and foreign 
languages and towards encouraging the expression of 
all of these in broadcasting. By contrast, most other 
countries closely monitor broadcasting to keep it from 
diluting their national cultural heritage and debasing 
the purity of the national language or languages. Many 
countries impose ceilings on the amount of television 
programming that may be imported from abroad. Some 
American commentators are critical of many of the social 
effects of permissive broadcasting. Paulu, an American 
who has extensive experience of European broadcasting 
systems comments : 
"Europe can look to American broadcasting 
for enthusiasm and drive as well as for 
production ingenuity. But the United 
States can acquire from Europe the concepts 
that broadcasting is a public service 
rather than an industry, and that 
programme policies should be determined 
by social values rather than investment 
returns. 1118 
Many South Africans in a position to make comparisons 
would probably agree with Paulu. Certainly permissive-
ness on the American scale is inconceivable in South 
Africa, where broadcasting planners have traditionally 
looked to Europe for direction and will almost certainly 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
2-14 
continue to do so. 
Head is quick to point out that the three prototypes 
of authoritarianism, paternalism and permissivism exist 
nowhere in "pure form". American commercial broad-
casting's permissiveness is tinged with a sense of 
responsibility19 • The BBC's paternalism is qualified 
by a "duty to keep sensitively aware of the public's 
tastes and attitudes as they now are" 20 • The USSR's 
authoritarianism if only calculatingly, finds "paternal-
istic head-patting and occasional permissive eye-winking 
. . d "21 sometimes to its a vantage • 
2.3 THE TREND TOWARDS PLURALISM 
Head emphasises that even with the best of intentions, 
a single institution (or group of institutions ruled 
by a single philosophy) tends towards rigidity. 
Commenting on over half a century of broad~asting 
experience he maintains a pluralistic system seems best 
able to assure that the medium will develop its full 
potentialities within a given national framework. A 
single monolithic system seems to inevitably cramp the 
potentialities of the medium in one respect or another. 
By providing divergent methods of programme control 
and alternative programming philosophies, a pluralistic 
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system introduces elements of diversity and competition. 
Pluralism also prevents a system from drifting too far 
away from the realities of audience interests and tends 
to stimulate creativity and innovation 22 . 
The popularity of the European pirate broadcasting 
stations in the 1960's illustrates the consumer's need 
for choice in programming. These off-shore pirate 
stations swiftly commanded large audiences, particularly 
among young people and created national demands that 
could not be ignored. In 1965 the popularity of a 
television station operating off the coast of Holland 
escalated the issue of commercial television to the 
point where it caused the resignation of the Dutch cabinet23 • 
The pirates made the monolithic systems of Europe acutely 
aware of neglected audience tastes. Britain and other 
western European countries significantly liberalised 
their broadcasting policies to serve audiences whose 
wants had theretofore been unsuspected or ignored24 • 
The trend towards pluralistic systems of broadcasting 
has advanced with increasing tolerance of advertising. 
Although the majority of the earlier radio broadcasting 
systems were non-commercial, today over 60 percent of 
the world's national television systems operate 
commercially, wholly or in part. Alternatively, in 
countries like the United States, which started with 
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commercialism, the emergent element is a viable non-
commercial service. In either case, the trend is 
1- l' t. 25 p ura is ic • 
The unique advantages of television advertising are 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 as, apart from it being 
the most painless and least discriminatory way of taxing 
the set-owner, it performs a useful function in the 
national economy. A BBC researcher monitoring world 
developments in the 1960's tells of a visit to a Japanese 
home. The house was traditional in every way except 
for an array of electric kitchen utensils. The house-
wife explained that "until she saw TV advertising, she 
didn't even know such gadgets existed" (Cawston 26 ). 
Head argues that dependence on advertising income focuses 
management's attention on objective analysis of audiences 
and their desires, providing a counterbalance to non-
commercial services, which respond less sensitively 
to popular taste. Advertising by its very nature 
stresses competition and so provides a spur to innovation 
and creativity27 . 
This is undoubtably true, but it focuses attention on 
the most controversial area of commercial television, 
namely how far should responsible television go in trying 
to gratify popular taste? · The answer can only lie in 
' 
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interest. Independent television was vastly profitable 
from the very start. By offering viewers a choice 
of a second channel with a range of ,programmes that 
were later to be heavily criticised in the Pilkington 
Report of 1962 28 , it quickly commanded large audiences 
so that by the late 1950's the BBC's share of the 
television audience had dwindled to 30 percent. Almost 
everyone had switched to ITV, whose directors, after 
a few shaky moments to begin with, were themselves making 
29 fortunes that even they had never seen in prospect • 
Television advertising jumped from $4,8 million in 1955 
to $160 million by 1960. As Lord Thomson said, in 
a famous phrase that both he and others have since 
regretted, "A television licence is a licence to print 
30 
money". While ITV counted the money, the BBC was at 
first inclined to fall back upon a pompous insistence 
that "come what may it would not change its principles". 
But, according to Green, a corp::>ration that takes the public m::mey 
for licence fees, cannot do so with very good grace if rrost of the 
public is not looking at it (a situation that had never 
faced the BBC before, because there was no viewing 
. 31 
alternative) . 
2.4 COMPETITION IN BROADCASTING 
A fundamental change in BBC philosophy proved to be the 
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turning point for the corporation, resulting in the 
BBC facing ITV's competition head-on and winning back 
much of its lost audiences. 
The cornerstone of this new philosophy was the new 
director general of the BBC, Hugh Greene. Greene 
brought to the job nearly 30 years of professional 
journalism and broadcasting experience and had no 
32 doubts about what must be done 
" ••• I wanted to encourage enterprise 
and the taking of risks. I wanted to 
make the BBC a place where talent of 
all sorts, however unconventional, was· 
recognised and nurtured, where talented 
people could work and, if they wished, 
take their talents elsewhere, sometimes 
coming back again to enrich the organis-
ation from which they had started. I 
may have thought at the beginning that 
I should be dragging the BBC kicking 
and screaming into the sixties. But 
I soon learnt that some urge, some 
encouragement was what all the immense 
reserve of youthful talent in the BBC 
had been waiting for, and from that 
moment I was part of the rapidly flowing 
stream • "33 
This imaginative and dynamic spirit infused the whole 
corporation and was a major factor along with the stimulus 
provided by ITV competition in the BBC's television 
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service ultimately being regarded by many media 
commentators as 'the best in the world'. 
The Pilkington Report paid tribute to the BBC by stating! 
" ••. the BBC knows good broadcasting 
and by and large they are providing it. 
Our broad conclusion is this : that 
within the limitations imposed by a 
single programme (the BBC had not been 
allocated its second channel at this 
time}, the BBC's television service is 
a successful realisation of the purposes 
of broadcasting as defined in the 
h t II 34 c ar er . • • . 
The bulk of the criticism aimed at television was levelled 
at ITV : 
" •.• We conclude that the dissatisfaction 
with television can largely be ascribed 
to the independent television service. 
Its concept of balance does not satisfy 
the varied and many-sided tastes and 
interests of the public. In the field of 
entertainment and not least in light 
entertainment - there is much that lacks 
quality ••• the service of independent 
television does not successfully realise 
the purposes of broadcasting as defined 
in the Television Act ..... 35 
What lessons, if any, can be applied from the above to 
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future innovations in corrunercial television in South 
Africa? Probably the most significant is the need 
for regulation to ensure that any new television service 
provides the type of broadcasting for which it was 
instigated. In the South African situation a new Act 
of Parliament would be necessary setting out the guide-
lines for the operation of independent television. 
The Pilkington Report showed up the inadequacy of the 
original Television Act of 1954. Independent television 
was more tightly regulated under the new Television 
Act of 1964 which stipulated much closer scruting of 
programme schedules and the imposition of a tax levy 
on advertising revenue - by the end of the 1960's as 
much as 25 percent of advertising revenue was being 
36 
siphoned off at once by the government • 
The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), like the 
BBC, is a non-profit, chartered corporation. It owns 
and operates all the transmission facilities used by 
the commercial broadcasting companies. It appoints 
separate companies to serve individual (regional) areas 
of Britain. The private programme companies rent 
transmission facilities from the IBA, supply the programm-
ing and sell the advertising. The IBA is thus respons-
ible under the IBA Act of 1973 for the strict control 
of both programming policies and advertising practices. 
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Advertisers are unable to interfere with programming 
in any way. 
by the Act. 
Sponsorship of programmes is prohibited 
This division of responsibilities restrains 
the influence of commercial interests because it gives 
the IBA no reason to defer to advertisers. It can 
fine a contracting programme company for infringement 
of rules and can even cancel its contract altogether. 
When franchises come up for renewal they may be awarded 
to what the IBA considers to be other more deserving 
companies. The test is always which of the competitors 
for the regional broadcasting franchise is likely to 
make the best contribution to the quality of independent 
television services? From a South African viewpoint, 
it is worth noting that the companies are awarded regional 
contracts so no single company achieves a dominant 
position, nor can regional interests be neglected. 
The above would indicate that the effect of independent 
television on the SABC would take various forms, some 
of them detrimental but this would probably be a short-
terrn phenomenon. In the longer term, the SABC can 
have very little to fear from competition and should 
benefit in a number of substantial ways. The SABC's 
experience, size and special position as state broadcasting 
corporation will ensure that it will be able to rise 
to meet the competition provided by an independent 
regional television service and will be the better for 
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it. SABC-TV should be allowed to consolidate and 
improve its services of TVl, TV2 and TV3, all centralised, 
national operations, based on Johannesburg. Revenue 
should continue to come from the two sources of tele-
vision set licences and adver~ising. Fears that SABC-
TV will lose valuable advertising revenue to its 
regional independent competitors are probably not 
justified. At the moment SABC-TV's advertising comes 
from the major national organisations. The smaller 
local businesses cannot afford national advertising 
rates of up to ..!. R9 500 (at 1983 prices) for 30 seconds of exposure at 
peak viewing time. Even if they could afford these 
rates, plus the additional high costs of making the 
commercial, they would be buying 'wasted exposure' as 
their marketing objectives are regional in range of 
operation, rather than national. What would certainly 
happen is that more regional advertising would be 
generated. There would inevitably be some switching 
of advertising from other media notably the press, 
outdoor and cinema. This does of course raise issues 
regarding the survival of these other media, an aspect 
fundamental to proposals made elsewhere in this 
dissertation. Essentially, however, where the develop-
ment of television has been encouraged, after a period 
of sometimes fairly painful rationalisation, the other 
media have re-emerged fitter and more competitive, ready 
to face the challenge of new technology. A fundamental 
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point is that independent television should, in fact, 
mean more advertising in the economy, not merely the 
same amount being divided up by more media. (See also 
Chapter 1, reference 5 re: South African advertising 
expenditure expressed as a percentage of GNP.) 
Another fear possibly harboured by the SABC management 
would be that the new service would tempt away valuable 
staff members. Expensively trained technicians, 
directors, writers and performers could be offered 
lucrative contracts to join the opposition. To some 
extent this is bound to happen. However, it could 
be argued that the future of the South African television 
industry as a whole can only benefit if employment 
opportunities are opened up through the mechanism of 
the free market, where workers can sell their services 
to competing ,, employers rather than to only one 
employer. Ultimately cross-fertilisation of this kind, 
brought about by freedom of movement, should benefit 
all participants and act as a spur to the industry, 
creating even more job opportunities and leading to 
higher standards of professionalism. All sections 
of the South African economy, this argument would main-
tain, would benefit as a result. 
Head presents a persuasive argument setting out the 
benefits of constructive competition in broadcasting 
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which pluralism promotes. He makes the point that 
most highly developed systems now try to provide for 
it. He cites the German Federal Republic as an example 
where each of the nine federal political units has its 
own broadcasting system. When the state decided to 
broaden programme choice by developing an alternative 
service, it did not allow the existing broadcasting 
units to furnish this second service but instead 
established an entirely separate organisation to compete 
with existing stations 37 • French broadcasting, although 
considered by Head to be one of the most authoritarian 
systems in the western world, was reorganised in 1974 
1 . 1 . . 38 so as to create at east intramura competition 
New Zealand undertook a thorough study before revamping 
its national system, one of the principal recommendations 
being the creation of two networks in order "to bring 
f I d' • • II 39 about a system o guide competition • The value 
of competition was also recognised by the Carnegie 
Commission in its recommendation for US public television. 
The commission proposed the establishment of more than 
one national programme production centre, in part because 
"competition between two or more centres will act as 
a spur and will provide a basis for cornparison1140 
Canada and Japan are other major foreign examples of 
the pluralistic approach. The Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, a non-commercial public chartered body, 
I 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
2-26 
modelled originally along BBC lines, operates a national 
network of stations. Privately owned, commercial local 
stations also exist, but they must carry CBC non-
commercial national programmes as well as their own. 
Japan has a government-sponsored national network, 
operating side by side with relatively unrestricted 
. . 1 . 41 private commercia stations • 
Existing plans for South African television, while 
moving away from the rigidity of a single channel service 
towards the provision of additional channels broadcasting 
in African languages (TV2 and TV3), do not, at the 
moment, satisfy the criteria for a pluralistic system. 
This is not to disparage the efforts of the government 
which obviously had decided that the first priority 
is to provide some kind of television for all the major 
language groups in South Africa, a laudable objective, 
especially considering the complexities of the problems 
concerning technology, geography and programming. 
Financial considerations are restrictive. The launching 
of the new service (TV2/TV3) involved just over RlOO 
million. Of this R70 million represented capital 
expenditure and approximately R35 million establishment 
costs42 • If we accept the economic and social arguments 
in favour of a pluralistic television service for South 
Africa, based on the importance of providing viewers 
with a choice, it would be unrealistic as well as 
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undesirable to expect the next evolutionary stage for 
television in South Africa, i.e. a regional television 
network, to be a mere extension of a state broadcasting 
monopoly. The logical answer suggests looking to the private 
sector. The press groups, both English and Afrikaans, 
would welcome the opportunity to diversify into the 
electronic media; they have the financial resources 
and the communication skills. They are also well aware 
that elsewhere in the western world television has 
replaced all other media as the principal source of 
public information. No amount of wishful thinking 
can reverse the clock. South African viewers have 
had their appetites whetted by eight years of SABC 
television. They are rapidly becoming aware of the 
quality and range of television services offered over-
seas and are certain to demand similar benefits. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, the offer of 
television was used in the 1966 South African election 
as a carrot to win votes. It failed miserably. It 
would be interesting to see how the offer of additional 
improved television services would fare in a general 
election today. 
Although it would be expected that the South African 
press would welcome the opportunity to diversify into 
television, the ownership structure would need to be 
controlled to prevent too much power being vested in 
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too few hands. Suitable safeguards in terms of 
qualifications for ownership and permissible stock 
holdings would have to be worked out, but there are 
several examples of such control systems currently in 
use in other countries; a suitable adaptation for 
South Africa is offered in Chapter 10. Diversity of 
ownership would be in the best interests of the proposed 
new regional network, the widest possible range of South 
African economic activity should be encouraged to be 
represented. 
2.5 GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES TO BROADCASTING 
In any democracy, government involvement in broadcasting 
is inevitable. It has to consider what type of broad-
casting organisation would best serve the interests 
of the population. Policies are necessary regarding 
programming and financing. Technical considerations 
have to be regulated to prevent electronic chaos and 
the worst excesses of commercial exploitation. The 
1959 Geneva Convention, for example, stipulates that 
43 
every radio station must be licensed by its government • 
The major reason for government involvement is the 
recognition of the importance of broadcasting as a method 
of communication - communication power that can of 
\ 
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course be used for good or harm. As radio and tele-
vision are considered primarily to be public services, 
broadcasting organisations are obliged to provide 
information, education and entertainment to meet the 
requirements of the indigenous cultural groups forming 
the population. Because broadcasting is directed 
straight into the home, certain moral justifications 
for regulation are provided, particularly with regard 
to violence, obscenity and profanity (social issues 
of television and advertising are considered in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6). It is interesting to note that 
because of television's unique combination of vision, 
sound and capability for 'live' and recorded broadcast-
ing, requirements for public service are more stringent 
for broadcasters than for the press. South Africa 
is no exception to this rule. 
Broadcasting grows out of, reflects and contributes 
to its environment. Government attitudes towards 
broadcasting, therefore, are just one aspect of their 
prevailing theories about information media in general. 
Where the basic philosophy favours freedom of expression, 
there probably will be freedom for all means of 
communication including both printed and electronic 
media. On the other hand, governments which control 
information as a general principle probably will control 
all communication media. Most west European countries 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
2-30 
follow a free press policy, while those in the communist 
44 
east have government-controlled systems . 
In a preface to describing different broadcasting 
organisations, Paulu 45 considers that John Milton in 
1644 outlined the issues concerning freedom when he 
declared "Give me the liberty to know, to utt,er, and 
to argue freely according to conscience, above all 
liberties". If truth and falsehood should be in contest, 
he continued, "who ever knew truth put to the worse, 
in a free and open encounter?1146 • Paulu also quotes 
from John Stuart Mill in his famous essay 'On Liberty• 47 
"If all mankind minus one, were of one 
opinion and only one person were of the 
contrary opinion, mankind would be no 
more justified_ in silencing that one 
person, than he, if he had the power, 
would be justified in silencing man-
kind. Were an opinion a personal 
possession of no value except to the 
owner; if to be obstructed in the 
enjoyment of it were simply a private 
injury, it would make some difference 
whether the injury was inflicted only 
on a few persons or on many. But the 
peculiar evil of silencing the 
expression of an opinion is, that it 
is robbing the human race; posterity 
as well as the existing generation; 
those who dissent from the opinion, 
. ' 
still more than those who hold it. 
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If the opinion is right, they are 
deprived of the opportunity of exchang-
ing error for truth; if wrong, they 
lose, what is almost as great a benefit, 
the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error." 48 
Democratic issues like the freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press are well summarised by the distinguished 
. h" . 1 k 49 . 1944 American istorian Car Bee er in : 
" ••. The democratic doctrine of freedom 
of speech and of the press, whether we 
regard it as a natural and inalienable 
right or not, rests upon certain 
assumptions. One of these is that men 
desire to know the truth and will be 
disposed to be guided by it . • • 
Another is that the sole method of 
arriving at the truth in the long run 
is by the free competition of opinion 
in the open market • Another is 
that, since men will inevitably differ 
in their opinions, each man must be 
permitted to urge, freely and even 
strenuously, his own opinion, provided 
he accords to others the same right 
·~· And the final assumption is that 
from this mutual toleration and 
compassion of diverse opinions the one 
, 
that seems the most rational will 
50 
emerge and be generally accepted • • " 
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To expect complete freedom in the South African context, 
would be unrealistic and more than a little naive, when 
one considers that it hardly exists anywhere in the 
world, as most governments feel duty bound, for reasons 
previously stated, to impose some limitations. However, 
on a comparative basis, broadcasting in South Africa 
appears excessively restrictive when examined alongside 
other western systems. 
The SABC's claim to be an impartial, autonomous public 
institution independent from government strictures, 
is the subject of much comment, a great deal of it bitter 
and vitriolic. Criticisms of this kind are, of course, 
normal when discussing state broadcasting systems but 
the sheer magnitude of criticism aimed at the SABC both 
from within South Africa and from the outside world 
place it in a class of its own. The following example 
(October, 1981) illustrates the controversy. Mr Pik 
Botha, Minister of External Affairs and Information, 
in addressing a National Party congress said that the 
government and the SABC hierarchy continually "consult 
each other" about news coverage and the choice of 
television programmes. This. incensed a number of 
political and media correspondents in the English language 
press and gave rise to a number of highly critical 
leading articles and political cartoons. James Mcclurg, 
respected media columnist of the Rand Daily Mail, writing 
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I 
in its sister publication The Cape Times, had this to 
say : 
" .•. How hollow in retrospect seem Sir 
John Reith's confident words when, in 
his report to the South African govern-
ment, he recommended that the SABC be 
set up as an autonomous public 
institution : 'It is obvious that free-
dom from public interference includes 
freedom from any sort of political 
influence, overt or hidden. It is 
almost inevitable that members have 
political opinions, but these will not 
be permitted to influence those in whom 
so serious a responsibility would be 
vested. They would not take advice, 
much less instructions, from the parties 
to which their political allegiance was 
given.' • Should the SABC treat 
politics and politicians with disdain? 
Certainly not; they are an important 
part of the real world which it is the 
corporation's duty to reflect. In this 
real world there is no reason why a 
political party, including the NP, should 
not make representations to the SABC 
where it feels, for instance, that it 
has not been fairly treated. But 
approaches from the government, as the 
executive arm of the state, are only 
permissible by way of exception and then 
under strict safeguards. 1151 
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Generally speaking, western democratic governments are 
reluctant to become openly involved in attempts to 
influence broadcasting policy for fear of violating 
constitution tenets regarding freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press. The communist world, on the 
other hand, has always recognised and encouraged the 
role of the media in propagating ideology. According 
to Stalin : 
"The press is the prime instrument 
through which the Party speaks daily, 
hourly, with the working class in its 
own indispensible language. No other 
means such as this for weaving spiritual 
ties between Party and class, no other 
tool so flexible, is to be found in 
52 
nature." 
Although Stalin was describing the press, how much more 
significant is his statement when applied to the 
electronic media. 
The Constitution of the USSR guarantees citizens free 
speech and a free press but a careful rereading of the 
introductory phrase shows that there is freedom of speech 
only for those who will use it to support the established 
order and not for those who wish to question its basic 
principles. The mass media are not to present 
uncensored information from a wide range of sources; 
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they are to play a positive role in developing the 
53 
socialist system • 
Throughout the socialist bloc, broadcasting is a state-
controlled monopoly. All eastern Europe follows the 
Soviet pattern, with programming responsibility assigned 
to broadcasting committees of actual or near ministerial 
status and with financial support derived mainly from 
public funds. Most systems have some advertising, 
although except in Yugoslavia such r venue is not a 
significant part of the total budget. Transmitting 
and connecting links are run by ministries of 
communications. Also involved are the government agencies 
concerned with education, culture, propaganda and censor-
ship. Always important is the Communist Party, although 
it is difficult to determine the exact relationship 
. 54 
between government, party and broadcasters • 
Critics of broadcasting in South Africa, and indeed 
media commentators in general, often point to an alleged 
degree of similarity between the South African and Soviet 
-systems. This similarity, whether it has come about 
by dictate of the peculiar circumstances of South Africa's 
social and economic evolution, or by political motivation, 
is, according to critics, possibly one of the strongest 
arguments in favour of granting the SABC a much greater 
degree of autonomy to carry out its mandate as an 
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impartial, public service corporation, dedicated to 
providing South Africans with the best possible broad-
casting service in terms of entertainment, information 
and education. It is also seen as a powerful argument 
for introducing a pluralistic broadcasting system in 
keeping with the best interests of a free enterprise 
society and the pursuit of democracy. 
The degree of government involvement or 'guidance' in 
broadcasting is therefore manifest d in censorship and 
the control of news. One aspect of this concerns the 
amount of exposure given to political opponents. 
was quite specific in his thinking : 
"Why should a government which is doing 
what it believes to be right allow 
itself to be criticised? It would not 
allow opposition by lethal weapons, 
and ideas are much more fatal than 
guns ... ss 
The Argus picks up this theme in an editorial on a 
programme about Soweto and the Baragwanath Hospital 
which serves its Black community 
" • One can only guess at the harm 
the SABC has done to South Africa in 
the way it prevents the whole truth 
from reach~ng its listeners and 
viewers. South Africa and its govern-
Lenin 
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ment always present a benign face to the 
world through SABC microphones and 
cameras. This is the corporation's 
intention. It believes it is being 
patriotic. It is a false patriotism. 
It deludes people, especially those to 
whom newspapers are not readily avail-
able, and it helps to produce an 
electorate unfit to choose a good 
government and to judge official 
policies • n56 
In similar vein, Gary Edwards, news editor of Capital 
Radio, the independent radio station broadcasting from 
Transkei, was alleged to have been critical of .what 
the .SABC regarded as news. He was also reported as 
disagreeing with its policy of 'sectionalising news 
on a racial basis'. Very little Soweto news, according 
to Edwards, ever got near White ears because of the 
SABC's policy of presenting 'White news for White ears• 57 • 
SABC monopoly in television broadcasting has inevitably 
led to a great deal of criticism concerning programme 
content in general. Stanley Uys expresses the feeling 
that bureaucracy has rendered the corporation immobile 
and insensitive to the need for change within South 
Africa : 
" ••• I cannot believe that the sheer 
awfulness of SATV is due to lack of 
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talent in the organisation (SABC). There 
can be only one explanation • • • that 
the heavy hand of officialdom stifles all 
imagination and enterprise • 
• • . If producers, editors, actors, 
cameramen and so forth are allowed to 
flex their talents, they will grow with 
the job and SATV will improve. But 
everything withers under the heavy hand 
of bureaucracy • . • 
• • . In many ways the problem is a 
political one. Respect for authority 
seeps through every crack in the crumbling 
SATV structure. It conditions all 
attitudes. It is bad enough when a 
minister is being interviewed. The 
interviewer practically comes in on his 
knees and, at the end, withdraws without 
turning his back on Authority. 
But even in panel discussions, there is 
no spontaneity, or humour, and very 
little information either. It is all 
so ponderous . . . 
• . . Surely, if Mr Botha is trying to 
open people's eyes, there is no quicker 
way to do it than through television. 
It's the easiest way, for example, to 
get a Black man into White.drawing-
rooms 
SATV in a sense symbolises much of 
what Mr Botha is trying to eradicate : 
the old, inflexible order which, haunted 
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by the spectres of the past, has locked 
- "58 itself in immobility • 
State broadcasting corporations, particularly where 
they enjoy a monopoly, are always open to severe 
criticism regarding propaganda and their alleged role 
as tools of government policy. When Mr Alf Widman, 
the chief opposition spokesman, moved an amendment, 
declining to pass the budget for the Post Off ice 
"unless the SABC introduced an unbiased news service 1159 , 
a fierce row erupted in the House of Assembly. The 
row intensified when Mr Dave Dalling, chief opposition 
spokesman on the media and Mr Brian Page, the chief 
spokesman for the New Republic Party said that the 
corporation was "nothing more than a propaganda arm 
of the National Party". Attacking Broederbond involve-
ment in the SABC, Mr Page said it was run "by the 
breeders, for the breeders". Mr Dalling, quoting from 
a recent book on the Broederbond, which had said that 
the organisation's aim had been the 'Afrikanerisation' 
of English speakers, said that this had been the policy 
of Dr P.J. Meyer (the then retiring Chairman of the 
SABC, now replaced by Professor W.L. Mouton). "He (Dr 
Meyer) had put the Broederbond ahead of South Africa. 1160 
In his reply to the debate Mr Smit said that : 
" ••• the claim that the SABC was no more 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
2-40 
than a tool of the NP was unsubstantiated. 
Opposition members gained a biased 
impression of what they had seen . 
. . • Opposition demands that TV programmes 
be dubbed and broadcast in the alternative 
language on FM was no more than a veiled 
attack on bilingualism" 
Mr Smit .said: 
"Less than 10 percent of the people inter-
viewed in an independent survey had 
indicated that they were dissatisfied 
with SABC news. Leaders in Africa who 
were opposed to the government in fact 
lauded the objectivity of SABC news • • " 61 
Stanley Uys criticises the SABC for what he sees as 
its lack of autonomy and its failure to reflect changes 
in society and the national mood : 
"SABC TV since its inception, has been 
under total political control. It is 
no more an autonomous body than my 
eye • 
It does not attempt to hold up 
a mirror of the world around it nor 
does it even pretend that it is its 
duty, fully and fearlessly, to reflect 
changes in society and in the national 
mood 
. 
• • • the SABC is controlled by a bunch 
of political heavies who not only do 
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what they think their political masters 
want them to do, but do so without any 
imagination or style . •· • SABC TV 
must stop presenting TV as a largely 
Whites-only medium in which, ponderously 
and boringly, the orthodoxies of a 
White-supremacist society, and the 
pieties of a heavily-censored society, 
are dished up as news and culture • • • 
• South Africa is not only a multi-
racial society, but a changing one, too, 
and if it is to change with the minimum 
of violence, the realities of life should 
be explained to the White public - and 
TV is a highly effective medium to do 
th . ..62 l. s • . . 
Mr Uys argues that an independent and representative 
board of SABC gov rnors should be appointed who would 
be autonomous and run the SABC without political inter-
63 f erence • 
Mr Ken French, one of South Africa's most respected 
film makers, commented on political interference with 
South African television when he noted the 'imbalance' 
between the English and Afrikaans services in terms 
of personnel, budgets and equipment : 
" • • It was common knowledge in the 
film industry • • • that there were 
astronomical imbalances between English 
and Afrikaans service budgets and that 
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the best crews were to be found in the 
Afrikaans service • 1164 
French described these and other features about SATV 
as "ominous and part of the total design". He is 
reported as being convinced that SATV would be more 
adventurous if viewers had a choice of channels 65 . 
The repeated criticisms that the SABC does not reflect 
South African life and that it has failed to achieve 
autonomy from political influence, have resulted in 
demands, particularly from English speakers and the 
official opposition, for top management of the 
corporation to change and for new thinking to be applied 
to broadcasting. When a BBC commission was called 
on to assist in setting up Zimbabwe's revised broadcast-
ing system after independence, it found that p:rogranmes and 
editorial decisions were subject to political consider-
ations. For example, radio and television tried to 
give Whites the impression that they were winning the 
war as the situation, in fact, deteriorated. A member 
I -
of Mr Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front 1, Party claimed that Whites 
I 
were deceived by their own propaganda. The result 
was that the governments of Mr Smith and Bishop 
Muzorewa had no idea that Mr Robert Mugabe enjoyed 
majority support in the country66 • The Argus at the 
same time took the view in an editorial that : 
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"There is a lesson here for South Africa. 
Many of Mr P.W. Botha's difficulties in 
getting his more conservative countrymen 
to accept the need for change probably 
stem from the fact that the SABC does 
little to tell the real story of what is 
happening in South Africa." 67 
The 1980 Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media 
provided an excellent opportunity for South African 
broadcasting to be examined in the light of the 
commission's terms of reference : 
'to inquire into and report on the question 
whether the conduct of, and the handling 
of matters by the mass media meet the 
needs and interests of the South African 
community and the demands of the times, 
and if not, how they can be improved 168 • 
However, this examination of the mass media has been 
interpreted by the newspapers, particularly the English 
press, as a new move to curb the influence of the press. 
The president of the Newspaper Press Union of South 
Africa (NPU), Mr R.W.J. Opperman, said the NPU could 
not understand why the government had appointed a 
commission of inquiry into the mass media and objected 
to its establishment. Its terms of reference he said had 
already been largely covered by the Cillie Commission 
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which investigated the unrest throughout the country 
in 1976 and the manner in which the media dealt with 
it, and by the first Steyn Commission which investigated 
the reporting of defence and police matters in the 
press. He also considered the sam: ground had been covered, to a 
large extent, by the Rabie Commission which was reviewing 
. t 1 . 1 t. 69 secur1 y eg1s a ion • 
Very little coverage was given to a wider interpretation 
of the media commission's terms of reference and the 
possible ramifications for broadcasting in South Africa 
were largely ignored by the press in their speculation 
and suspicions of government intentions. 
It is to be expected that the press formed the main 
focus of the inquiry as it was, and will continue to 
be for some time, the major source of information for 
most South Africans. But it was a cause for regret 
that the electronic media, particularly television were 
not treated with the importance they deserved in an 
investigation of this nature. The Commission of 
Inquiry would have been more representative of the 
interests of all South Africans if it : 
- had explored the inherent dangers of broadcasting 
monopoly; 
- had investigated more fully the accusations of 
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political bias and the propagation qf political 
ideology; 
- had examined the possibility of private enterprise 
offering an alternative, competitive television 
. 70 
service 
By and large, the South African press seems aware of 
its responsibilities and jealously guards its freedom, 
so it was understandable that in the prevailing 
political climate any new commission of inquiry would 
be seen as a threat. Whatever is said about the 
political views of newspapers, they are the product 
of private enterprise and the public is free to choose 
between them or ignore them. However, when it comes 
to broadcasting, the South African public is not free 
to choose. There are no alternatives to state mono-
poly and all broadcasting is entirely financed by the 
taxpayer. This being so, The Argus makes the point 
that : 
" ••• there is cause for deep public 
concern when a former SABC television 
producer, Mr Kevin Har~is, tells the 
Steyn Commission under oath that the 
National Party and the Broederbond have 
a stranglehold on the country's broad-
71 
casting services" 
Adding : 
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"The commission should probe his charges 
72 
expeditiously and thoroughly" . 
) 
It is worth recording that even though the protests 
tended to be loudest from the English language press 
concerning what they regarded as 'yet another inquiry 
into the press', the Afrikaans newspapers also spoke 
out against any potential erosion of their freedom. 
Mr Ton Vosloo, editor of Beeld, saw the Steyn Commission 
as a chance to free the press from present legal 
restrictions. In evidence before the commission, he 
said : 
"The freedom of speech as embodied in a 
free Press should be entrenched by 
Parliament • there should be a 
diversity in the media and in media 
ownership 
The electronic media, such as radio 
and TV, should also not be the sole 
possession of the State, but should 
be gradually disconnected. 1173 
Mr Vosloo urged that the powers of the present Press 
Council be extended to initiate investigations into 
contraventions of the Press code 74 • 
In discussing the broad principles of democracy and 
responsible broadcasting, the peculiarities of the 
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South African political climate and the heterogeneous 
nature of its population cannot be ignored. The country's 
history is also of paramount importance, particularly 
with regard to systems of government. It seems difficult 
to imagine a form of government based on the British 
parliamentary system that results in such unremitting 
conflict with such a large section of the press. South 
Africa does enjoy a free press, but nevertheless the 
complexities of the situation tend to increase press 
anxiety that press freedom could be a transient state. 
All governments have the power and indeed the duty to 
sanction the worst excesses of an irresponsible press, 
but perhaps nowhere else in the western world does the 
threat to press freedom appear so menacing or continually 
imminent. This conflict and threat situation, must 
be due, in part, to South Africa's history and 
h 1 t . h 75 . d' . eterogeneous popu a ion. Vatc er r1n 1scuss1ng 
systems of government, highlights the problem when he 
says : 
"Successful responsible cabinet govern-
ment assumes the existence of a 
relatively homogeneous population 
sharing similar values, a situation not 
found in South Africa. Moreover, the 
British system of government assumes 
that those who participate in it 
understand and accept its rules • 
• • • The system of government in the 
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old Boer republics was quite different, 
and much more authoritarian. Before 
Union, the British system worked well 
in Natal and the Cape under such 
stalwarts as Rhodes, Schreiner and 
Merriman because they understood and 
accepted its rules. The same might 
be said of the Union under Botha, Smuts 
and the coalitions of Hertzog, although 
the system was perhaps less satisfactory. 
But the British type of parliamentary 
government has always been repugnant to 
extremists such as Malan, Strijdom, and 
Verwoerd, both because it was British 
and because it was not in harmony with 
their aims or their philosophy of 
government. In the British system each 
political party accepts the structure, 
but differs in terms of conduct and 
ideology within the structure. In South 
Africa, parties tend to reflect racial, 
religious and cultural differences 
rather than philosophical ones, and are 
the more keenly felt ••• n76 
The evolution of broadcasting along more democratic 
fines and particularly innovations such as the emergence 
of pluralistic broadcasting systems originating in the 
private sector, are inextricably bound up with the 
Afrikaner's assessment of his culture's survival. In 
a speech to an American audience at the Houston World 
Trade Center, in October 1981, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Mr Chris Heunis said : 
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"Only reactionaries still believed the 
Afrikaner could survive through political 
protectionism or military might • • • the 
Afrikaner had come of age - and that this 
heralded a beautiful new dispensation for 
all of us •.. now approaching fast" 77 • 
Emphasising that the status quo in South Africa could 
not and should not be maintained, Mr Heunis said : 
" •.. the Afrikaner no longer needed a 
laager to protect him . . • It was true 
that the Afrikaner had long relied on 
'protectionist' policies, but he could 
now assert himself without special treat-
78 
ment from the government" • 
Paulu divides broadcasting systems into two categories 
those in which broadcasting and government are closely 
related and those in which they are not. In the former 
case, since the government usually provides the funding 
and often controls the output, broadcasting is apt to 
become a government mouthpiece. From the democratic 
point of view, this is undesirable, for which reason 
those western countries with close government-broadcaster 
relationships make great efforts to ensure the freedom 
of the media. The United Kingdom has been outstandingly 
successful in this respect. The United States, facing 
this problem for the first time in funding public broad-
casting, is having great difficulty working out a 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
2-50 
satisfactory solution. In the socialist countries, 
of course, closeness of media and government is considered 
79 
an advantage . 
South Africa, in a sense, is at a cross-roads. If, 
as Mr Heunis indicates, there is to be a "new beautiful 
dispensation" to include all South Africans, then broad-
casting's role in the pursuit of democracy will need 
to be reviewed. The SABC should actively seek, and 
be granted, a degree of automony beyond reasonable doubt 
and the unnatural constraints on the development of 
the medium of television should be removed by active 
government encouragement for a pluralistic system 
permitting the participation of the private sector in 
television broadcasting, with due regard for the social 
responsibilities inherent in all mass media. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BROADCASTING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Proposals concerning the future of television broadcast-
ing in South Africa cannot be made, or would certainly 
not be credible without evidence of an historical 
perspective comprising the origins, special circumstances 
and subsequent development of broadcasting and its 
impact on the complex and heterogeneous South African 
society. 
In formulating this chapter, the writer is indebted 
to the excellent reference by Peter B. Orlik entitled 
The South African Broadcasting Corporation : An Historical 
Survey and Contemporary Analysis. This dissertation 
was submitted to the Office for Graduate Studies, Graduate 
Division of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, 
USA in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1968. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution 
Dr Orlik's work has made to recording the fascinating 
early history of the SABC and to facilitating further 
research. 
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3.1 RADIO'S IMPRESSIVE ACHIEVEMENTS 
In 1897 Edward Jennings, a Port Elizabeth Post Office 
engineer, claimed to have "invented wireless telegraphy 
independently of Marconi, but to have.received no 
encouragement 111 
Later during the South African war the Boers imported 
wireless telegraphy sets from Germany for use against 
the British, but it is generally considered that they 
proved of little practical value to either side at the 
t . 2 ime • 
It was not really until the end of the First World War 
! 
that new technology ushered in the origins of wireless 
telephony or 'radio' in South Africa. 
The government recognised the popularity of the new 
medium and its future potential and in August 1923 issued 
regulations to ensure that progress would be orderly. 
The Postmaster-General was given the power to grant 
licences for the establishment of radio transmitters 
as well as for .the ownership of receiving sets by members 
of the public. Listeners were required to contract 
with the licensed broadcaster in their area and to pay 
him standard 'prescribed charges' for his service in 
addition to the five shillings per annum paid directly 
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to the Post Office in order to obtain a listener's 
1 . 3 1cence • The regulations also granted the broadcaster 
certain rights which included the right to "hire out 
receiving sets", the previously mentioned right to 
contract with listeners in the providing of service, 
and the right to "make contracts with advertisers to 
disseminate advertising matter for not more than six 
minutes in any hour" 4 • 
In ?rder to raise funds for South Africa's participation 
in the Empire Show at Wembley in England, it was decided 
at the end of 1923 to broadcast a series of concerts. 
A broadcasting corrimittee was formed from South African 
Railways personnel and a temporary broadcasting station 
was set up in Johannesburg's Railway Head Office5 • The 
broadcast began with Prime Minister Smuts addressing 
the nation from a Pretoria military hospital via a special 
telephone hook-up. The occasion was described in the 
press as a "broadcasting triumph". Enthusiastic 
listeners reported good reception at distances of up 
to 1 000 miles but, as engineers were subsequently to 
discover, many of these listeners had allowed their 
enthusiasm to grossly colour their perception6 • 
The success of the Railway experiment led to the decision 
for the Associated Scientific and Technical Societies, 
ASTS, to take over responsibility for broadcasting. 
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The facility was moved to new premises on the roof of 
Stuttaford's Building on Prichard Street. July 1, 
1924 marked the beginning of regular broadcasting from 
Johannesburg7 . 
Sir David de Villiers Graaff, a leading citizen and 
Member of Parliament, was keen to ensure that Cape Town, 
too, would enjoy the benefits of radio. He offered 
to donate funds for a transmitter and studio. The 
city fathers at first declined the offer but finally 
relented when the Publicity Association came out in 
support of the scheme, as they saw in radio the means 
of extending the audience for its orchestra. Cape 
Town went on the air on September 15, 1924 at a cost 
to Sir David of £6 000 8 • 
Durban was soon to follow the lead of Johannesburg and 
Cape Town and began regular broadcasts from December 
10, 1924, establishing the broadcasting 'triangle' which 
was to be considered the prime route for South Africa's 
programme origination and distribution for so many years 
to come 9 • 
As public interest in the new medium grew, more and 
more receiving sets were purchased. An accompanying 
problem with the growth in listeners was the refusal 
of many listeners or set owners to pay their licence 
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fees. The broadcasters had petitioned the Postmaster-
General to assume responsibility for collection of 
licence revenue. The petition was successful but the 
subsequent efforts of the Postmaster-General's depart-
ment were no more productive than those of the broad-
casters themselves10 . 
Indeed by the middle of 1926, listener 'negligence' 
in the payment of licence fees had reached such 
proportions that the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 
felt compelled to push through Parliament a new and 
stronger Radio Act. Through the Act, the Minister 
acquired absolute control over radio transmission and 
reception and could fix licence fees for both stations 
and receivers as he saw fit. The Act also included 
severe penalties for certain infringements of 
regulations. Failure to procure a listener's licence 
was punishable by the confiscation of the set and a 
fine of up to five pounds11 • 
In spite of the new legislation and numerous prosecutions 
listeners were still reluctant to purchase licences. 
At the time the Johannesburg station executives stated 
that half of the 9 000 known radio set owners in that 
city had not bothered to purchase a licence. As a 
result, the station was forced to close down in January 
192712 • 
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When the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce petitioned 
the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs requesting that 
assurances be provided to any private organisation which 
might be interested in taking over the defunct broad-
casting operation that the government would strictly 
enforce payment of licence fees and vigorously prosecute 
non-payers, the Minister, Mr Madeley replied in a 
telegram indicating that the government was thinking 
along quite different (and very significant) lines. 
The reply reads : 
" ••• The general tendency in broadcasting 
is increasingly in the direction of public 
control. A private profit-making control 
would be a retrogressive step. I cannot 
therefore agree to sanction the transfer 
~f the (broadcasting station's) Licence 1113 • 
The government's intentions regarding state controlled 
broadcasting were however, reconsidered when one of 
South Africa's most powerful business interests, the 
Schlesinger organisation, offered to assume the 
liabilities of the existing stations. Schlesinger 
operated the largest chain of cinemas in the Union. 
The organisation's combined financial strength and strong 
entertainment industry links persuaded the government 
that commercial broadcasting although not what it 
intended was better than bankrupt broadcasting. 
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A ten-year broadcasting licence was subsequently issued 
to Schlesinger for his "African Broadcasting Company" 
and formal control of the Johannesburg station became 
effective in April, 1927. This was followed shortly 
by the Cape Town operation and by the end of the year 
Durban was also part of ABc14 . 
Although the ABC drew heavily on its 'entertainment' 
experience in its programming, it soon faced serious 
financial problems. The number of listener's licences 
~ose to a mere 15 630 in 192815 • In spite of the 
installation of larger transmitters in the major 
population centres and the construction of additional 
relay stations throughout the country, the vast distances 
and the primitive technology of most home receivers 
resulted in poor reception for many16 
In 1929 ABC shareholders were enraged when, after three 
years of no dividends, the company declared a loss of 
£15 000 for the year. An application for a government 
subsidy was turned down17 • 
During the following year, however, ABC, through a subtle 
marketing ruse, was highly successful in increasing 
its number of listeners and thereby improving its 
revenue position. The company conferred its statutory 
right to sell radios to those trade dealers who agreed 
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to issue a 'Blue Free Voucher' with every set. sold. 
The voucher supposedly entitled the purchaser to a free 
radio licence for a year. In fact the licence was 
not of course free as the licence fee had merely been 
added to the price of the set. The scheme had another 
marketing benefit not only did ABC obtain their 
'licence' revenue but also had a record of purchasers' 
names and addresses for 'reminder' purposes should they 
'forget' to renew their licences18 . 
The results of this ploy were impressive by any 
·standards. In 1931 the number of current listener's 
licences increased by over 9 000 with a ·further increase 
of 14 000 in 1932. This fresh injection of capital 
enabled ABC to install 10-kilowatt transmitters at 
Cape Town, Grahamstown and Pietermaritzburg as well 
to improve the quality of programming. Improved 
programming had, in itself, a dramatic effect on listener 
response and in 1933 53 670 .licences were issued. 
19 This figure increased to 73 704 in the next twelve months • 
The ABC had finally arrived as a successful business 
venture. 
In spite of the ABC's success, there existed a great 
deal of dissatisfaction among Afrikaners in that the 
service catered almost exclusively to the urban and 
largely English speaking population of a few large cities, 
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virtually ignoring the large number of Afrikaners living 
in rural areas and small towns. Even when the Afrikaner 
found himself within range of the transmission signal, 
he was forced to listen, for the most part, to broadcasts 
in the English language. The Afrikaans language was 
relegated to a token one hour per week from Johannesburg 
and Cape Town. This was clearly a situation that could 
not be tolerated indefinitely20 . 
The government, too, not unnaturally, was concerned 
with the deprivation of Afrikaners and to some extent 
with the profit-seeking motivation of the ABC. For 
these and other reasons, the Hertzog government decided 
on a complete review of the now established medium of 
broadcasting. This review was timely as the ABC's 
10-year licence was soon due to expire. As a result, 
the Postmaster-General was sent to England with the 
brief of studying BBC operations. Based on his 
subsequent report, Prime Minister Hertzog invited BBC 
Director-General Sir John Reith to come to the Union 
and "look over the situation in this country respecting 
broadcasting and have conversations with my government 
as to policy for its future development1121 • Sir John -
accepted this invitation and early in 1935 spent six 
weeks in South Africa before presenting his findings. 
Reith's contribution to broadcasting is well recognised. 
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Many consider his continued striving after the highest 
moral and intellectual standards in programming to be 
puritanical. In his view, nothing in the entire 
history of civilisation could compare with the effective-
ness of broadcasting as a means of information, while 
the speed of its development was greater even than that 
of printing in past centuries. 
He frowned on commercialism on the air 
"Broadcasting is something sui generis 
- unique; and among the things it 
does not need is ••• pushing of one's 
wares or ideas, which is a fundamental 
mistake (or misbehaviour) of irrespons-
ible small proprietors or large 
propagandist organisations, governments 
included • • • A conscious social 
purpose • • • should be given to the 
exploitation of the medium. The 
stewardship will be judged in terms, 
not only of the contentment of the 
community, but of its responsibility 
and of its intellectual and ethical 
standards. 1122 
The Reith Report released in March, 1~35, stated that 
no serious attempt had been made to plan for national 
coverage and that the objective of any new corporation 
should be to cover the country as completely as possible. 
Reith realised, however, that this service must be 
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extended gradually since reception conditions in South 
Africa were "difficult". To remedy this situation, 
he recommended a greatly expanded system of telephone 
relay lines and the setting up of a system of regional 
headquarters as well as a co-ordinating national head-
quarters. A short-wave receiving station should also 
be erected, he felt, in order that special events from 
other countries could be reliably relayed to South 
African listeners 23 • 
Though praising the ABC's achievements, Sir John advanced 
the opinion that the service could be immensely improved. 
He advocated a state-contr lled system since it was 
felt that no commercial company, in search of profits, 
could be expected to provide truly comprehensive 
programmes or to reduce listener's licence fees to a 
point which would make broadcasting available to the 
great majority of the populace. 
Reith stressed that, even though state-controlled, any 
new corporation must be free from governmental or 
political interference. Thus, he suggested that a 
corporation be created by statute and that the Postmaster-
General should grant it a licence. Policy was to be 
supervised by the Governor-General-in-Council rather 
than by any one Minister while the Postmaster-General 
would oversee technical operations. Sir John predicted 
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that such a division of authority would secure greater 
public support than if the Corporation was to be made 
the tool of a single department. The Governor-General 
would appoint the first Board of the Corporation and 
these six or seven members should ultimately come to 
have total responsibility vested in them24 (See also 
Chapter 9, Section 9.2, for reference to Reith's influence 
on British broadcasting.) 
An important recommendation from Sir John was that 
regional presentations be proportioned between the 
Afrikaans' and English languages "as ••• circumstances 
warranted". He also expressed the hope that an advisory 
committee for school broadcasting could be formed since 
"broadcasting is the royal road to enlightenment and 
responsibility1125 . This meant that broadcasts "for 
the natives" were to be encouraged and, since few of 
them could afford receivers, Reith suggested that the 
government set up radio sets at trading stores and 
missions where the "natives" could gather to listen26 • 
Reith's Report on Broadcasting Policy and Development 
had considerable impact and on March 25, 1935, the 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, C.F. Clarkson, announced 
that the government intended to adopt Sir John's proposals 
and the enabling legislation would be introduced at 
the next Parliamentary session. 'tribute was paid to 
the Schlesinger organisation for "having shown the 
greatest public spirit" but at the same time it was 
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announced that the ABC's licences would not be renewed 
upon their March 1937 expiration dates 27 • 
Mr Clarkson said that because broadcasting had become 
so integral a part of the citizens' lives, the govern-
ment was now compelled to recognise its responsibilities 
in the matter. Broadcasting in South Africa should 
follow the lead of systems in most other countries and 
be placed under the ownership of the public in whose 
interests it existed28 • 
The Bill became Act No. 22 of 1936, a piece of legislation 
which resembled in many respects the ideas, ideals and 
conditions of the BBC Charter29 • In addition to the 
nine-member Board of Governors, the so-called "Broadcast 
Act" also provided for the appointment of local councils 
at Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, Grahamstown, 
Durban and Pietermaritzburg to advise the Governors 
on matters connected with the broadcasting service. 
The new Corporation was empowered to issue stock or 
debentures with a 6 percent annual interest rate in 
order to finance acquisitions of the ABC's assets and 
was given the authority, pending approval of the Minister 
of Posts and Telegraphs, to set listener licence fees 30 • 
Thus, on August 1, 1936, the African Broadcasting 
Company was officially dissolved in favour of the new 
/ 
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South African Broadcasting Corporation. Drastic changes 
in the Union's broadcasting were not expected and it 
was felt the most pressing task was to tactfully initiate 
the "fifty-fifty policy in relation to the use of the 
Afrikaans and English languages" 31 . 
Because there were insufficient funds to establish 
separate Afrikaans and English services, an attempt 
was made for the existing service to become bilingual 
by alternating programme announcements in English and 
Afrikaans. This proved intensely irritating to 
listeners and it was therefore decided, after much 
deliberation, to retain English as the sole language 
of the existing service while constructing at least 
a temporary system to serve the needs of the Afrikaans 
speaking population. This temporary expedient was 
achieved by hiring two short-wave transmitters. As 
the bulk of Afrikaans speakers lived outside the range 
of the established AM transmitters in the cities, they 
were accustomed and equipped to benefit from short-
wave broadcasting32 • 
The first complete Afrikaans transmission was broadcast 
from Cape Town on October 25, 1937, with Johannesburg 
following with a similar service on December i 33 • 
In 1938, in remernberance of the Great Trek, which had 
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taken place 100 years earlier, the SABC broadcast stages 
during the four month re-enactment. Naturally, a great 
deal of Afrikaner interest was created and this one 
event probably did more to make Afrikaners radio-conscious 
than anything else 34 . 
It was not long before broadcasting and politics were 
being discussed. On September 21, 1938, Mr W.B. Madeley, 
the former Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, suggested 
that Parliamentary proceedings should be broadcast. 
He argued that this practice was working well in New 
Zealand and that it would protect the South African 
public from the "garbled reports found in the press". 
Replying, Mr F.C. Erasmus, the Nationalist member, 
stated that in his opinion the best practice was to 
keep radio completely out of politics and he used the 
occasion to criticise the SABC for allowing the Minister 
of Finance (a member of the United Party) to broadcast 
a budget message. Mr Erasmus complained that such 
a broadcast could not do otherwise but represent the 
Minister's Government and Party in a favourable light 
and therefore constituted Party politics. Attempting 
to arbitrate, Mr Clarkson, the current Minister of Posts 
and Telegraphs, explained that the abbreviated budget 
report had been broadcast only because of the tremendous 
public interest in it. He suggested that if the 
Opposition cared to make a reply or recommendation he 
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would be glad to submit it to the SABC Board of Governors 
since this body was taking scrupulous care to keep Party 
propaganda out of broadcasting35 . 
Dissatisfaction simmered however, and on February 7, 
1939, Dr P.J. van Nierop rose to complain about the 
"political statements and speeches of British states-
men" which the SABC was broadcasting from time to time. 
He asked if similar exposure was being given to South 
African statesmen. Mr Clarkson r plied that these 
broadcasts were often necessary because of their 
"intrinsic international importance". Statements by 
leaders of other nations were also broadcast, but due 
to language barriers these were translated in summarised 
form. Pronouncements by "domestic politicians" were, 
on the other hand, largely vehicles of local and 
partisan interest and broadcasting of these w9uld inject 
an element of Party propaganda which the SABC Board 
of Governors, who after all make policy, sought to 
avoid36 • 
Soon after this, politics sparked off another controversy, 
this time within the ranks of the SABC's staff where 
allegations of "disaffection and insubordination" prompted 
the Board of Governors to appoint an investigatory 
committee. Its findings confirmed that due to intense 
opposition to United Party rule, a minority of staff 
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had been lax in carrying out their duties and had 
improperly expressed opinions about the political 
content of certain items broadcast. Specifically, 
Afrikaans speaking announcers claimed that their read-
ing of Government statements was distasteful to them 
and prejudicial to their future. 
As a result, the Governors engaged "special announcers" 
to present the statements so that listeners could easily 
distinguish such announcements from normal programming. 
But the Board also made it clear that each member of 
the "reorganised" staff would be required to sign a 
loyalty oath to the Corporation "and to its avowed 
object of fully co-operating with the Government and 
giving it every assistance 1137 . 
From incidents like these and others it was hardly 
surprising that Afrikaner resentment flourished. The 
SABC's Afrikaans service was a very poor relation to 
its English counterpart. Although AM transmitters 
had been added to complement the work of the two hired 
short-wave units serving Afrikaans speakers, there was 
no comparison in terms of quantity and quality with 
English service facilities. The situation was further 
aggravated in the minds of Afrikaners by the completion 
of the impressive receiving station at Panorama near 
Johannesburg, which enabled the SABC to relay even more 
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BBC material to South African listeners. Panorama 
was to serve South Africa well, however, monitoring 
Allied and Axis broadcasts throughout the War, gathering 
valuable intelligence and acting as a listening post 
for the entire country38 • 
The War caused many more Afrikaners to move to the 
cities in search of the increasing numbers of industrial 
jobs, bringing with it increased demand for more medium-
wave (AM) Afrikaans stations. However, due to the 
War effort and other priorities, the SABC's planned 
development was severely inhibited. Even so, some 
programme advances were initiated. For example, in 
1940 what was eventually to become Radio Bantu began 
a fifteen minute daily broadcast in Xhosa. Additional 
news programmes and personal messages from South 
African servicemen and new entertainment programmes 
filled out the programme schedules. Prime Minister 
Smuts used the Corporation's facilities to inform and 
rally the people to a cause unpopular with many of them. 
He used the radio as a recruiting vehicle for the South 
African Army which had suffered heavy losses at Tobruk39• 
(There was no conscription in the Union due to intense 
Afrikaner opposition to fighting a war on the side of 
the British~) The SABC, in its turn, released for 
duty scores of employees who volunteered for service. 
The departure of the largely English speaking volunteers 
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had the effect, according to Orlik40 , of further 
polarising the two groups of SABC staff : 
"Although no one liked to admit or talk 
about it, there was very close to the 
surf ace antagonism between Afrikaans 
and English and a definite belligerence 
on the part of the Afrikaans speaking 
group, engendered by a so-called 
inferiority complex. The English speak-
ing section (rather stupidly condescend-
ing at times) blandly ignored the 
situation but gra~ually key administrative 
posts were filled by Afrikaans speaking 
\ , 
and/or sympathetic individuals. It 
should be remembered that the Smuts 
Government during the War contained many 
Afrikaners and that there was a strong 
dedicated anti-British group which openly 
supported Hitler and Fascism . And 
although Smuts and his friends almost by 
sheer personality persuaded most 
Afrikaners that their prosperity lay with 
Britain and her Allies, they still hated 
England and very carefully prepared for 
the time when they could, with advantage 
break away. So that while almost all 
English speaking people innocently stood 
by, the ground was thoroughly prepared 
for an Afrikaner take-over in broadcast-
• 11 41 ing. 
The Nationalist Party's continued refusal to support 
the Allied cause led to a great deal of ill-feeling 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
3-20 
among those South Africans (largely English speaking) 
who had friends or relatives in the services. Some 
of this ill-feeling found an outlet in the clandestine 
"Freedom Radio" whose one-hour evening transmissions 
42 
attacked the Nationalist opponents of the War • 
With the growing antagonism between English and Afrikaans 
speakers within the government and the SABC being fanned 
by the clandestine Freedom Radio, it was decided that 
all candidates in the 1943 general lection would be 
excluded from making appeals to voters over SABC radio. 
German's Zeesen Radio quickly exploited this opportunity 
with its blatantly pro-Nationalist broadcasts. The 
voice for these broadcasts was Erich Holm, a citizen 
of the Union who came to be known as South Africa's 
Lord Haw-Haw. Operating with the assistance of nearly 
flawless intelligence, Holm was able to comment on the 
movements of South African troopships within 24 hours 
of their sailing and detailed files of military docu-
ments, allegedly relayed by sympathetic Nationalists 
were found in the Berlin Foreign Office at the War's 
t . t" 43 ermina ion • 
With the end of the War, the SABC tried to pursue its 
earlier objectives particularly in regard to upgrading 
the Afrikaans service. However, the badly needed new 
equipment was either unobtainable, or prohibitively 
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priced, added to which was the fact that the English 
Service's equipment and transmitters were inadequate 
to cope with interference problems created by the, growth 
of industrial development during the War years. It 
soon became apparent that the SABC would need an 
injection of new capital if it was to fulfil its 
obligations. 
In 1946, with the Corporation under extreme pressure 
caused by rising costs and the enormous task ahead, 
the then Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Mr J.W. 
Mushet, raised the subject of commercial broadcasting. 
He revealed that there had been numerous requests for 
commercial broadcasting licences and admitted that the 
large profits which commercial radio might well provide 
would be a tremendous asset to a corporation plagued 
for a decade by a shortage of funds. Any commercial 
system would ultimately be controlled by the government, 
Mr Mushet hastened to add, since, as in New Zealand, 
such control would promote a higher standard of broad-
casting 44. 
The SABC then began researching various commercial 
systems in operation around the world. Despite some 
discouraging feedback, the SABC, by the end of 1946, 
had come to realise that non-commercial radio in South 
Africa had served to limit the numbers of listeners 
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due to the relatively feeble entertainment which it 
offered and the high listener licence fee which was 
necessary to support it. Thus, firm plans were laid 
for five AM transmitters which were to radiate commercial 
broadcasting by 1948. Located in Johannesburg, Cape 
Town, Durban, Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth, the trans-
mitters were to constitute a completely separate service 
each having an effective range of approximately one 
hundred miles 45 • 
The construction of the commercial service ran into 
technical and financial difficulties and by 1948 the 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs had to reaffirm that 
the plan was still being implemented46 • Work had been 
proceeding in order to meet previous commitments to 
the other services and it was decided to equip every 
existing AM station with triple transmitter banks so 
that each could radiate all three services. Through 
this revised plan, SABC engineers were able to order 
and install the new Afrikaans Service equipment at the 
same time as that which was to carry the commercial 
service. Provision was also made for new buildings, 
studios, and high-capacity landlines and by the 
beginning of 1949 the Corporation's twenty-one transmitters 
were each broadcasting an average of 98 hours per week, 
with initiation of the commercial service on a nation-
wide basis planned for the following year 47 
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Springbok Radio, the name chosen for the new commercial 
service, went on the air on May 1, 1950, after four 
years of delay. Yet it too, even though its format 
favoured entertainment, became involved in the 
continuing socio-economic power struggle. Most of 
Springbok Radio's advertising came from the over-
whelmingly English speaking business sector and this, 
in the eyes of its critics, made it more English in 
character. The Afrikaner press accused the new 
station of exposing Afrikaners to blasts of 'foreign' 
influence in their homes 51 • 
The English language press was also hostile to Springbok 
Radio as it viewed the station as an unwanted competitor 
for advertising. This fear was short-lived, however, 
for the English press soon found that in South Africa, 
as in other countries, commercial broadcasting helped 
to stimulate advertising in other media as well as 
providing for itself. Before long, according to Roos, 
the only charge that the English press and the English 
business community could level at Springbok Radio was 
its lack of sufficient time to meet the demands of 
advertisers 52 • It is interesting to note that this 
same charge is now being made today against the SABC's 
commercial television services. 
A new network of high-fidelity landlines enabled 
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Springbok Radio to reach the regional transmitters and 
these same lines permitted integration of the other 
two services on a national level, with Johannesburg 
being the production centre. 
On July 22, 1952, the SABC inaugurated a special 16-
hour 're-diffusion' service for the Blacks of Orlando 
Township near Johannesburg. The system consisted of 
a series of loudspeakers receiving programmes from the 
SABC in Johannesburg. About two-thirds of this material 
was presented in the African languages, having been 
prepared by Black employees of the Corporation. The 
immense popularity of the system soon prompted its 
extension to other townships 53 . 
Having no sooner adopted this new programme policy in 
relation to the Bantu, the Board of Governors was 
suddenly faced with the task of reviewing old programme 
policy in relation to political broadcasting. The 
proximity and importance of the 1953 general election 
had once again raised this controversial issue. After 
numerous discussions with the major political parties, 
the SABC Governors decided that, as an experiment, radio 
would be allowed to carry partisan appeals to the people 
during the course of the 1953 campaign. The government 
and opposition were each allocated eleven quarter-hour 
periods with one additional period to follow the voting. 
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Both the English and Afrikaans services carried the 
presentations. 
Ultimately, it was the Nationalists who seemed to benefit 
most by the plan, since their speakers, all of whom 
were cabinet ministers, clearly demonstrated their 
superior bilingualism. 
This proved disasterous for the United Party, since 
it appeared to confirm the Nationalist stereotype of 
the English speaking as predominantly unilingual, a 
serious handicap in a country which is 70 percent 
bilingual, and amongst Nationalist Afrikaners who had, 
according to Orlik, an almost fanatical feel.ing of 
devotion to their language. 
As a result of the elections, the Nationalists greatly 
increased their parliamentary majority and, though there 
can be no precise estimate of the contribution of the 
broadcasts to the government's victory, it can be 
concluded that South Africa's radio speeches of 1953, 
like the American television debates of 1960, were 
in Orlik's words "more bane than boon" for the losing side54 • 
Even so, radio still had a long way to go before an 
adequate service was provided for all South Africans. 
The large short-wave facility under construction at 
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Paradys, near Bloemfontein, expected to extend coverage 
throughout the interior even though the signal quality 
would be poor. 
SABC engineers knew that the Paradys facility brought 
an end to further expansion of domestic AM or short-
wave services due to a lack of spectrum space. Any 
future developments would have to use the FM (frequency 
55 
modulation) systems • However, financial and techno-
logical factors prevented any such development during 
the 1950's. 
By 1957 fifty-two transmitters with a total output of 
352 kilowatts were radiating AM and short-wave signals 
to all parts of the country. Programmes for the Blacks 
were also becoming more important with a separate Bantu 
Service being established to administer the "rediffusion" 
system. By 1958 this service was piped into 11 910 
Bantu homes for sixteen hours a day. Limited to the 
immediate Johannesburg townships, the SABC impatiently 
looked forward to the day when the majority of Bantu 
could be exposed to over-the-air broadcasting56 • 
This opportunity came sooner than expected for, with 
the accelerated development of transistors, it became 
apparent to SABC engineers that a low cost portable 
receiver was now within the reach of not only rural 
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Whites, but even the Bantu in the non-electrified 
reserves. 
The potential for FM broadcasting development opened 
up by the transistor set meant that new technical data 
would be required on network planning. Senior SABC 
engineering staff visited broadcasting organisations 
in West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the SABC had 
applied to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
for spectrum space allocations for FM sound broadcasting 
in the Union and South West Africa57 • 
After successful field tests, the SABC allocated funds 
to begin construction of the first of the new FM stations 
in December, 1960. 
Thus, after seven years of relative stagnation, the 
SABC was now ready for a period of unprecedented 
expansion. At the beginning of 1960, the Corporation 
was operating thirteen domestic stations - only one 
more than in 1953, and the number of programme hours 
per week had increased from 333 to 364 in that same 
seven-year period. The impending introduction of an 
FM network promised to radically alter the situation 
and it was pointed out that, while the capitalised 
~ture for all the Corporation's studios, transmitting 
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stations and general equipment stood at just over £4 
million by the end of 19601 the projected FM network 
h f . 58 alone was expected to cost three times t is igure • 
In preparation for its role in FM broadcasting, Radio 
Bantu too, took the first step in its planned expansion 
when it was officially inaugurated on June 1, 1960. 
Special half-hour morning broadcasts for the Bantu were 
now extended to all regions of the country over the 
English and Afrikaans services, thereby increasing total 
time allotted to Bantu programmes to six hours per 
59 day • The programmes were broadcast in the language 
of the prominent Bantu groups in each region and these 
modest beginnings set the scene for the various separate 
services to be introduced by Radio Bantu once the FM 
network was established. 
As usual political controversy was never far from the 
surface. When J.J. Kruger left his job as editor of 
the Verwoerd-managed Die Transvaler to assume the post 
of 'cultural advisor' to the SABC, many citizens regarded 
the appointment as further evidence of Nationalist Party 
influence shaping SABC programming. Two listeners' 
organisations were formed : the Listeners' Union in 
Natal and the Listeners' Protective Society in the 
Transvaal. The Natal group was the most vocal in its 
criticism of the Corporation and its complaints centred 
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around the twin contentions that the SABC was now almost 
entirely dominated by the Broederbond and that the 
programme South African Scene, written by Kruger, 
was nothing more than Nationalist propaganda. The 
Listeners' Union also charged that Corporation officials· 
who balked at producing pro-Nationalist material were 
being passed over for promotion 60 • 
As the day of the Republic referendum approached ~he 
newspapers were filled with letters complaining about 
alleged SABC bias in news programmes and pro-Republic 
propaganda broadcast by the Corporation. At the time, 
United Party M.P. Mr Ray Swart declared : 
"The SABC is becoming an organisation to 
propagate Nationalist Party policy and 
it is taking no notice of widespread 
protests by its subscribers. 1161 
A new element in the conflict was added with the 
resignation of the Corporation's Director-General, Gideon 
Roos, scheduled to become effective on May 31, the day 
South Africa became a republic. Many suspected that 
his once dominant position with the SABC had, in fact, 
been whittled away to the point where the Board of 
Governors and its chairman, rather than the Director-
General, held the real power. Mr Roos had held his 
post for twelve years and, according to The Times, had, 
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during that time, consistently opposed attempts to turn 
the SABC programmes into propaganda messages 62 
The man who held the now powerful position of SABC 
Board chairman was Dr P.J. Meyer, originally appointed 
to the Board of Governors "for his strong and out-spoken 
Nationalist sympathies" 63 and to whom Roos had slowly 
lost control over planning, development, administration, 
programmes and finance. Former secretary of the 
Broederbond's Federasie van Kultuurvereniginge (FAK) 
(the main grouping of Afrikaans cultural organisations), 
Meyer had appointed Kruger to the 'cultural advisor's' 
64 post It was Meyer also who, like Verwoerd and 
Vorster, had run foul of the war-time Smuts government 
through, acoording to Eyinga, "the blatant exercise of his pro-
German vielf/" 65 • Meyer, in addition, was regarded by many as the 
then Supreme Chief of the entire Broederbond apparatus 66 • 
Whatever the political controversy, the impressive FM 
broadcasting programme continued unabated and on Christmas 
Day, 1961, the new FM network officially became 
operational as English, Afrikaans, Springbok Radio, 
South Sotho and Zulu programmes were radiated from 
Johannesburg. At the same time, construction was 
continuing on other FM stations at Pretoria, Rustenburg, 
Welverdiend, Cape Town and Durban. FM broadcasting 
67 
for all peoples in all localities was about to be attained 
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At about this time and without waiting for the completion 
of the FM hook-up, 'radio vision' (educational broadcasts 
with accompanying film strips for in-classroom use) 
was launched into South African schools - an extremely 
successful innovation. At the same time, the SABC's 
School Broadcasting Service, in conjunction with the 
National Council for Audio-Visual Education, was· trans-
mitting a great many bilingual programmes that did not 
require the utilisation of special film strips or slides. 
Many of these educational programmes as well as some 
presentations used in regular English and Afrikaans 
transmissions soon found their way to all corners of 
the globe as the SABC formed ~ts own Overseas 
Transcription Service to freely distribute the best 
of South African radio to interested foreign stations68 • 
In 1962 Radio Bantu expanded into FM broadcasting and 
was also able to benefit from a number of youth 
programmes within the now full-time broadcast schedules 
of the South Sotho and Zulu services. By July 1962, 
the Tswana and North Sotho services, originating from 
the just-completed Pretoria installation, were on the 
air with similar features. This brought Radio Bantu's 
total daily broadcast hours to 51 and utilised the 
tal~nts of over 100 Bantu staff with further expansion 
imminent as Durban was prepared for FM transmissions 
for the Zulu in its area 6 9. 
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Unfortunately, while the Corporation was achieving 
great things in the provision of FM facilities and in 
improving broadcast services to Black~ another political 
controversy had sprung up around J.J. Kruger, the SABC's 
'cultural advisor'. Reacting to the increasing number 
of sabotage incidents which were occurring throughout 
the Union, he announced that the Corporation felt it 
was its duty to introduce a new programme, to be called 
We Present Facts, which would give "correct and 
authoritative information about all matters of vital 
interest" 70 • 
The nature of these broadcasts infuriated many South 
Africans and caused The Star to label the SABC "a crude 
mouthpiece of the extreme Right" 71 • 
Despite such criticism, the SABC's new broadcast 
policies were continued and in March, 1963, they finally 
provoked a parliamentary reaction from the shadow 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Mr Etienne G. Malan, 
who moved a private member's motion which condemned 
the government's refusal to supply Parliament with 
information about the SABC and requested the appointment 
of a commission to inquire into the policies of the 
Corporation, especially in reference to news gathering, 
selection and presentation. Predictably, aerording to 
Bunting72 , Malan's efforts had little effect and the action was quickly 
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beaten down by the Nationalist majority which, with 
its overwhelming superiority in numbers, defiantly passed 
a counter resolution approving of SABC policy73 • 
Two months later, public attention was once again 
focused on charges of SABC news slanting. This time, 
the attack on the Corporation was mounted by a defence 
attorney who presented to the court a transcript of 
an SABC newscast which imputed that his clients, six 
journalists, had incited a demonstration by Indians 
in order to get themselves arrested. 
The magistrate hearing the case, Mr P.J. Vanderspuy, 
considered the charge against the Corporation important 
enough to be called to the attention of Johannesburg's 
Senior Public Prosecutor. Commenting on the broadcast, 
defence attorney K.W. Stuart concluded "This is grave 
contempt of court. It appears to be an attempt by the 
SABC to conduct a trial by radio. 1174 Charges against 
all six of Mr Stuart's clients were subsequently 
dismissed and three of them brought damage claims 
against the SABC which were later settled out of court, 
part of the settlement apparently consisting of a 
broadcast apology by the Corporation75 • 
By 1964 the growth of the FM network was quite remark-
able. Fourteen FM stations utilising 65 transmitters 
/ 
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had been put into operation and it was hoped that, by 
the end of 1.967, virtually all of the country would 
be provided with FM services 76 • 
On September 1st two further breakthroughs were achieved 
as round-the-clock broadcasting and a new commercial 
FM service were both initiated. The new all-night 
FM service was named Radio South Africa (not to be 
confused with the external service of Radio RSA) and 
featured nearly continuous music and news bulletins. 
It proved an immediate success 77 • 
The daytime commercial FM service, Radio Highveld 
linked stations in the urbanised Transvaal and parts 
of the Orange Free State. It joined Springbok Radio 
in performing what Dr Meyer called "service to the 
business world" 78 • 
During 1964, politics also reared its head on the 
international scene. In January, Dr Meyer had a part-
time BBC correspondent barred from using SABC facilities 
in the relaying of reports to London. Meyer told the 
BBC that the action had been taken in reprisal for the 
"tendentious reporting" in which the correspondent, 
Anthony Delius,/ had allegedly been indulging79 • 
; 
In October, nearly thirty African delegations walked 
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out of an International Telecxmnunications Union (ITU) meeting 
in protest over the presence of Portuguese and South 
African broadcasters. The conference had been called 
to outline a specific pattern of spectrum utilisation 
for the African continent. The British representatives 
were successful in leading a ~ove to prevent South 
African expulsion but thereafter the African delegates 
refused to participate in any meaningful discussion 
when representatives of the Republic were present 80 • 
Angered by this and other diplomatic harassment, the 
SABC, according to Orlik, 
" ••• began to launch ever more vitriolic 
attacks on Black African states in the 
all-night service's domestic news 
bulletins. By 1965, these attacks had 
been broadened to include virtually every 
.prominent adversary or assumed adversary 
of the Verwoerd government. Thus, the 
broadcasts raked not only the Organisation 
of African Unity and the Afro-Asian bloc, 
but also the United Nations, the World 
Council of Churches, Dr Martin Luther 
King, the Ford Foundation, G. Mennen 
Williams (then us Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs), the Christian 
Institute of South Africa, and the Rand 
Daily Mail. 11 81 
Long critical of the Corporation, the English language 
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press now hit back even harder. Representative 
d 1 . d b h h. . . 1 d d 82 comments e ivere y t e papers t is time inc u e 
"This tendentious and partisan attitude 
II 
of the SABC . . . The Government's 
propaganda machine . disgraceful 
smear tactics • • • an abuse of 
monopolistic power." 
(Rand Daily Mail) 
. this farrago of isolated quotations 
and innuendos • • • " 
(Cape Times) 
". . • t.endentious, slanted comments • • 
mastery of the smear technique 
sly innuendo • • a national 
scandal • . . Broederbond propaganda." 
(Johannesburg's Sunday Times) 
II Broederbond-controlled SABC • 
continues to follow the example 
of Dr Goebbels II 
(East London's Daily Dispatch) 
The SABC's reply came in the Current Affairs programme 
when it asked : 
"Where will they (the English language 
newspapers) stand and whose side will 
they take, if the Republic were to be 
faced with a situation demanding unity 
of purpose?" 
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This, Or 1ik states, prove:i too much even for The Star which had long 
ignored the Corporation's pronouncements 83 . It felt 
compelled to reply for the sake of "the unsophisticated 
who may still take the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation at its face value". The SABC, continued 
The Star, "has unashamedly become a propaganda arm of 
the party in power1184 
In October Current Affairs criticised Die Burger for 
its defence of" a group of DRC ministers who were under 
pressure due to their membership of the multi-racial 
Christian Institute of South Africa. This unprecedented 
attack on an Afrikaans newspaper with strong Nationalist 
sympathies, whose first editor, Dr Daniel Malan, had 
led the Party to victory in 1948, shocked many but others 
suspected the reason to be that Die Burger did not get 
on well with Prime Minister Verwoerd, who was chairman 
of the board of a competing paper85 
j Or lik states that many citizens and editors held out the hope that the 
SABC would eventually work itself out of its "persecution 
complex" and once again conform to its traditional policy 
of neutrality. These hopes were dashed upon the release 
of the Corporation's 1965 Annual Repor_t which made it 
clear that old policy would be brought in line with 
new practice rather than the other way around 86 : 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
3-39 
"To a neutrality urge which could jeopardise 
the security and well-considered interests 
of the country and the people, the Board of 
Governors conceded nothing more than might 
be expected from a South African institution 
occupying the strategic position of the 
SABC. It (the Board of Governors*) is 
firmly convinced that the Corporation is 
obliged to serve this country and its 
population groups in spite of limited but 
vociferous movements serving aims that 
undermine and ultimately destroy the 
happiness, prosperity and future of our 
country." 87 
As Orlik states, "Its position thus made clear~ the 
SABC confidently went about the task of extending its 
FM network and its influence" 88 • 
By the end of 1965 two-thirds of the Republic's population 
(including all urban dwellers) were served by FM 89 . 
Twelve full-time services were in operation including 
the latest addition Radio Good Hope serving the 
Western Cape. The total number of weekly hours broad-
cast was now 1 110, a 300 percent increase over 1961. 
The number of current listener's licences rose to 
1 314 384 which covered approximately 2 500 000 radio 
*Author's italics 
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sets, listened to by an estimated audience of 7 000 000. 
Radio Bantu constituted an important part of this latest 
expansion. All the major Bantu linguistic groups were 
now being served by Radio Bantu, broadcasting a total 
of 70 hours per day. 
By 1966, 47 FM stations were operational providing 77 
percent of South Africa's people with quality FM signal 
coverage and another six facilities near completion 
promised to increase this percentage even more. 
In spite of this impressive progress, the Corporation 
was still behind its announced schedule and Chairman 
Meyer was forced to concede that total FM coverage 
within the Republic would not be implemented until 1970, 
three years later than originally planned 90 • 
Dr Meyer pointed out the tremendous progress that the 
Corporat~on had made in its three decades of existence. 
This was achieved : 
" • only by growing in the service of 
the community as a whole and by becoming 
a vehicle in the service of the rich 
cultural life of the community concerned 
• • • Broadcasting in this country has 
only recently developed into an inde-
pendent medium of communication along-
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side other media~" 91 
The events of the past few years had given opposition 
parties numerous reasons to doubt broadcasting's 
"developing independence" however, and 1966 was no 
exception. During the March General Election campaign, 
Nationalist members of the government, accx:>rding to Kahn92 , had 
little trouble in securing air time while the Opposition had to be 
content with summarisations of United Party chief, Sir 
De Villiers Graaff's speeches which were broadcast as 
news items. The treatment so angered the UP leader 
that, in August, he included a pointed reference to 
the SABC during his attempt to have a censure motion 
passed against the government93 : 
"We all know that it is a state-protected 
monopoly. We all know that we have to 
pay licences to Radio South Africa, and 
that it is presenting news and comments 
and points of view and that it is doing 
it almost to the exclusion of others. 
We know that the Prime Minister said 
that its function is to correct what he 
regards as misinformation from certain 
newspapers in South Africa. While he 
regards it as that, yet Radio South 
Africa regards itself as being above 
the Press Code. It can attack individuals 
or newspapers or institutions or societies 
or organisations. It is not called upon 
to give those individuals, societies or 
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organisations the right to reply over 
the radio to the attacks upon them. 
Sir, is that democratic?. Is that in 
accordance with the best principles? 
Would any newspaper be allowed to do 
that? No, they would inunediately be 
reported to the Press Board of Reference, 
and they would be reprimanded by that 
Board and they might find themselves 
in trouble. Various individuals and 
organisations can testify to the 
' 
manner in which the appeals to be 
heard in their own defence have been 
treated by Radio South Africa, the 
contempt with which they have been 
treated. There are various dignitaries 
of the Church and there are various 
individuals, newspapers and institutions 
of different kinds. When a state-
protected institution virtually enjoy-
ing a State monopoly is entitled to 
act in this way, then it seems to me 
that it is taking or is being allowed 
to take totalitarian power. It is 
being allowed to deny the fundamental 
tenets of democracy. It is being 
allowed to make serious inroads into 
the rights and freedoms of the 
individual." 94 
After listening to Sir De Villiers' speech, the Nationalist 
majority voted down the censure motion and actually 
introduced a new Radio Amendment Bill, making it an 
imprisonable of fence to supply broadcast material to 
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any radio station in the world which had been "designated" 
by the Postmaster-General. Any foreign station could 
be placed on the list if it was held that its intent 
was to "disturb the peace, order, or public safety in 
the Republic, or may prejudice any industry or under-
taking in the Republic"95. 
When objections to the Bill were raised by members of 
the public and press, the Minister of Posts and Tele-
graphs, Albert Hertzog, charged that the Reuters office 
in London was hiring Communists to select the news to 
be transmitted to South Africa and stated that the 
English language press had no right to object to any-
thing since it was continuously trying to bring Afrikaners 
into disrepute and had thus set the stage for the 
Verwoerd assassination96 . 
By 1968 listener surveys indicated a daily listenership 
of over two million Bantu. The seven programme services 
catering specifically for Blacks received more than 
six million letters during the year. By the end of 
1968 there were 54 completed. FM stations in the Republic •. 
Licence fees contributed over R8! million to revenue, 
while advertising accounted for just over RS! rnillion 97 • 
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3.2 TELEVISION'S TROUBLED BEGINNING 
It seems ironic that South Africa was one of the last 
industrial countries in the world to offer its people 
a television service. It could have been one of the 
first. Television was successfully demonstrated and 
enthusiastically received in South Africa as long ago 
as 1926 98• 
Somehow, the same failure to exploit scientific discovery 
prevailed as had happened with Edward Jennings, the 
Port Elizabeth Post Office worker, who invented wireless 
telegraphy independently of Marconi. 
Television, alas, was to remain unattainable for South 
Africans for another 50 years. 
The long tortuous and highly political road that led 
to the eventual acceptance of a television service has 
been discussed in the introduction to this dissertation 
under the heading of Politics and Television. 
The first practical step came in December, 1969, when 
the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs announced that 
a Commission of Inquiry into Television, consisting 
of twelve members, under the chairmanship of the Chair-
man of the Control Board of the SABC, Dr P.J. Meyer, 
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had been appointed to consider the desirability or other-
wise of introducing a television service in South Africa; 
and to make make recommendations on the nature of such 
a service, should it be introduced. 
In defining the terms of reference of the Commission, 
the Minister stated that the following principles would 
have to be borne in mind 
the proposed service would have to be integrated with 
existing radio services; 
- it would have to be statutorily controlled; 
- it would have to be fully bilingual and multilingual 
for the Bantu population; 
it would have to be a cultural service, without 
usurping the function of the press or of the film 
and entertainment industries 99. 
Then followed an extensive tour by Dr Meyer on behalf 
of the Commission to Australia, Japan, the USA, Canada, 
Brazil and the Argentine where discussions took place 
with television experts particularly with regard to 
the management, administration and financial aspects 
of television 100 • No reference is made at this time 
to contact with British television specialists, but 
it can be reasonably assumed that television develop-
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ments in the United Kingdom were well understood by 
the SABC at the same time. 
In the same year, 1970, the Prime Minister, Mr B.J. 
Vorster, decided that broadcasting should be the 
responsibility of the Minister of National Education, 
reflecting a shift in emphasis away from the 'technical' 
orientation of Posts and Telegraphs, towards a 'service' 
orientation, emphasising news, cultural and educational 
services to the public. the decision was also 
influenced by 
" ••. the ever increasing development 
of television in other countries serving 
to emphasise broadcasting as an inde-
pendent, modern cultural and educational 
institution" 101 • 
On April 27, 1971, the Minister of National Education, 
Mr J.P. van der Spuy, announced that the Cabinet had 
substantially accepted the Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry and approved in principle the establishment 
of a statutorily controlled television service for South 
Africa, with the SABC responsible for the establishment 
and furtherance of the service. This announcement 
presented the Corporation with the greatest challenge 
in all of its thirty-five years of existence102 • 
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A paper was drawn up in which all aspects of the 
proposed service, as recommended by the Commission of 
Inquiry, were set out. This document was circulated 
to thirty-two experts, foreign and local, inviting 
suggestions for the planning of the service. This 
action was to serve as the basis for forming a team 
of specialists to take charge of the new venture103 . 
In describing the Corporation's activities in the 1972 
Annual Report, Dr Meyer said : 
" ••• the introduction of a colour 
television service in South Africa in 
Afrikaans, English and Bantu languages, 
is an undertaking the scope and value 
of which will gradually become clearer. 
It is a task comparable in importance 
to any assumed by any other state 
corporation. The introduction of a 
television service by the SABC as a 
statutorily autonomous government 
corporation will not only bring a new 
cultural and educational force of 
inestimable value to bear for the 
benefit of this country in the years 
to come, but it will also greatly 
help to stimulate the national 
economy, particularly in the future 
development of the electronics 
industry • • • Television is funda-
mentally and essentially an educational 
medium. It is a necessary service 
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that no modern society can dispense with, 
without spiritual and mental harm. 11104 
Few me~ia commentators would disagree with Dr Meyer's 
sentiments, although many would see the irony in the 
circumstances when they ponder the length of time it 
took for South Africa's political leaders and the SABC 
to reach this conclusion, resulting in South Africa 
entering the era of television a quarter of a century 
behind most of the world's industrialised countries 
and many years after most major countries on the African 
continent. 
During 1974 the Minister of National Education announced 
that the licence fee for the forthcoming television 
service would be R36 per annum and selected advertising 
spots would be approved for broadcasting from January, 
1978, approximately two years after the start of the 
service. 
Approval was also granted for the initiation of a tele-
vision service for Blacks, as Phase 2. This service 
would be permitted to carry advertising from its inception. 
Test transmissions for Phase 1 were scheduled to begin 
in 1975 105 • 
By 1975 the gross total revenue from radio advertising 
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was R28 455 148, and represented the Corporation's 
largest single source of revenue and a percentage increase 
over 1974 of 20,9 percent. 
After the nationalisation of all radio services in 
Mocambique in October, 1975, the Corporation seized 
the opportunity of replacing the popular Lorence Marques 
Radio with a new station wholly controlled by the SABC, 
under the name of Radio 5 This meant that all revenue 
derived from Radio 5 would accrue to the SABC, whereas 
the revenue of LM Radio was shared with the Radio Clube 
de Mocambique. 
A new department, SABC Enterprises was created in 1975 
with responsibilities for finding and marketing 
commercial applications for a variety of SABC activities, 
thereby generating additional revenue 106 • 
Television became a reality for South Africa on January 
5th, 1976, with the introduction of the dual Afrikaans/ 
English channel. According to the SABC 
"presenting the talents, cultures and 
points of view of the English and 
Afrikaans speaking on one channel 
contributed to a better understanding 
107 between the two language groups" • 
Radio advertising revenue for 1976 was R27 553 990 after 
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deducting agency commission. The R36 television 
licence fee boosted revenue from licences (radio and 
television combined) to R43 428 688 after allowing for 
collection expenses, thus temporarily reversing the 
recently established trend of advertising revenue 
exceeding all other forms of income. Total income 
for the year (all sources) amounted to approximately 
R89, 3 million 108• 
Television commercials appeared from January, 1978 as 
scheduled. High artistic and production standards 
had been met and it was generally agreed that the tele-
vision advertisements compared favourably with those 
of countries with long established commercial television 
services. Indeed a number of South African commercials 
109 
won international awards at Cannes in June, 1978 • 
The gross total revenue from advertising income in 1978, 
the first year of commercial television, was R73 373 652; 
of this R38 946 703 was derived from television. In 
spite of competition for advertising from the new more 
dynamic medium of television, the radio services main-
t . d th . d t" . . llO aine eir a ver ising income • 
During 1979 the demand for television time continued 
to exceed supply. The SABC had to resort to a system 
of allocation as the best means of apportioning the 
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available time to prospective advertisers. 
An increase in advertising time of 0,75 percent of 
broadcasting time was granted in October and immediately 
taken up. After deduction of agency commission, 
earnings from television advertising alone totalled 
R46,6 million, making it the biggest single source of 
. f th t' 111 income or e corpora ion · . 
The introduction of TV2, the channel aimed specifically 
at South Africa's Blacks, was approved by the government 
in 1979. The service was scheduled for operation in 
1982. Estimated expenditure in capital and establish-
ment costs for TV2 during 1980 and 1981 were R80 million. 
It was expected that the 'Black' channel would operate 
at a considerable loss, incurring an estimated liability 
of at least R96 million during the first five years 
of operation. The government undertook to 
contribute R36 million to these losses to make its 
introduction possible. T.he balance is the 
responsibility of the SABC. 
By the end of 1979, the Corporation had reached an 
important goal with 100 transmitting stations 
providing virtually all of South Africa with 
FM radio transmissions112 . 
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3.3 THE SABC A STATUS REPORT 
In April, 1980, Professor W.L. Mouton, a member of the 
Board of the SABC since March, 1979 was appointed Chair-
man of the Board, replacing Dr P.J. Meyer, whose_ term 
as chairman expired after 22 years of service113 
The Nationalist press speculated that Professor Mouton's 
appointment heralded a new dispensation for the SABC, 
with the Board having more say in the control, manage-
ment and policy matters than in the past. Critics 
of the SABC saw the outgoing chairman, Dr Meyer, as 
extremel~ verkrampte* and virtually an autocrat, 
totally dedicated to the Nationalist line in broadcasting 
policy. 
Professor Mouton, on the other hand, was regarded as 
being:verZigte** and was believed to be firmly in the Prime 
Minister's camp. 
Speculation on what a new dispensation for the SABC 
might mean caused The Argus to voice its feelings in 
an editorial under the heading of 'Good Riddance' 
"Reports of impending reforms at the 
SABC - most notably the removal of 
yesterday's men from their Auckland 
Park thrones - come none too soon. 
*Conservative; **Liberal 
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It was in the days of Dr Verwoerd that 
the SABC's immense resources were 
cynically deployed to fulfil the role 
of propaganda arm of the National Party. 
And today an old guard still carries 
on as though hardly anything has changed 
in South Africa since 1948. 
If the advertised reforms restore a 
political balance to our airwaves we 
may yet see an end to one of the most 
scandalous abuses of power in a country 
that has seen too much of such things." 114 
The government also shifted responsibility for the SABC 
from the Department of Posts and Telecommunications 
where it had only recently settled (1979), from the 
Department of National Education. This time the move 
was to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, 
under Mr Pik Botha, widely held to be one of the Prime 
Minister's most faithful allies. The Report of the 
Steyn Commission of Inquiry observed that the motivation 
for this last .change is unclear and gave ri.se to a 
considerable amount of speculation 115• 
But even these:verligte developments were viewed with 
concern by the Opposition, who feared even stricter 
government control over the SABC was in the offing. 
Dr Alex Boraine, an Opposition spokesman on media matters, 
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said the move to the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Information has "an ominous ring" in view of past 
government attempts to control the media. 
"Even if this move is purely an adminis-
trative one, it will undoubtedly lead to 
specualtion that the SABC and its 
television service, linked as they now 
will be, with the Information service, 
will become another propaganda vehicle 
for the government It is 
counter-productive to South Africa's 
interests to make this move. The one 
thing we cannot afford is to have an 
116 
even more fettered broadcasting system." 
When the Sunday Times spoke to SABC staff members for 
their opinions on what the appointment of a new board 
chairman would mean, it met with scepticism. Naturally 
preferring to remain anonymous, (SABC staff are prohibited 
from talking to the press), they said it was unlikely 
that there would be any change in attitudes unless "there 
is a clean sweep of top management as well" 117• 
" ••• If the present Directors-General 
Dr Jan Schutte, Mr Jan Swanepoel and the 
Deputy Director-General, Administration, 
Mr Gert Yssel, who have all survived 
since the Albert Hertzog era, stay where 
they are, no-one at the SABC believes 
there can be any meaningful changes •• nll8 
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II The new enlightenment of P.W. Botha stops firmly 
at the door of Auckland Park", said another senior 
SABC-TV staffman, who had recently resigned. He 
added, 
"The Prime Minister's promising changes 
haven't even reached this corporation." 
He described relations between the SABC executive and 
119 
their department chiefs as "pure schoolmasterism" · -
Another broadcaster said, "Staff members have been very 
concerned that none of the Prime Minister's verligte 
policies seem to have been reflected on TV or radio11120• 
A well known broadcaster ,who was about to resign was 
asked by a Sunday Times reporter what changes staffers 
would like to see from a new chairman. "We'd like 
more freedom", he said. 
"We'd like to know that thinking people 
are allowed to think for themselves 
without, according to our bosses, 
121 bringing down the country." • 
According to the Sunday Times' report, many of the best 
SABC journalistic staffers had resigned in frustration 
122 
over the previous twelve months • 
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It is of course possible that these remarks are typical 
of disgruntled employees to be found in any large 
organisation merely voicing their frustration by hitting 
out at management under the protection of anonymity. 
However, it is significant that the same dissatisfaction 
and frustrations were heard as evidence during the 
Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media. It 
was acknowledged in the report that the structure and 
control of the SABC has been the topic of considerable 
123 
comment and criticism • 
The Commission noted that the Board of the SABC was 
currently engaged on the c mprehensive task of re-
assessing all echelons of management from Director-
General down. It endorsed Board policy 
II 
• • of placing the whole management 
of the SABC on a sound professional foot-
ing, at the same time ensuring better 
lines of communication both upward and 
downwards, thus rectifying a serious 
fault that has been identified as one 
of the weaknesses in the day-to-day 
operations of the SABc11124 • 
The economic boom resulted in the single channel tele-
vision service being oversubscribed by potential 
advertisers by close to 100 percent during 1980. Many 
advertisers and agencies were up in arms over the meagre 
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allocations of time, usually only 40 - 50 percent of 
what they had requested. Grey Phillips, media 
director Adriaan de Buck, said " ••. general agency 
and industry reaction is one ranging from outrage to 
d , d d, , II 125 ismay an isappointment • 
Although dissatisfaction was reported to be high, it 
was thought that many advertisers feared antagonising 
the SABC by openly criticising allocation policy, for 
fear of further jeopardising their allocations. At 
the time, 5,57 percent of total air time was allocated 
to advertising and the advertisers wanted this increased 
to nearer the international average of 10 percent. They 
pointed out that TV2, the Black channel, would be launched 
in 1983 with 8 percent commercial time from the 
b . . 126 eg1nn1ng • 
The SABC felt that there was little it could do to 
increase commercial time, due to the continuous represent-
ations by the Newspaper Press Union (NPU) to government, 
claiming that television advertising is absorbing too 
large a slice of the overall media cake. The Financial 
Mail pointed out, however, that newspapers.are allowed 
to buy into television stations overseas. It went 
on to state : 
"Commercial air time should be increased 
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- a move which would probably take 
government years to make - or rates 
should be hiked significantly enough 
to clear the market, or (probably 
the best solution) TV broadcasting 
should be opened to private enter-
prise" 127. 
Apart from pressure from commercial interests, the SABC 
continued to be the target of politicians during 1980. 
In August, Mr Dave Dalling, the PFP spokesman on the 
media, led a delegation of ten MP's to see the SABC's 
Board of Governors. Criticism ranged from alleged 
slanting and selection of news reports and failure to 
present the other side of the story to actuality 
prograrnroes failing to touch the surf ace of reality and 
ignoring the real issues of the day 128 . 
I 
Criticism of the Corporation was by no means restricted 
to the official Opposition. The extreme right-wing 
party, the Herstigte Nasional Party (HNP), at its 
national congress supported with enthusiasm a call for 
a boycott of SATV, as the Corporation was accused of 
"bringing Blacks into our living-rooms 11129 • 
During a heated debate on the media, HNP members said 
that 'true Afrikaners' should refuse to take out 
television and radio licences for this "autocratic 
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censorship apparatus and lackey of the government". 
Delegates rejected the proposed channel for Blacks as 
"repulsive", as it was financed by White taxpayers 130• 
The announcement that the new Black television channel 
would attempt to cater for the five major African 
language groups caused advertisers to conclude that 
they would have to present their commercials in all 
five languages. This caused consternation in the 
advertising industry. Critics of the Corporation 
were quick to see this as "ideologically motivated and 
quite ridicµlous". The Argus, in an editorial headed 
'Tower of Babel' reflected the mood : 
"Apart from imposing sky-rocketing costs 
on itself and its advertisers by 
enforcing a quintuplication of programmes, 
the SABC is clearly ignoring what either 
its viewers or its clients want. Most 
advertisers believe English is the right 
medium for a sophisticated Black market. 
The indications are the likely viewers 
not only understand the language, but 
prefer it. 
They are likely to resent and resist 
the corporation's attempt to impose a 
form cf 'mother-tongue' television on 
them. But it seems .the Government 
simply will ~ot learn. 11131 
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The SABC subsequently denied ruling that commercials 
must be in the 'language of the broadcast', saying it 
had been misrepresented by the industry. The Corporation 
stated that commercials on TV2 could be in any one 
language in either the Nguni or Sotho language groups. 
However, the SABC, with its highly successful experience 
with Radio Bantu, knew. it was right to stick to African 
languages for television. The decision was vindicated 
two months after the start of the Black service in 1982 
by research carried out by the J. Walter Thompson Company 
which showed quite conclusively that Blacks preferred 
132 
viewing in African languages · • 
In spite of the ever-present political wrangling and 
pressure from the advertising industry, 1980 proved 
to be another year of achievement for the SABC. Total 
income increased to Rl71,5 million, and increase of 
12,6 percent over the previous year. Operating 
expenses (including depreciation and write-offs) 
amounted to Rl20,5 million, capital expenditure to 
Rl5,5 million and TV2 establishment costs to approxi-
rnately R6,9 million. 
Advertising accounted for over 54 percent of total 
income, with income from licence fees amounting to just 
over 37 percent. Of the total advertising income of 
R93,3 million, R58,5 million or 63 percent was derived 
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from television (SABC Annual Report, 1980). 
On June 28, 1980, a second, independent radio station 
began beaming programmes and advertising at the lucrative 
South African market from the soon to be independent 
state of Bophutatswana. Channel 702 was launched with 
advertising billings of Rl,5 million. Listener and 
advertising response had, according to managing director 
Mr Issie Kirsh 
" •.• exceeded our expectations and proves 
a point we made at our launch in Johannes-
burg - that there was a definite need for 
a new independent regional radio station 
in the Transvaal" 133 . 
3.4 THE STEYN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE MASS MEDIA 
The most significant media event in 1981 was the 
publication of the report on the investigation carried 
out by the Steyn Commission, appointed in June, 1980, 
to look into the mass media. The Commission's terms 
of reference were : 
"To enquire into and report on the 
question whether the conduct of and 
the handling of matters by the mass 
media meet the needs and interests 
of the community and demands of the 
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times, and if not, how they can be 
. d "134 improve . . 
The Leader of the Opposition, Dr Frederik van Zyl 
Slabbert, had said the inquiry appeared to be "an 
attempt to begin to harness the press into its (the 
135 Government's) total strategy". He asked if the 
inquiry was really necessary considering 
"the government had a myriad of laws 
and regulations which enables it to 
exert almost total control over the 
press for any specific purpose it 
wishes to11136 • 
The press, in its hostility to what it saw as an attempt 
to control and interfere still further into its affairs, 
tended to lose sight of the fact that the mass media 
in toto was the subject of the investigation and many 
newspapers referred erroneously to the inquiry as the 
Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the 'Press'. 
In retrospect, the newspapers were probably correct 
in their interpretation of the Commission's main task. 
When the report was not dealing with the "total onslaught" 
or the "conflict and threat situation facing South Africa" 
- by far its major emphasis - it singled out the press 
almost exclusively for the brunt of its criticism and, 
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in particular, the English language press. Sadly, 
the opportunity presented for an equally full and 
comprehensive analysis on the present status of the 
broadcasting media was missed. The Commission's report 
dealing with broadcasting appears superficial and dis-
appointing. Only one named SABC executive, Dr J.H.T. 
Schutte, appears in the annexure listing submissions 
and witnesses, compared with 25 representing the press. 
Assuming the Commission to be genuinely concerned with 
the future of the mass media in South Africa, it is 
reasonable to expect a greater spread of informed 
opinion from the SABC's hierarchy in the report, 
particularly considering the importance of the electronic 
media to the country's future. 
Mr James Hulett Hopkins, a Natal educationalist, and 
a member of the Steyn Commission, was also appointed 
vice-chairman of the SABC Board on the same day as the 
Commission was announced. Such an appointment must, 
inevitably, raise questions of impartiality and 
objectivity. 
The author of this dissertation appeared before the 
Commission suggesting that a working party be set up 
to examine the viability of an Independent Broadcasting 
Authority for South Africa 137 (see Appendix A). 
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Representatives of the Newspaper Press Union (NPU) in their 
evidence to the Conunission, also presented a case 
for allowing the press to diversify into independent 
broadcasting. The South African Society of Marketers 
took a similar view, expressing concern over the lack 
of advertising exposure time and the failure of the 
existing broadcasting services to meet advertising demand. 
In its wisdom, the Steyn Conunission decided that the 
time was not yet ripe for independent broadcasting, 
stating : 
"It is not beyond the bounds of possibility, 
therefore, that the SA Society of Marketers 
may look beyond our borders to the National 
States as suitable localities for the 
establishment of independent conunercial TV 
transmitters, thus draining off a valuable 
source of income for the SABC. The 
precedent of Channel 702 and Capital Radio 
with adequate sponsorship, could be 
extended to include television, to the 
embarrassment, financial and otherwise, 
of our own service. 
The Conunission, nevertheless, regards the 
creation of an independent local broad-
casting (radio and TV) service, next to 
the SABC, as undesirable at this stage, 
mainly owing to the vast demands which 
the needs and interests of the conununity 
make on the economic and manpower resources 
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of the country, especially in the light 
of the serious conflict situation now 
prevailing. However, this is a matter 
which merits further consideration by 
aZZ those concerned at a time when 
• t • 11 138* c~rcums ances perm~t. 
Although the Commission appeared over-cautious, perhaps 
even negative, when faced with the challenge of 
independent television, it did place a high premium 
on autonomy in broadcasting as indicated from the 
following extract from its report : 
"The Commission is strongly of the 
opinion that the present arrangement 
whereby the SABC is directly 
responsible to one of the state 
departments is not the best arrange-
ment, either for the SABC, or for 
the community it serves. We have 
heard a considerable amount of 
evidence indicating excessive govern-
mental control of broadcasting in the 
Republic, in news, commentary and 
general policy. We find that the 
present arrangement, whereby the 
SABC falls directly under the control 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Information • • • is not in the 
*Author's italics 
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best interests of the community in its 
widest sphere, and furthermore we find 
that many of the allegations of govern-
mental control (it is· interesting to 
note that the Commission did not use 
the work 'interference'*} are substantiated. 
In order to assure the autonomy and 
impartiality of the SABC, and to refute 
these charges of governmental control, 
we recommend that the Corporation be 
elevated to a status equivalent to 
that of a 'Crown Office' in the United 
Kingdom. 
The implications of suchia move would 
be that the SABC would not be respons- . 
ible to any particular Minister or 
Department. The Chairman of the Board 
would be responsible directly to the 
Head of Government (i.e. the Prime 
Minister} but, at the same time, he 
would have access to any Minister of 
his choice for the purpose of 
consultation and co-operation. Under 
this arrangement it would be possible, 
for example, to work directly with 
the Minister of National Education on 
matters relating to the use of the 
electronic media for educational 
purposes; the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications on technical 
*Author's italics 
L 
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matters; and the Minister of Finance 
on matters affecting the Treasury, to 
name but three instances. 
All ministers should be mindful of the 
immense national importance of .an 
institution such as the SABC and their 
doors should be open at all times to 
its Chairman. 
The Commission is unanimous that, 
at all costs, the SABC should be 
permitted to pursue its own destiny, 
under direction of its Board of Control, 
~hin the bounds of national loyalty, 
impartiality, decency and good taste, 
and in the broad interest of the SA 
community, in terms of the Charter to 
which it owes its origin and continued 
. t .. 139 ex1s ence. 
The "broad interests of the South African community" 
were brought into sharp but contrasting focus by The 
.Argus in an earlier editorial on the Steyn Commission 
"Whatever can be said about the 
political views of newspapers, they are 
purveyed by private enterprise and the 
public is free to ignore them. But the 
SABC has a monopoly of all broadcasting 
and is entirely financed by the tax-
payer (an erroneous statement as the 
Corporation's largest source of income 
is derived from advertising revenue, 
but the main point regarding public 
L 
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accountability is valid*). 
There is thus cause for deep public 
cpncern when a former SABC television 
producer, Mr Kevin Harris, tells the 
Steyn Commission under oath, that the 
National Party and the Broederbond 
have a stranglehold on the country's 
broadcasting services. The Commission· 
should probe his charges expeditiously 
and thoroughly." 140 
Whether the Commission complied with this suggestion is 
open to conjecture, but a significant paragraph in the 
report appears under the heading 'SABC and Politics' 
"The SABC should guard against being 
manipulated by pressure groups in 
society (e.g. political parties, 
churches, cultural or sporting bodies, 
etc.), for their own particular 
motives. An autonomous organisation, 
professing to serve the overall 
interests of the whole community, 
,cannot, and must not, become the 
. 141 
mouthpiece of a sectional group." 
The Report of the Steyn Commission of Inquiry and its 
r~commendations concerning the press was widely condemned 
*Author's italics 
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_by both the English and Afrikaans press. Typical of 
the depth of criticism from both South African and a 
number of influential overseas newspapers was the 
following from Mr Ken Owen, at the time newly appointed 
editor of the Sunday Times, but writing in the Cape 
Times : 
"Steyn Report a 'sorry document' 
The Steyn Commission of Inquiry into 
the Mass Media has performed the extra-
ordinary feat of devising an instrument 
of press control too crude even for the 
taste of a Nationalist government that 
has long sought to force newspapers to 
lie by omission. 
Its report tabled in Parliament last 
week is sloppy, shallow, unbalanced,. 
frequently ignorant and dangerous. 
It has been deservedly brushed aside 
by the Prime Minister and summarily 
condemned by newspapers, editors and 
publishers, English and Afrikaans. 
The harm it has caused abroad to South 
Africa is considerable. 
The essence of the report is not free-
dom of expression. The key to 
understanding this sorry document was 
explained during the week by the 
government's own mouthpiece, Beeld 
'The essence of the voluminous report 
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of the Steyn Commission on the mass media 
is that state security in South Africa 
is threatened by a Marxist-inspired 
onslaught.' Hence, according to a 
headline in the same newspaper, the 
press must be vasgevat (tightly grasped) 
11142 
The bulk of criticism, as expected, came from the press 
and centred around the Commission's proposals on 
compulsory registration of South African journalists, 
the general view being that such proposals would signal 
the end of press freedom in South Africa. 
In addition to the above proposal for a statutory roll 
of journalists, the other key points of the report 
were : 
- A council for the mass media to control the enrol-
ment of journalists. 
- The government to appoint the first council. 
- The council subsequently to have three members 
each elected by journalists on newspapers, magazines 
and from the SABC, with three government-appointed 
members. 
- Only enrolled journalists may be employed by news-
papers or other organisations. 
- The existing Press Council to be disband~d. 
t 
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Individual shareholders in newspaper companies to 
be limited to one percent of the share capital 
(10 percent for private companies) . 
- Crossholdings of shares between companies such as 
the Argus group and SAAN to be prohibited. 
- The government's information branch to be recon-
stituted independently from the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. 
- The SABC's status to be elevated and its autonomy 
143 furthered • 
Mr Joel Mervis, official observer in South Africa of 
the International Press Institute and a former editor 
of the Sunday Times, described the proposals relating 
to the press as "grotesque" : 
"Grotesque! And totally irreconcilable 
with the concept of a free press! .· • 
The gulf between Steyn-style 
censorship on the one hand, and press 
freedom on the other, is just about as 
wide as the gulf which separates the 
philosophies of Pravda and Izvestia 
from the ideas of Thomas Jefferson. 
The Steyn report stands exposed now 
as a monumental jumble of contradictions, 
arbitrary assumptions, ideological 
quibbles and - above all - gross mis-
conceptions of the meaning and function 
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144 
of a free press . • • " 
A major criticism of the Steyn Commission Report was 
its failure to grasp a unique opportunity for improving 
South Africa's mass communications infrastructure by 
making bold, imaginative proposals for the future of 
broadcasting. 
The rather superficial analysis and·recommendations 
concerning this most vital area were regarded as dis-
appointing by many media commentators. 
The Commission appeared to them to have become bogged 
down with the "conflic  and threat" situation and as 
a result, broadcasting did not get the attention it 
deserved. This was thought to be all the more regret-
able when seen alongside the rest of the western world's 
initiatives in exploiting the communication explosion 
via the new technologies of broadcasting. These new 
developments are explored in Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation Evolution, Innovation and New Technology. 
The SABC is said by its chairman, Professor Mouton, 
to be watching these developments with interest, 
particularly the use of domestic satellites for 
. t' 145 communica ion purposes . 
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Critics of the Steyn Commission Report were offered 
one small ray of light in the Commission's recommend-
ation that the SABC should have greater autonomy, a 
recommendation in keeping with developments throughout 
the western world where the trend is not only towards 
greater autonomy but also to pluralism in broadcasting 
(see Chapter 9 : Aspects of Overseas Television 
Systems of Possible Relevance to South Africa). 
The Steyn Commission's timid and rather negative approach 
to pluralism in broadcasting as evidenced in its report, 
was the subject of a proposed radio discussion in which 
Mr Nigel Murphy of the SABC's Cape Town office inter-
viewed the author of this dissertation. The taped 
discussion was sent to the corporation's head office 
\ for approval~, for possible inclusion in the popular :rrorning 
programme Radio Today, where it was envisaged it would 
occupy the fifteen minute 'Special Report' slot. 
The material was considered topical coming a week after 
the publication of the Steyn Report. It was not 
broadcast. 
d . Bl46 Appen ix 
An approximate transcript is attached at 
Referring to the findings of an opinion poll (carried 
out by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) on 
behalf of the Steyn Commission of Inquiry, where a 
sample of 8 282 respondent~ representing all races 
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147 
were polled) , the report stated 
II 
•• consequently greater objectivity, 
more obvious independence and less 
governmental interference are urgently 
called for in the handling of the most 
powerful medium". 
One of the most salient features of the poll according 
to the report, was that 
"radio and television consistently 
project government in a more favour-
able light than that in which it is 
perceived by the community"l48. 
The Commission, as part of its case for a new status 
for the SABC, stated that the original legislation 
giving virtual autonomy to the SABC had been eroded 
by various amendments and the way had been paved as 
early as 1952 for more direct ministerial control of 
the SABC - a move which could adversely affect the 
corporation's image of objectivity and credibility. 
"The legally enshrined limitation on 
direct interference in the affairs 
of the SABC, as envisaged in S26 of 
the 1936 Act, which acted as 
guarantor of relative autonomy, has 
been removed and the ambit of the 
original licence conditions which 
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were restricted to technical matters 
relating to the Postmaster-General, 
have been considerably broadened, 
creating uneasiness with regard to 
the ability of the SABC to maintain 
its autonomy and consequently also 
its credibility in respect of its 
, 1 b d , , , , II 149 interna roa casting activities. 
When the Steyn Commission's report was debated in the 
House of Assembly on February 15, 1982, the official 
Opposition, the PFP, urged the government to scrap the 
report as its recommendations "would kill press freedom 
and strangle democracy". 
The PFP was alone in outright condemnation of the 
report. 
The New Republic Party supported some aspects of the 
report and suggested modifications to others 150• 
Mr Harry Schwarz MP, speaking for the Opposition, said 
monopolies in the media were undesirable but the spread 
of shareholdings recommended by the Steyn Commission 
was not the answer and could assist the concentration 
of power in newspapers. He criticised the commission 
for only investigating the shareholding of English 
language newspaper groups and not those of the Afrikaans 
press groups. 
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Mr Schwarz also criticised the report for not making 
any recommendations to end the radio and television 
monopoly in South Africa, although it had said there 
should be a greater degree of independence from govern-
ment. 
"If there should be no monopoly in 
newspapers, there should be no mono-
poly in radio and television . 
the danger of tame media under the 
exclusive control of political power 
elites is only too obvious. If the 
Steyn Commission had hoped to find 
answers to the problem of removing 
monopolies and avoiding them in 
future, it had failed. 
The Commission stressed the need for 
private sector involvement in convey-
ing an authoritative picture of South 
Africa but it had excluded the private 
sector from radio and television • • 
II 151 
3.5 FUTURE TELEVISION SCENAR10S 
In January 1982,South Africa's television service 
celebrated its sixth birthday. In spite of the 
criticism regarding its late arrival on the media scene, 
its frequently bland and uninspiring programme offerings; 
the paucity of viewing hours and the lack of real 
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programme choice, there can be no denying its impact 
on White South African society. 
The SABC chose televis~on's sixth birthday to launch 
its service for Black viewers, TV2/TV3. It is 
expected that these new ethnic channels will exert an 
equally powerful cultural impact on Blacks. 
Looking at the future of television, Professor Wynand 
Mouton, chairman of the SABC, emphasises the need for 
television to serve the community as a whole. He states 
that more has to be done t  provide a service for both the 
.Asian and Coloured o::mnunities. ~ is reported as being particularly 
concerned with the ole that television can play in 
education. A number of factors point to more energetic 
use of television in this regard. These include the 
manpower shortage, the increase in student population 
in schools and universities and the changing technology 
of education itself. The recommendations of the De 
Lange Commission are being looked at in detail 152• 
On the question of whether television tends to widen 
cultural gaps because of its emphasis on ethnicity -
for example, by broadcasting to Blacks in their own 
languages - Professor Mouton observes that this is 
preferred by viewers. He comments : 
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"Television should cater for different 
cultural groups but the programme 
content tends to bring groups together, 
even though the language does not. 
The SABC is very aware of its respons-
ibility in this regard and is 
continuously reviewing programme 
content in terms of cultural back-
ground." 153 
Professor Mouton adds that "because of policy" there 
is no likelihood of the English and Afrikaans television 
programmes ever being separated, as has happened to 
some extent with radio154 • 
TV2 and TV3 divided into two separate 'regional' services 
in 1983. Viewers on the Reef and in the immediate 
vicinity now have a choice of three SABC channels : 
TVl, TV2 or TV3. Viewers in the predominantly Nguni 
areas of the Cape, Natal and parts of the eastern 
Transvaal have a choice of tuning to either TVl or TV2, 
while those living in the predominantly Sotho areas 
of the northern and western Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State have a choice of either TVl or TV3155 • 
It is, however, erroneous to describe the TV2 and TV3 
services as 'regional' in the traditional broadcasting 
sense, as all programmes originate from the Johannesburg 
studios and are broadcast from the SABC's centralised 
broadcasting complex at Auckland Park. Their intended 
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audiences are often fragmented and located considerable 
distances from Johannesburg. 
True regionalism would imply decentralisation and high 
levels of autonomy. Each station would, as far as 
economically possible, transmit a truly local flavour 
in programming and be located in, or near, the community 
it serves, providing jobs for local people. 
According to Mr Pieter Erasmus, head of TV2 programmes, 
TV2 and TV3 might each eventually have more air time 
than TV1 156 • 
"It is quite possible that within the 
coming decade TV2 and TV3 will be the 
champions in every respect on the 
African television scene, including 
such aspects as studio facilities, 
personnel numbers, numbers of viewers 
and total air time." 157 
In examining broadcasting objectives, Mr Steve de 
Villiers, recently retired (1983) Director-General of 
the SABC, said the introduction of TV2 and TV3 should 
be seen against the overall purpose of SABC broadcasting 
policy in 
" •.• providing edifying and wholesome 
entertainment balanced by information 
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and education .•• it should foster 
good relations between the various 
peoples of the country and should try 
to reflect the cultural assets of all 
th d . 't' "158 e iverse communi ies . 
Mr de Villiers acknowledged that as far as radio services 
are concerned, these objectives were being met by current 
SABC programming. The television service must, in 
his words "pursue similar objectives" 159 • 
There can be little doubt that radio has been a success 
story on an impressive scale. Mr de Villiers pointed 
to the daily listernership in nine languages o~ nearly 
5,5 million people and the average letter receipt of 
between six and seven million letters a year. 
The main challenge facing the Corporation now, according 
to De Villiers, is to harness the power of television 
to education - endorsing Professor Mouton's own 
conviction. 
Planned capital development by the SABC over the five 
years 1982 - 1987 amounts to R250 million. This cost 
includes the development and splitting of the two Black 
services, TV2 and TV3, and the extension and improvement 
. ' . 160 
of current services • 
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The Corporation's production facilities will be enlarged 
with new production centres being built in the eastern 
Cape, Natal and northern Transvaal. A new complex 
is being developed in Cape Town, while it is planned 
161 to further develop Broadcast Centre in Johannesburg • 
In an interview in the Financial Mail in January 1982, 
Mr Wynaand Harmse, the SABC's director of administration 
and finance, reported that, although the total annual 
operating budget of the Corporation was expected to 
increase by more than 50 percent in 1982, the SABC's 
financial position remained healthy. This was largely 
due to revenue generated by advertising on TVl. By 
contrast, revenue from TV2 and TV3 was expected to be 
insufficient to meet expenses in the first year, mainly 
because of the shorter broadcasting hours. He 
expected the SABC will come to the market within the 
next two or three years to borrow capital, in order 
162 to meet its development targets 
Frequent increases in advertising charges, a source 
of annoyance to advertisers and the Society of Marketers, 
are justified by the Corporation in terms of its 
development plans. The SABC emphasises that it 
endeavours· to break even rather than create surpluses. 
It does, however, as the Financial Mail points out, 
have the advantage that if it runs into deficits, it 
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can turn to its advertisers for more revenue and in 
so doing need not be overconcerned with competition163 • 
On the other hand, some advertisers would like to see 
a free market policy operate in relation to advertising 
time, claiming that the SABC is not charging enough 
for its scarce resource. Grey Killarney's media director 
Mr Adraan de Buck claims the cost per thousand viewers 
had increased by only 14 percent over four years and, 
as a result, smaller advertisers who would not normally 
consider television in their media scheduling, are 
becoming attracted to the medium, regardless of whether 
it is the right choice for them164 • 
Many media planners would swiftly refute this statement 
and its implications that size of advertiser should 
have anything to do with access to television, generally 
regarded as the most dynamic and effective advertising 
medium of all. 
The SABC would also, no doubt, take exception to such 
a statement as it tends to contradict its policy of 
attempting to attract advertising from a wide spectrum 
of the South African economy and not just (as generally 
tends to be the case ln practice) the large national 
and multinational advertisers. 
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The so-called 'halo' effect long associated with tele-
vision advertising, whereby additional prestige is 
automatically conferred on the advertiser by virtue 
of being seen on a dynamic medium among other successful, 
well-known companies, is also, no doubt, contributing 
to the scramble for this extremely scarce resource. 
Established users of the medium are obliged to helplessly 
watch their allocations become smaller each year. 
This urgent need for increased commercial air time is 
borne out by industry estimates claiming that TVl was 
oversubscribed by a minimum of 100 percent and that 
TV2/TV3 commercial time could have been oversubscribed 
by as much as 25 - 40 percent for the second half of 
1982165 • 
There is growing evidence indicating that advertisers 
who fail to get the allocations they applied for are 
not inclined to invest the capital in other media166 • 
These developments are naturally a cause for concern 
to the South African press in particular. The implic-
ations for other media are discussed in Chapters 4 and 
5. 
By 1983, the SABC had developed into a large diverse 
broadcasting institution, broadcasting 19 radio services 
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in 20 languages; with four television services utilising 
three channels in seven languages (the shared English/ 
Afrikaans TVl channel counts as two services) 167 . 
In the SABC Annual Report, 1983, the Corporation reiterated 
its intention to become more fully involved in the 
country's education and training needs. 
The establishment by the South African Post Office (SAPO) 
of an experimental videotext system, Beltel, led to 
the SABC focusing its attention on teletext (a system 
by means of which coded information is transmitted by 
television signal) with a variety of possible applications 
· 1 d. b t·t1· f · 168 inc u ing su - i ing or programming 
Considerable time was spent during 1983 investigat~ng 
the new broadcasting technologies including cable-TV, 
over-the-air subscription TV (STV), direct broadcasting 
by satellite (DBS), multipoint distribution services 
(MDS), using microwave frequencies to increase the number 
of over-the-air channels169 . (These new technologies 
are described in Chapter 7 : Evolution, Innovation 
and New Technology). 
The SABC expects to become "actively involved" in satellite 
technology in the "near future" 170 • 
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SABC revenue totalled R316,4 million, with advertising 
services, after deducting commission, contributing just 
over Rl97 million, or 62 percent. Television advertis-
idng, the Corporations single largest source of income, 
generated revenue of Rl41,6 million or 45 percent of 
total revenue171 . 
The SABC today is at a crossroad. A policy of con-
solidation and improvement of existing services has 
been outlined for the 1980's. Beyond that no clear 
policy statement has been publicly announced, apart 
from the fact that the Corporation will be watching 
developments in broadcasting in other countries with 
interest. 
The Corporation, variously described by its detractors 
as a monolithic, autocratic institution, has come a 
long wa9 in its 48 years as a state corporation. It 
has survived political onslaughts of great intensity 
and long duration capable, in some countries, of bringing 
governments down. It has pursued its interpretation 
of the broadcasting ideals propagated by Sir John Reith, 
under whose influence the BBC and numerous broadcasting 
organisations around the world were shaped. 
Fiercely pro-South African from the outset, the 
Corporation has ultra-cautiously picked its way through 
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the complexities of the South African socio-political 
scene, appearing to many to have sacrificed its autonomy 
(Reith's prerequisite for public service broadcasting) 
to political expediency along the way; 
The Steyn Commission of Enquiry into the Mass Media,, 
although woefully inadequate in its coverage of broad-
casting, did recognise the importance of restoring a 
measure of autonomy to the SABC. It is a matter for 
regret that the Prime Minister has rejected the Steyn 
Commission's concept of autonomy, preferring to keep 
the SABC on a reasonably tight rein, under the wing 
of his Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
However, the Broadcasting Amendment Bill providing for, 
among other things, increasing the membership of the 
SABC's board from nine to 15, to allow for the inclusion 
of other races and enabling the Director-General of 
the Corporation to be appointed by the board, is a 
promising development for the future of South African 
broadcasting, and television in particular. 
The real challenge on the future of television broad-
casting has yet to be faced by the South African govern-
ment. With the SABC totally committed for the 
foreseeable future to its programme of consolidation 
and improvement of existing television services, new 
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developments in television, e.g. additional channels 
and regional services, should be encouraged to come 
from the private sector, a desirable situation in a 
democracy. The Steyn Commission, disappointingly, 
chose not to face up to this exciting possibility. 
Will the government yet heed the inherent logic in the 
following quote which formed part of the NPU's sub-
mission to the Steyn Commission? 
"Though the historical reasons are under-
stood, at any rate at the present time 
(January, 1981), this situation {mono-
poly) is undesirable and not in the best 
interests of a democratic order. A 
better balance, as well as a more 
competitive relationship for radio-TV, 
would be achieved by allowing newspapers 
and other interested groups to acquire 
rights • . • to commercial radio and TV 
stations, in competition and for 
partnership with the SABc. 11172 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF TELEVISION BROADCASTING 
4.1 PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS TELEVISION 
The examination of the social implications of television 
is a prerequisite to any presentation advocating more 
television for South Africa. It is necessary, and 
indeed essential, to look beyond the brief South African 
experience to countries with a much longer involvement 
with the medium. 
In a dissertation of this nature it is not possible 
to review the whole spectrum of social implications 
of television broadcasting. It was decided, therefore, 
to examine those aspects that possibl~ have .the more 
direct implications for future television developments 
in South Africa. 
Television is evaluated in a 'public service' role and 
this term, in itself is sometimes regarded as ambiguous. 
Throughout this dissertation the term "public service 
broadcasting" is meant to convey broadcasting that has 
the primary objective of satisfying public needs for 
information, entertainment and education. It is 
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genera~ly considered that this objective is best served 
through a variety and balance of programme offerings. 
The term also implies catering for'the needs of minority 
. 
audiences by providing television services that are 
not always judged successful using conventional commercial 
criteria. 
It follows then, that 'public service' television accord-
ing to this definition, places the 'public interest' 
above commercial considerations, usually through a 
broadcasting organisation accountable to the public. 
Unfortunately, the concept of 'public interest' is even 
more difficult to define in broadcasting terms as the 
history of broadcasting shows•' Thus, both terms defy 
precise and universally accepted definition. 
In turning to over 30 years of United States' and 
European television experience, one is immediately 
confronted by the controversial and complex nature of 
the problem. Lucid arguments are to be found in 
profusion, mainly condemning, but occasionally praising 
television in a social context. 
Although the sociologists differ widely in their think-
ing, there seems to be a measure of agreement among 
the more recent researchers that the true potential 
of the medium, in terms of social service, has yet to 
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be fully explored. Television's dependence on 
commercial support has tended to result in under-
utilisation of its potential to inform and educate. 
The overemphasis on entertainment associated with 
commercial television is frequently viewed by the 
sociologist with concern. 
Eric SevaYeid, CBS news commentator and frequent writer 
on television in society, has a point when he says : 
n 
• The most conspicuous critics of 
the medium, of course, are the professional 
intellectuals • • • whose complaints are 
addressed to other fastidious intellectuals. 
They are telling each other what they them-
selves like and dislike about TV. But 
they put on a disguise. They pretend that 
their concern is with the great mass of the 
people • • • They tempt me to agree with 
Eric Hoffer who said ••• that 'intellectuals 
must never be given power because they want 
people to get down on their knees and learn 
to love what they really hate and hate what 
they love' • .1 
Concern with television takes on stronger tones when 
one examines the now considerable amount of research 
dealing with the effects of broadcasts containing sex 
and violence,, on young people. Here there appears to 
be a developing concensus reinforcing a disturbing 
picture. 
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Claims that television discourages reading are hard 
to prove. Considerable evidence exists which supports 
the contrary. Books serialised on television, both 
contemporary and classic, have experienced phenomenal 
sales after TV exposure. Interesting topics on TV 
often stimulate people into seeking out books for more 
information and enjoyment. 
TV is often pointed to as a destroyer of conversation. 
However, some sociologists take the view that non-
conversing families were non-conversing families before 
television entered their lives. It can, of course, 
also be argued that TV programmes themselves generate 
a great deal of conversation. 
It is also claimed that TV debases the purity of language, 
yet there are millions of people living in slums and 
remote rural areas who almost never hear good diction 
except on TV _or the radio2 • 
Television became the dominant information medium in 
America in 1963 and has steadily increased its lead 
. 3 
since • What is interesting from South Africa's point 
of view, is that Americans now look to television as 
the primary source of news about the communities they 
live in, as well as for a great variety of public services. 
This emphasises the growing social importance of 
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regional television in large countries with heterogeneous 
populations, of which South Africa is an example. The 
conventional television networks in America are under 
siege from the new technology and its multitude of new 
viewing options : Satellite and cable TV.; over-the-
air pay TV broadcasting scrambled signals; teletext; 
direct-to-home satellite distribution systems and of 
course the now familiar (even in South Africa) video 
cassette recorders. Conventional networks will survive 
but only if, it 'is thought, they are able to adapt to 
the popular demand for more 'localism' - the expanded 
use of television formats which rely upon local and 
regional news and information. In this way, conventional 
stations will mark themselves out as different from 
the suppliers of programmes from remote sources via 
satellite or cassette4 • 
It is essential, if &outh African television is to develop 
into a major industry, providing a high level of public 
service, that the government examines methods of 
incorporating 'localism' or at least regionalism into 
future developments. If it fails to rise to this 
challenge, and chooses not to follow the lead of other 
industrial countries, then whole sections of the South 
African viewing public could be enticed away from what 
is still a very underdeveloped indigenous resource, 
to the more polishe~ offerings that could eventually be 
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The obvious alternative would be to allow private 
enterprise, with suitable safeguards, to develop a strong 
regional television network with the-emphasis on 
'localism' as is happening in America, Australia and 
Britain, and a number _of other countries (see also 
Chapter 7, Evolution, Innovation and New Technology 
and Chapter 9, Aspects of Overseas Television Systems 
of Possible Relevance to Future Developments in South 
Africa ) • 
A combination of the state corporation SABC and an 
independent regional television service, would constitute 
the basis for a rigorous South African television 
industry, with a good chance of holding its own against 
future international satellite competition. 
A parallel exists in Europe where it is now believed 
by media commentators that some governments will be 
persuaded by the threat of foreign satellite broadcasts 
to liberalise their own broadcasting systems and admit 
h l d d t . . 5 more c anne s an a ver ising • 
/ 4.1.1 The Influence of Television 
In the United States the influence of television is 
all-pervasive. Watching TV is, for most Americans, 
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the most frequent activity after work and sleep6 • Given 
its pervasive powers, the question that really concerns 
sociologists, psychologists, etc. is how persuasive 
is television? In an interesting study by Professor 
W'll' St h Th Pl Th f M C . t' ? 1 iam ep enson, e ay eory o ass ommunica ion , 
an intellectµal framework is created to help explain 
what the consumer of television is experiencing. 
Stephenson says the consumer's life is divided into 
work and play. Watching television is considered to 
be a play activity and for this reason it is not some-
' 
thing to be taken too seriously. Television is for 
relaxation and entertainment. But it is not mindless. 
Newspaper and magazine reading are also seen as leisure-
time activities but with a more serious purpose. 
Stephenson concludes that the programmers of American 
television have grasped this point, and therefore the 
need to engage the viewer and hold his attention becomes 
the bottom-line requirement of all television present-
ation. 
It is possible that some South African programmers are 
unaware of this theory, or are reluctant to subscribe 
to it because of its tendency to place all programming 
in the 'show business' category, whether it is news, 
documentary or entertainment. Nevertheless, it could 
perhaps, partially explain the fairly high proportion 
of indigenous programmes, that are dull and predictable 
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and which fail to meet viewer expectations. 
In this connection, it is interesting to compare the 
polished, professional efforts of the advertisers to 
those of the programme producers. True, they are in 
the selling business and fully understand the importance 
of impact and presentation in a competitive market. 
If television is seen from the point of view of its 
audience in terms of Stephenson's "television-as-play" 
theory, some seemingly contradictory developments are 
explained. 
Candidates for political office in the Unites States 
today increasingly use television to convey 'auras' 
to the voters rather than policies. Diamond8 uses 
the Ford-Carter presidential campaign to illustrate 
this point. The strategists concluded that the voters' 
presidential choice would turn on perception of 
character, as no major substantive issues appeared to 
divide the candidates. The question posed to the 
voters in 1976 was, in effect : 
"Who is best able to restore confidence 
in government and faith in the American 
way after the terrible events of 
Watergate, the excesses of the CIA and 
the FBI, the Vietnam war and the civil 
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disorders? - what better way to convey 
aura and a persona than to use television 
• • • where performers constantly project 
images and emotions? • Not 
surprisingly then, both Mr Ford and Mr 
Carter eagerly accepted the of fer of the 
League of Women Voters for a series of 
presidential 'debates' on television to 
demonstrate their abilities. • •• 
The 1976 campaign turned on the stylistic 
issue of character and television was 
used to project that character." 9 
Another example of taking the viewers' perception into 
account can be found in looking at daytime television. 
This very popular viewing behaviour pattern (not yet 
fully established in South Africa) is often dismissed 
in a derisive fashion as 'soap opera', so called because 
the original programme sponsors were detergent and other 
consumer goods manufacturers, who targeted their products 
predominantly at the housewife. The attention of this 
audience is captured by dramatic serials of family life 
whose on-going plots emphasised highly dramatic family 
crises such as adultery, alcoholism, run-away children, 
pregnancy, abortion or divorce. Diamond considers 
these programmes as highly politicized material in that 
they raise the kinds of human issues that people can 
imagine themselves facing. 
South African viewers have experienced some of the same 
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kind of emotional involvement, albeit in the evening, 
at peak viewing time, with the imported American 
programme Dallas and also with the South African 
production Westgate. 
Even in peak viewing evening slot$,where the American 
emphasis is unabashedly on entertainment, Diamond detects 
a trend towards the more intelligent comedies where 
very real social issues are handled. Many of these 
American programmes dealing with sensitive human 
relationships have since proved extremely popular with 
South African audiences. In addition to All in the 
Family and The Mary Tyler Moore Show, quoted as examples 
of the popular culture by Diamond10 , the more recent 
Taxi and WRKP in Cincinnati are good examples of comedies 
which are able to explore human relationships with 
sensitivity. 
4.1.2 Television and Black-White Relations 
In examining the influence of television on society, 
an interesting study with relevance to South Africa 
was carried out by K.N. Bowmani at Stanford University11 ~ 
The general purpose of the research was to determine 
if TV tended to foster, maintain, or close the socio-
economic-political (SEP) gaps between Blacks and Whites 
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in America. 
The study was divided into two parts. The first 
included a project called One Week of Black TV which 
systematically examined the portrayal of Blacks on prime-
time network TV. The second part included a Hollywood 
case study, based on the popular Black TV programme 
Good Times which examined the function of TV in relation 
to the Black communi~y. Both parts of the study used 
the basic of DCT (domestic colonialism theory). DC 
was defined as a highly unequal, exploitive relation-
ship imposed and controlled by a dominant group over 
a subordinate racial or cultural group within a country. 
Four basics of Black DC were examined 
(1) domination or involuntary subordination; 
(2) cultural devaluation; 
(3) colonial administration; 
(4) racism. 
A major proposition that Blacks on prime-time network 
TV tend to be portrayed in subordinate lower-status 
occupations, was not supported, indicating perhaps that 
programmers were consciously trying to avoid stereotyping 
Blacks, rather than reflecting American society as it 
is. South African programmers are often faced with 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
4-13 
the same dilemma which is seldom resolved convincingly, 
from a viewer's point of view. 
Other contentious conclusions reached by Bowmani were : 
(1) TV maintains and probably fosters existing SEP 
gaps between Blacks and Whites. 
I (2) Black DC is fostered by TV's profit-maximising 
operations as broadcasters claim they have no 
mechanism besides profits and audience ratings 
for judging programmes. 
(3) TV tends to provide homogenized, imitative 
programming that reinforces the DC mentality 
and status of Blacks. 
(4) Black ownership and employment in TV is colonial, 
partly because broadcasters do not fulfil their 
legal obligation to 'serve the public interest, 
convenience and necessity' (presumably another 
argument that the prof,it motive inhibits equal 
opportunity in the television industry). 
(5) The outlook for TV as a tool for Black decolonisation 
is not promising (in the U.S.*) given current 
SEP conditions. 
*Author's italics 
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Summarising Bowmani's recommendations : 
(1) Researchers should concentrate more of their 
limited resources on 'macro issues•, e.g. the 
effects of corporate control on TV programming 
policy. 
(2) Improvements in Black TV portrayals should be 
matched by concomitant improvements in Black 
ownership and employment in the TV industry. 
(3) Blacks should have a fair share of control over 
TV and other aspects of society proportional 
to the population. 
(4) TV's profit maximising ethic should be dropped 
and basic changes are needed in the industry's 
inter-locking financial relationships with big 
business. 
(5) While being restructured, TV should be simul-
taneously used to foster Black decolonisation, 
the elimination of gaps between rich and poor, 
men and women, etc. 
A central pillar of Bowmani's dissertation, namely 
that the system, or existing TV institutions, militate 
against decolonisation (in South Africa the term 'equal 
integration' probably comes nearest in meaning) is 
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probably overstated. However, the call for industry 
restructuring has been made before and may well 
eventually be forced on the industry by SEP pressures 
and/or the dynamic nature of the new technology. How 
these recommendations might be achieved, assuming of 
course that they have the necessary level of American 
public support, is open to conjecture. Certainly it 
would require an increase in regulatory instruments 
at a time when the emphasis is on deregulation of 
broadcasting. 
Nevertheless, the overall findings of Bowmani's research 
have a possible bearing on the development of television 
in South Africa. Particularly relevant is the 
recognition given by the study to television as a power-
ful force for influ ncing human behaviour. Indeed, 
many of the issues raised are currently exercising 
broadcasters on both the Black and White services of 
the SABC. 
have been. 
Only time will show how successful they 
4.1.3 Pressures on 'Offensive' Television Programmes 
The American experience provides numerous examples of 
public concern regarding programme content and there 
is a history of pressure groups advocating boycotting 
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of companies sponsoring what are considered to be 
'offensive' programmes. It was not so long ago that 
these pressure groups held considerable power and their 
influence, to a significant degree, dictated the kind 
of programme networked across the United States. This 
led to 'safe' rather bland television fare, non-
controversial in content, relatively inoffensive, where 
fear of upsetting the sponsor (advertiser) and particularly 
his customers, became a major concern of programme 
planners. However, bold new developments in programme 
experimentation began appearing in Britain in the 1960's. 
These controversial,but highly imaginative new directions 
were to revolutionise the medium in Britain and, consider-
ably later, in the United States. 
The basic ingredient in the new formula was satire. 
Few individuals, institutions or beliefs were sacrosanct. 
Cynical observation, the debunking of hypocracy and 
ridicule, provided a new creative format which astonished 
the viewing public and rivetted them to their television 
screens. South Africans will be interested to learn 
that this programme innovation began with'the BBC which 
does not carry advertising, so did not have to worry 
about upsetting'sponsors. The BBC is also privileged 
in that it does not have to conform to the requirements 
as laid d.own in the Television Act, enjoying its jealously 
guarded charter status. The independent (commercial) 
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television companies in Britain are obliged to conform 
with the minimum requirements of the Act. They also 
have to heed, to some extent, the attitudes of the 
advertisers buying spots in their programmes. For 
this reason, they can perhaps be compared with their 
American counterparts when it comes to being sensitive 
to public reaction to programming. Commercial television 
per se,has always been suspect in the sociological sense, 
so the British independent companies have tended to 
concentrate on professionalism and evolving progranunes 
acceptable to the masses, with the emphasis on entertain-
ment rather than on innovation and its possible 
controversial consequences. 
Two recent examples illustrate the BBC's unique autonomy 
regarding programme issues. The first is what many 
consider to be the 'outrageously' satirical comedy series 
Not the Nine O'Clock News. The second concerns the 
BBC's stance on its coverage of the Falkland Island 
crisis. Under severe criticism from Mrs Margaret 
Thatcher the Prime Minister, leading defence statesmen 
and many other influential Britons, not to mention large 
elements of the British public, Mr Richard Francis, 
head of BBC radio replied : 
11 
••• It is not the BBC's role to boost 
British troops' morale or to rally the 
British people to the flag • Our 
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contribution to the national morale in 
the present crisis is no more than to 
provide the most reliable account 
possible of confusing, worrying events 
• • • The truth is always the best 
12 propaganda." 
Needless to say, this second contentious and rather 
extreme example was siezed upon by sections of the South 
African press to draw comparisons : 
"How incongruously these words fall upon 
South African ears inured as they are 
to the biased, politically suspect 
approach to news which has become the 
hallmark of the SABC! And how refresh-
ingly independent he (Richard Francis) 
seems after the obsequiousness which 
luminaries in our own electronic media 
display towards the Government • It 13 
The American broadcasters' dilemna of whether they should 
risk alienating the sponsors by pursuing more controversial 
programming, or maintain the status quo, was solved 
by the simple expedient of observing the changing needs 
of the viewing public. Americans began examining the 
line between democratic self-expression and antidemocratic 
repression. ' They grew increasingly dissatisfied with 
pressure groups attempting to become arbiters of taste 
and dictators of moral philosophy for the nation. 
Television itself had changed. The trend was away 
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from sponsorship of programmes (and consequently 
programme control) towards the buying of spots in the 
programmes. The advertisers, although still concerned 
with where their advertisements appeared in the programm-
ing, had less opportunity to dictate programme content, 
their main concern being with audience size (the ratings). 
For all that, pressure groups like the Coalition for 
Better Broadcasting claiming to represent 300 mostly 
conservative, anti-abortion and religious groups 
(including Moral Majority, its largest member and 
financier, which demonstrated its formidable political 
influence in the 1980 elections), are taken very 
seriously indeed by advertisers and broadcasters alike. 
Some observers argue that while many of the other 
pressure groups want to refine and expand certain aspects 
of television content, the coalition wants to eliminate 
great chuncks of the schedule so the TV product conforms 
with its views and visions. Moreover, the dominating 
presence of Moral Majority in its ranks suggests that 
the overriding concerns are not just social,but political 
and religious. For many, the spectre of a 'new 
conformity' is real and chilling14 • 
According to John O'Connor, television has had its own 
history of citizen pressures. Many groups have lobbied 
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successfully in recent years for better representation 
on TV : Blacks, Hispanics, women, homosexuals, environ-
mentalists, etc. 
In the 1970's the National Citizens Committee for Broad-
casting, a group currently headed by Ralph Nader, 
regularly and prominently identified advertisers whose 
spots appeared most frequently in violent programming. 
No official boycotts of the advertised products were 
called for, but the strategy clearly involves sensitive 
15 
matters of degree • 
The American television industry is resisting such 
pressures. Programmes, like NBC's Jesus of Nazareth, 
were broadcast despite opposition from several religious 
groups. So, too, was CBS's Playing for Time, the story 
of a Jewish victim of a Nazi concentration camp, starring 
Vanessa Redgrave, an outspoken advocate of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), in spite of protests 
from Jewish gr~ups16 • 
In Britain, in 1980, ATV's programme Death of a Princess, 
a dramatised reconstruction of the life and death of 
a Saudi Arabian princess executed with her lover in 
1977 for adultery, sparked off what the Daily Mail referred 
to as "the biggest row since Suez". The newspaper 
claimed that the Saudi's were threatening to ban British 
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exports, cut off diplomatic relations and embargo 
17 Britain's oil, if the programme was broadcast • ATV 
went ahead with the broadcast and as far as it is known 
none of the alleged threats materialised. In retrospect, 
it would appear that the British press gave the story 
far more substance than it actually had, but there can 
be no doubt that the programme did cause a major inter-
national incident. 
Apart from constant criticism from individuals and some 
small, relatively unsophisticated groups in the press, 
South African television has yet to experience organised 
pressure groups on a large scale. The powerful Dutch 
Reformed Church {NGK) has consistently opposed the 
broadcasting of sport on Sundays. However, there 
appears to be a discernible, albeit unorganised, ground-
swell advocating that Sunday's television programming 
should be restructured to cater more for the needs of 
those viewers seeking to relax with entertainment and 
sport. The current overemphasis on religious broad-
casting is the cause of much dissatisfaction. 
It is known that the SABC has been wrestling with the 
subject of Sunday sport for a considerable time, but 
so far it has been unable to satisfactorily resolve 
the problem. 
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Ian Gray comments that a blanket 'No' to Sunday sports' 
broadcasting would result in 
" ••• a wail of outrage from the Black 
viewers who have indicated in surveys 
that sport is their top form of television 
entertainment ~ and for Blacks, Sunday 
is for many reasons the most important 
viewing day • • • 
• • • A blanket 'Yes' would bring forth 
just as loud a protest from Whites -
but from a much smaller section of that 
population group. It is, as we know 
from the political front,  tiny but 
vociferous minority • . • nl8 
Hope was given to sports fans by the SABC announcement 
on May 16, 1982, that the corporation had reserved over 
four hours of satellite feed time on Sunday, July 4, 
for the Men's Singles Tennis Championship's Final from 
Wimbledon. A spokesman said the SABC was trying to 
obtain the best possible coverage, but the actual Sunday 
broadcast was not finalised19 • 
Significant differences in attitudes to television exist 
between South Africans and people from other Western 
countries. Whereas the British, Americans and 
Australians are, to a large part, firmly addicted to 
the medium, i.e. it plays a large part in occupying 
their time, the South African viewer's involvement with 
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television is relatively slight by comparison. 
"A British visitor recently put forward 
the serious suggestion that the SABC's 
strength lay in the fact that the bulk 
of South Africans will never become 
addicted to television to the extent 
that overseas viewers have • He 
found it terribly refreshing that most 
South Africans turn off the TV when 
visitors arrive and often leave it 
switched off for nights at a stretch, 
except perhaps for a brief period of 
news-watching • • • In Britain, he 
said, you can switch on early in the 
evening and, by channel switching, be 
completely absorbed in your television 
till the small hours • n 20 
This apparent 'lack of commitment' on behalf of viewers 
to television widely prevalent in South Africa, will 
almost certainly change as existing programme offerings 
improve both in quality and choice, creating a greater 
dependence on the medium in future generations. However, 
as there is yet no South African generation that has 
grown up with television, it is fascinating to explore 
perceptions of television particularly among educated 
opinion leaders in South African society (see also 
Chapter 8, South African Opinion and the Television 
Debate). 
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Perhaps typical, in many ways, of those who oppose 
television is Dr Chris Barnard, the heart transplant 
pioneer, who recalls how as a young doctor carrying 
out research in the United States he found television 
more of an irritant than a relaxant and he was unable 
to join other hospital staff who, after a fatiguing 
day, used to fall into an armchair and n1et the box 
massage their cares away1121 • 
Barnard's criticisms of television are not original 
but nevertheless have a relevance to present South 
African society. For example, in referring to the 
new technology, he states : 
fl Important events will be reduced 
to trivialities. The first time you see 
the assassination of an important figure 
you are horrified. The tenth time you 
are bored - which to me has more fearful 
, 
implications for the human race than the 
sociologists' warning of an increase in 
the availability of pornographic films 
11 22 
He is also critical of what he terms the nsubtle mould-
ing of behaviour and opinion by the box", indicating 
that viewers lose a sense of reality : 
n In South Africa the mythical 
headaches faced by a half dozen Ewings 
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(the central £amily in the Dallas series) 
are of more import and get more 
screen time than the very real heartaches 
faced by a half million migrant labourers 
• • • Worse TV destroys your 'now' 
experience • • • every hour spent watching 
is an hour less to spend doing • 
People who are fully occupied in active 
living simply don't have the chronic 
depressions, vague worries, odd aches and 
poor digestion of those who merely sit 
and watch others •.. " 23 
In judging television to be subtly all-pervasive, he 
sugars the pill, but only slightly when he states : 
" ••• There is some evidence that it acts 
to make life bearable in situations where 
it should be unbearable, as in problem-
ridden families or an unhappy marriage 
held together only because the members 
spend every free hour in front of the box. 
Take away the box and the marriage or 
family, never having time to examine their 
condition, falls apart ..• 
• • . There is also something strange 
about the view that TV is a blessing for 
the aged. As my sociologist friend 
put it : 'How sick we are in thinking 
that the old are provided for if only 
we keep them hooked into the drug that 
comes from the needle of the hypodermic 
aerial on the roof' • n24 
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Although somewhat cynical, and certainly not typical, 
Barnard's views on television are reflected to a greater 
or lesser extent by other South African opinion leaders, 
as Chapter 8 demonstrates. Educated people of ten find 
little to praise and much to criticise. 
Newspaper columnist Brian Barrow is typical of those 
South Africans who fear rather than welcome more tele-
vision. Hitting out at the 'cable revolution' soon 
to arrive in Britain, he describes the whole development 
II 'l d h • f 0 n 25 as evi an orri ying • 
Barrow fears that television will eventually regulate 
the lives of South Africans : 
II 
curse 
Already television is becoming a 
• a great mind leveller which 
is slowly and insidiously destroying 
our capacity for original thought. 
• It is forcing upon us a 
centralised uniformity and changing our 
moral and spiritual lives. I wouldn't 
be at all surprised if one day . • • 
people will look back on it as one of 
the greatest evils ever invented. 
There are many people who think that 
even the good TV programmes are 
fundamentally bad for us. In fact 
they might be the most harmful of all 
because they stunt and cripple the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
4-27 
imaginations of children with visual 
material from a central source. It is 
a frightening thought that images fed 
to us in this manner can stifle all 
originality • 
Cable TV is already a reality in the 
United States, Belgium and West Germany. 
In Britain the government is con~ider­
ing recommendations to introduce it 
Let us hope and pray that it 
never comes to South Africa. 026 
Barrow's criticism is typical of many South Africans 
who have comparatively recently seen television enter 
their lives. It is worth noting however, that similar 
criticism and emotional reaction greeted the invention 
of the printing press. The fact that television can 
serve the community via information, education and 
entertainment a d is a vital component of present day 
civilisation, tends to escape these critics who apparently 
sieze only on the abuses and excesses of the medium, 
of ten presented by means of questionable research and 
based largely on emotion. 
The debate should ideally centre around the uses to 
which the medium is put and not on emotional trivia 
and generalities. Certainly many media researchers 
and sociologists would strongly disagree with Marshall 
McLuhan when he states "the media is the message". 
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Contemporary commentators generally prefer to stress 
program.me quality as being a sine qua non, if television 
is to provide an enjoyable, exciting and socially 
gratifying service. 
Amid the debate as to what television's role should 
be in society, certain basic requirements are continually 
stated. It should have mass appeal in informing, 
educating and entertaining the public. It should provide 
a forum for free speech and communication, free from 
interference and its program.mes should reflect society's 
various interpretations of the term "social respons-
ibility". It should avoid becoming an instrument of 
political propaganda. 
The effects of television on society, as previously 
stated, are the subject of much research, but as yet 
remain largely unknown. Because the medium is still 
so young, researchers do not have subjects who have 
been exposed to it all of their lives. At very best, 
the oldest subjects for study purposes are only thirty-
five years old. The vast majority of people in the 
world have never even seen a television set as it is 
doubtful if more than 10% of the world's population 
h t t 1 . . 27 ave access o e ev1s1on • 
Milton Shulman also shares the view that Marshall 
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McLuhan was wide of the mark when he implied that the 
contents of the medium are irrelevant. He quotes 
Herbert Marcuse's view that television in America 
indoctrinates and manipulates people to accept the virtues 
of affluences and the profit motive through entertainment 
and commercials. 
"It thus positively obscures and disguises 
the contradictions of capitalism and 
reinforces the system. 1128 
Shulman implies that one does not have to go the whole 
way in agreeing with Marcuse's social criticism of 
television to accept his view that programme content 
is significant in shaping the attitudes of a society29 • 
4.2 TELEVISION AND YOUTH 
It is possible that television is made something of 
a scapegoat for family difficulties. Dr Bruno 
Bettelheim, Professor of Educational Psychology at the 
University of Chicago and Principal of the University's 
Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School for disturbed children, 
claims that parents, in their chronic anxiety to 'do 
the right thing' in bringing up their children, find 
it easier to fight television than to fight the problem 
in themselves 30 • 
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Dr Bettelheim recalls that there was a time when smoking 
was blamed for criminal behaviour, the corruption of 
youth and other social evils, views which seem ridiculous 
now. Similar criticism was levelled at the- cinema 
by responsible citizens when it first became popular. 
He concludes that the same thing seems to be happening 
to television. 
Bettelheim points to the striking contradiction between 
what people say about television and what they do about 
it. Few American families today are without at least 
one set in their homes. Would parents spend their 
own money to put before their children something that 
they honestly believe will corrupt them? Hardly, he 
concludes. 
"What seems more accurate is that parents 
aren't sure. They then feel a little 
guilty, fearing that their own pleasure 
in television as entertainment, and their 
own wish to give their children the same 
privileges as other children, may have 
led them into the path of least 
resistance - to the ultimate harm of their 
children. 1131 
Referring to British research published in 1958, entitled 
Television and the Child32 , he points to the report's 
conclusion 
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the final picture of the influence 
of TV on children's interests, knowledge, 
outlook and values proves to be far less 
colourful and dramatic than popular 
opinion is inclined to suppqse • • • n 33 
Though the British research doubted the effectiveness 
of TV in influencing personality, it was felt that the 
constant display of aggression by both the criminal 
and the upholder of the law would make an impact on 
children sensitive to such cues. 
Bettelheim argues that the.more educated the parent, 
the greater the gap between his interests and those 
of a young child, with the exception of certain play 
activities. Parents not exposed to TV as children 
(as is the case with .the South African adult), are often 
at a loss to fathom what it means, or may do to their 
children. Busy parents, craving free time for them-
selves, realise that letting their children watch 
television can provide this free time, but it often 
heightens feelings of guilt and this guilt which is 
really a manifestation of self dissatisfaction, is 
projected on to the medium as a whole. 
Less educated parents with perhaps fewer demands upon 
their free time, often watch and enjoy television with 
their children. They demonstrate few anxieties regarding 
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the medium, often being happily convinced that television 
keeps the family together. 
The other social source of anxiety explored by Bettelheim 
arises from the difference between television and the 
culture of the book. In his opinion, educated parents 
feel that audiovisual transmission of knowledge is more 
primitive than the printed word and more lacking in 
richness. They therefore complain that TV is taking 
childre.n away from reading. Bettelheim argues that 
for the vast majority of the populations of the United 
States and Western Europe this was not a problem 
" • . as children cannot be taken away 
from a literary culture that was never 
part of their lives . . . it was 
exactly those layers of the population 
who had never embraced the culture of 
the book - though most were literate -
who were delighted with TV, while the 
more highly educated the group . • • 
the greater their resistance to TV. 
Thus while the mass media and most of 
all TV, have opened much wider horizons 
to the non-book-readers, highly literate 
people fear illogically that TV will 
narrow the non-reader's cultural 
tradition. 1134 
Psychologically, television has more immediate impact 
and can capture the imagination, but does not liberate 
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it, according to Bettelheim. A good book not only 
stimulates but frees the mind, by involving the reader 
in personal mental activity, whereas television often 
leads to mental passivity. Although believing that 
the book is still of greater refinement as a learning 
instrument, Bettelheim argues that television also has 
unique qualities, particularly in terms of impact and 
information retention and that both have their place 
in society. 
More recent research by Colley in 1977 35 confirms 
instructional television as an effective tool in the 
educational process, when combined with other aspects 
of the educational environment, and particularly so 
when supported by active student involvement. 
In Calley's study each of four language arts classes 
was exposed to a different combination of television 
and activities. The study used two junior high schools 
in Oregon. Group One viewed the·televised lessons and 
nothing more. Group Two viewed the televised lessons 
twice. Group Three viewed the television lessons and 
did written practices, checking their responses with 
overhead projections. Group Four viewed the television 
lessons and had a brief discussion about them. 
Analysis of covariance revealed that learning occured 
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under all treatments and that Group Three was significantly 
higher than the average of the other three groups (P < 
. 
0,05). There was no significant difference in learning 
among Groups One, Two and Four. The superiority o~ 
the Group Three treatment was still evident though slightly 
diminished after ten days. 
This study tends to confirm Bettelheim's theories 
particularly with regard to television's educational 
qualities in terms of impact and retention. 
Further confirmation is forthcoming by examining research 
36 
carried out by Storm, 1980 , where young children's 
learning from selected television programme content 
(varied subject matter) was determined and a relationship 
sought between learning and a number of independent 
variables such as age, level in school, school achieve-
ment, average education of adults in the family and 
amount of prior viewing with an adult. Among the study's 
conclusions were the amount of viewing that a child 
does with adults appears to make a difference to how 
well he/she understands the content; that children 
learn more from certain types of television programmes 
as they get older; that subjects in the study whose 
adults in the home had more educatio~were reported 
to watch less television than others (possibly suggest-
ing that parental example led to greater selectivity 
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on the part of the· child), had fewer siblings, did better 
in school and learned more from selected television 
programming, especially programming designed to teach 
content traditionally taught in elementary schools. 
Shulman37 argues that television is now a fifth environ-
mental factor when considering the most important 
socializing influences in a child's life. He considers 
it now ranks in importance with the home and parents, 
the neighbourhood, school and church. None of these 
factors occupies more of a Western child's waking hours 
than does the small screen. 
Shulman points out that the average viewing figure for 
American children is four to four and a half hours per 
day. Since this is an average, many children obviously 
spend even more hours watching TV. Among the poor 
and uneducated the figure rises to five to six hours 
a day. One American statistic testified to the fact 
that in some slum areas of New Yor~ children between 
the ages of three and five looked at television eight 
to ten hours a day. It has been calculated that by 
the time the average American child has graduated from 
high school, he will have spent 10 800 hours in school 
and more than 20 000 hours watching television. It 
is likely that this figure will soon be matched in 
Britain38 • 
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In the light of the new technology, whereby satellite 
and cable television vastly increase viewing options 
(a development subsequent to the publication of Shulman's 
book in 1973), these figures are almost certainly on 
the conservative side. 
Shulman's central thesis is that television is being 
misused by an overabundance of trivial entertainment. 
He argues that young people may see this triviality 
as a reflection of society, become revolted by it, by 
moving violently against it, or by opting out altogether. 
39 In his book, The Ravenous Eye , he examines in some 
detail the evidence that television might be a serious 
contributor to the manifestations of violence, 
rejection of authority, the widening of the generation 
gap, unprecedented drug taking as a gesture of defiance 
and escape from straight society. He feels it is dis-
turbingly significant that these forms of antisocial 
behaviour are particularly prevalent in the United States, 
Britain and Canada, the only countries (at that stage, 
1973) that had raised a generation exposed to television. 
All of these countries, he points out, have made enter-
tainment the prime consideration in programming. 
Over thirty years of researching problems associated 
with television and children in the United States has 
brought in strong evidence that parental authority is 
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being undermined. According to Dr Irving Kaye of the 
40 Community Counselling Centre in New York , even the 
so-called harmless 'family' shows like Eight is Enough 
and The Tony Randall Show, which depict children as 
being brighter than their dull, dim-witted parents, 
are undermining the authority and influence of real-
life parents. 
Another family expert, Dr Selma Miller, of the American 
Association of Marriage and Family Counsellors, agrees. 
"The TV family has a definite influence 
on the viewing audience. • •. Parents 
and children tend to imitate, or at 
least think about imitating the relation-
41 
ships they watch on TV." 
Dr Diane Schmukler, a development psychologist at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, specialising in research 
into the effects of television on children, comments : 
"In general, South Africa has a relatively 
benign TV service. • •• but I do feel 
that it is harmful for children and 
parents to see family dramas and conflicts 
reach a 'happily ever after' conclusion 
in only 30 minutes, when of course, real-
life is not like that at a11. 1142 
Dr Schmukler recognises television as a medium capable 
of exciting strong social influence. She believes 
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certain morality issues played out on television are 
possibly harmful to teenagers who, she considers, could 
well interpret these situations as normal behaviour43 • 
Even the much acclaimed educational television programme 
Sesame Street (not seen by South African viewers) which 
is constantly re...;screened in America and forty other 
•' 
countries, comes in for heavy criticism from two American 
researchers, Dr Jerome and Dr Dorothy Singer, who run 
the Yale Family Television Research and Consultation 
Service, who claim the programme is turning out a 
generation of badly behaved and unteachable children 
"The programme creates children who can 
read letters and recite numbers • 
that's what parents love about it •• 
But that's all it's doing. It 
isn't preparing kids to learn or play 
well after the TV set is switched off 
Children are led to expect the 
same pace in life - sometimes even 
demanding it. 1144 
One of ·the results is that nursery school teachers cannot 
hold the attention of a kindergarten class for more 
than two or three minutes - the time of an average 
Sesame Street segment. South Africa's TV 1 English 
language children's prograinme organiser, John Howard, 
is aware of the findings on programmes like Sesame 
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Street and agrees that they can over-stimulate the child 
and cause anxiety because they move so quickly. 
"That's why we prefer to screen programmes 
like Liewe Heksie and Paddington Bear. 045 
Dr Schrnukler, who has worked closely with the Singers 
at Yale, believes that slower paced programmes are better 
for children, although parents and teachers don't approve 
of them. 
The director of Television Services at the University 
of the Witwatersrand, Kate Turkington, considers that 
the SABC is not doing enough to encourage children to 
get up and do things. She believes the early magazine 
programme Compass which attempted to do this, was the 
best children's programme to date. 
"Television is a wonderful educator. 
Research shows that with words alone, 
learning retention is about 35 per 
cent, with pictures alone, it's 
approximately 50 per cent - with 
words and pictures retention jumps 
to 85 to 90 per cent. But it must 
46 be properly researched." 
Dr Daan van Vuuren of the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC), has been involved in research into the effects 
of television on older children and adolescents. His 
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findings, although admittedly only covering the first 
two years of South African television, indicate that 
children who watch television tended to become better 
socialisers and more group oriented. He suggests three 
possible reasons for this : 
(1) Because they had last night's progranunes to talk 
about. 
(2) Some TV characters were seen as outgoing models 
to be imitated. 
(3) They realise that other people have the same 
problems as themselves and feel freer to talk 
about them. 47 
Dr van Vuuren found that other activities such as reading, 
homework and sport were affected but only to a small 
degree. Standard Five boys are still reading as many 
books, but fewer comics and photo-comics. Reading 
has become less popular with girls though they are showing 
a tendency to read more newspapers. Fewer Standard 
Eight boys are playing rugby and doing athletics. TV 
appears to have stimulated an interest in cricket and 
48 
soccer 
In the study Broadcasting and Youth49 commissioned by 
the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Calouste 
Gulbenkian Foundation, the Independent Broadcasting 
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Authority and the Manpower Services Commission, an attempt 
is made to look at what broadcasting is doing and, more 
importantly, might do in the future to meet the needs 
of young adults, particularly the less advantaged. The 
study maintains that young adults have needs which are 
quite distinct from the rest of the adult population 
and that these needs are not being adequately met by 
broadcasters at present. It argues strongly for new 
areas of educational programming and for more popular 
programming for young adults at both local and national 
levels. 
The study stressed the importance of local/regional 
broadcasting, stating that this 'educational dimension' 
has not been sufficiently exploited in relation to young 
people's needs. Schools and college broadcasting makes 
a contribution, but broadcasters should not see that 
as "their only or even major response"SO 
The report is careful not to exaggerate the power of 
broadcasting in terms of what it can do for the young, 
noting that it will not "create the jobs which so many 
young people are condemned to search for in vain". When 
regarding the sort of things that broadcasting can do, 
it mentioned the fact that broadcasts could easily fall 
into the trap of keeping young people out of trouble, 
thereby distracting attention from the real problem 
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- offering "circuses" when what is needed is "bread" 51 • 
In suggesting ways in which broadcasting can do more 
than act as a palliative, the report recognises the 
erroneous, but unavoidable assumption, that 'young people' 
are a homegeneous group. Thus any statements about 
the needs of young people must be read with caution. 
Nevertheless, the report identifies certain areas where 
young people need help where broadcasting may have a 
role. 
Areas like the provision of basic educational skills, 
including literacy, numeracy and social and life skills, 
by which is meant principally the practical techniques 
of making and doing, including seeking advice, claiming 
entitlements, elementary budgeting, leisure needs and 
applying for jobs, as well as a greater understanding 
of oneself in relation to others. 
Important, too, for many young people, is help with 
understanding personal relationships, particularly those 
involved in the transition from the dependence of school 
to the independence of taking a place in the adult world; 
and in moving from a society relatively homogeneous 
in age to one in which they will have to deal with a 
variety of different age and interest groups. 
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Many young people, even those reasonably equipped in 
elementary skills, have very little understanding of 
general political, social and economic matters, or of 
the nature of the industrial and commercial worlds. 
The report points out that within this broad context, 
they need greater specific careers' education and guidance, 
including information about the realities of working 
life (physical, social, emotional), the nature of jobs, 
the inter-relationship between job aspirations and 
educational requirements, the ability to develop 'job 
search' skills, the opportunities for further education 
52 
and training and the sources of advice and support • 
The report concludes that broadcasting is much more 
effective when it works in conjunction with other agencies 
such as correspondence colleges, volunteer agencies, 
further and higher education, newspapers and magazines. 
In the South African context it is not difficult to 
imagine the impact of schools and universities, e.g. 
the University of South Africa, being able to utilise 
the power of television in bringing the country's best 
teachers and lecturers to every corner of the land. 
South Africa's curreht lack of a regional television 
network would inhibit this form of broadcasting/other 
agency link-up for community education or information 
purposes. 
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A number of interesting recommendations emerge from 
the British report Broadcasting and Youth. Some could 
have relevance to the South African situation. The 
following are worthy of consideration : 
(1) The need fo,r research into the media usage 
patterns among young people. 
(2) Further enquiry into the social situation of 
young adults, including their emotional and 
leisure needs. (In the South African 
situation cognizance of attitudes to Sunday sport 
and entertainment prohibitions would need to 
be taken into account.) 
(3) Broadcasting institutions should alter their 
present organisational structures to ensure that 
the special needs of the fourteen to twenty-
one age group are adequately catered for. 
(4) There should be more popular and informative 
programmes for young adults, scheduled at times 
when young people (and their parents) are avail-
able to view at home, e.g. weekend mornings or 
between 5.00 and 7.00 p.m. during the week. 
(5) Extra broadcast provision should be made for 
the educational needs of young adults as 
previously discussed. 
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(6) Regional television should do more to develop 
a pattern of local coverage on programme topics 
like unemployment where local need is critical. 
(7) Television programmes, whether 'educational' 
or 'general', networked or regional, should, 
where possible, be developed in co-operation 
with external voluntary and statutory agencies, 
to provide programme follow-up and support 
activities. 
(8) The appropriate agencies should investigate the 
possibilities of an increased use of radio and 
video cassettes in schools, colleges and 
industrial and corr~ercial training schemes -
and when feasible within the home. 
(9) The formation of a Young Adult Unit whose function 
would be to help stimulate collaboration and 
co-ordinate action between the media and young 
adults; provide channels of communication between 
the two and the general public; and especially, 
help formulate and present the young adult's 
needs to all concerned. 53 
In analysing the report Broadcasting and Youth, a number 
of criticisms emerge. The major criticism is that 
the emphasis throughout the report is on broadcasting 
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as an instrument of education. This is hardly surpris-
ing when in examining the composition of the study's 
steering committee : it is discovered that only three 
out of the committee's fourteen members are not employed 
. d t• 1 •t 54 in an e uca iona capaci y • 
Of the 158 individuals and organisations consulted in 
the study, only seventeen appeared not to be connected 
with education, career opportunities, etc. 55 • 
More direct contact with representative samples of young 
adults themselves, instead of those in close proximity 
to them, would, in all probability, have provided greater 
insights into how youth regards broadcasting as a 
provider of entertainment, an extremely important social 
consideration. 
A point worth making is that with the increase in view-
ing options, via the new technology, particularly cable 
television, providing an ever increasing choice of 
programmes, it is probably optimistic to expect young 
people to show a preference for educational/informational 
programmes over entertainment and sport. Thus, even 
if the very sensible recommendations for an increase 
in educational/informational programmes are implemented, 
there is no guarantee that young people will watch 
them. On the contrary, unless young people and their 
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parents are taught to view television in a selective 
way; as good schools try and teach pupils to discriminate 
between good and bad reading material, educational broad-
casting will only have any meaning within the confines 
of the school or college. 
This in itself is a major challenge. Most vi?wers 
have come to regard television as escapism. Above 
all, they turn to television for entertainment. A major 
criticism, voiced by Shulman and other writers on the media, 
is that commercial television seeks to give the viewers 
what they want (entertainment) almost to the exclusion 
of all else. 
Shulman in discussing the dilemma facing BBC-2, the 
channel on British television (originally) devoted to 
over sixty percent of serious programmes, commented : 
" . in 1971 there were twenty-five 
million people with sets capable of 
receiving BBC-2, there was no sign that 
there had been a significant drift of 
viewers to the junior channel (BBC-1 
being the corporation's major channel). 
Something like five percent of the 
potential audience - if we accept JICTAR 
(industry audience research organisation) 
figures - regularly watched BBC-2. It 
had ominously and stubbonly remained at 
this figure for a number of years. Like 
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National Educational Television in 
America, which attracted about two per-
cent of the nation's viewers, BBC-2 
seemed to have acquired a reputation 
as a cultural ghetto. It was a 
reputation which would, in the end, 
discourage the average viewer from 
t h • • t .- 11 56 wa c ing 1 • • • 
More recently, BBC-2 has increased its audience figures 
significantly, but only as a result of becoming more 
involved in popular entertainment programming. It 
still, quite rightly, retains its reputation for quality 
and innovation. 
Educational/informative programming of the type advocated 
in Broadcasting and Youth will have to compete for 
viewers with a profusion of entertainment. offerings. 
The inference seems to be that only the highest quality 
and imaginative programmes will stand a chance. The 
question then remains how realistic are the report's 
recommendations? 
The other aspect prompting criticism is the recommendation 
concerning the formation of a Young Adult Unit to co-
ordinate action between the media and 'other agencies'. 
No clear workable framework emerges. This is a pity, 
as the report makes a good case for a 'junction.box' 
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to bring educators, employers, youth workers and young 
people themselves together. However, in reality it 
is difficult to visualise a workable infrastructure 
to say nothing about the justification of its cost. 
There can be little doubt that Broadcasting and Youth 
is one of the most important contributions to the subject 
in recent years. It is difficult to fault its under-
lying theme of utilising the broadcasting media to the 
benefit of young people as an extension of public service 
broadcasting. If it is flawed, it is perhaps in the 
assumption that given the programming policy advocated, 
young people would necessarily respond by watching and 
listening. This assumption must remain questionable 
in considering the range and quality of programme choices 
made available by the new technology. The study's 
methodology in seeking out prominent people in close 
proximity with youth (mainly educationalists) probably 
accounts for the optimistic predictions for the future 
of the electronic media as instruments of information 
and education. The reality will probably fall somewhat 
short of this idealistic expectation, with most young 
people continuing to exercise their preference for 
entertainment and sport over education and information, 
where they as individuals are in a position to choose. 
It is in the more.formal setting, e.g. the school or 
college, where the true potential of the broadcasting 
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media as envisaged by the study's compilers will be 
realised. 
4.2.1 Parental Influence and Children's Television 
Viewing Behaviour 
In a survey entitled Television and Children, Australia 
1977/78 for the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, 
deficiencies in parental control were observed where 
parents were shown not to be able to exert as much 
influence over their children's television behaviour 
as they would have liked. Control over viewing before 
school, over-viewing while doing homework and over-
prohibi tions on times and content were often ineffective. 
It appeared that because television was so appealing 
to children and al.most continuously available to them, 
it was inevitable that most children would eventually 
breach their parents' requirements 57 
However, parents had much more success in getting their 
children to watch particular programmes, usually of 
an educational or informational nature. 
the report states that 
"since these programmes were among 
those most disliked by children, 
there was no reason to suppose 
Significantly, 
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that parents' interventions here would 
be frequent or effective in producing 
a long-term change in viewing habits 
• • • Television viewing was an 
activity that saturated the home 
activities of children, 56% watching 
more than three hours a day. Viewing 
occurred before school, after school, 
during meals and homework and at night 
and at weekends .•. " 58 
Previous research suggests that television has significant 
effects both positive and negative on the social develop-
ment of children. An American study by Rojas59 confirmed 
many of the findings in the Australian work concerning 
parental influence and children's viewing behaviour. 
Rojas investigated the relationship between 
(1) parental TV viewing patterns; 
(2) parental techniques for controlling children's 
TV viewing; and 
(3) children's TV viewing patterns based on total 
weekly TV viewing; viewing frequency for 
particular programmes; perception of violence 
in TV programmes; and perception of TV's 
educational value. r 
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The results revealed a moderately positive relationship 
between parents and their children in total amount of 
viewing and viewing frequency of specific TV programmes. 
Low positive correlations between parents and their 
children were found for perception of violence and of 
educational value. These findings suggest that parents 
have a slight influence on their children's viewing 
patterns. 
Several findings emerged from the ·analyses of correlations 
between the Parental Control Index and children's TV 
viewing patterns. Slight negative relationships were 
found between the amount of children's TV viewing and 
the level of parental control. Also, it was found 
that the more controlling the parents, the more likely 
it was that their sons : 
(1) perceived low educational value in TV programmes; 
(2) did not watch sexually explicit programmes; and 
(3) did watch family-oriented programmes. 
No relationships between parental control and daughters' 
TV viewing patterns were observed. These results indicate 
that parents are more likely to control their sons' 
TV viewing than they are to control their daughters' 
TV viewing. 
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FIGURE 4-1 SCHULZ CARTOON 
The Cape Times, February 6, 1982 
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must be taught about violence so that they can learn 
to master it. 
Quoting Freud's views on the future, 
"The fateful question for the human 
species is mastering the disturbance 
of their communal life by the human 
instinct of aggression and self-
destruction. 1161 
Bettelheim believes that by denying outlets for the 
human instinct of violence, they can build up to a pitch 
where they can no longer be controlled. The present 
outcry against children playing with toy guns is an 
over-reaction, as he maintains such play provides the 
safety valve that drains off small amounts of violence, 
leaving a balance that can be managed. 
" . I am convinced that neither comics, 
nor TV, nor even James Bond corrupts 
children, despite all the warnings that 
these media are seducing the innocent 
• • • Violence exists and each of us 
is born with his potential for it. We 
are also born with opposite tendencies 
and these must be carefully nurtured if 
they are to offset the violence. To 
do this one must know the nature of the 
enemy. 1162 
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In discussing the mass of conflicting literature on 
the psychological effects of TV, Dr Ner Littner, a 
psychiatrist specializing in the psychoanalytic treat-
ment of children and adults at the Chicago Institute 
for Psychoanalysis, claims that the literature can be 
used to prove anything you want it to. He blames this 
situation on the lack of scientifically valid studies, 
pointing out the formidable problems in trying to measure 
the specific psychological effects of TV upon the viewer, 
. 
e.g. the psychological impact of violence63 . 
The major research problems he lists as 
(1) How do you factor out the specific variable you 
are trying to measure? 
(2) What is your definition of violence? 
(3) How do you compare the unreality of the violence 
in many of the children's shows against the 
realistic portrayal of a savage beating? 
(4) How does humour affect the impact? 
(5) What if the violence is justified? 
(6) Where do you get a control group to compare and 
contrast with the group exposed to the violence 
in viewing? 
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(7) How do you measure the full effects of the TV 
viewing upon the viewer? 
(8) How can you follow the viewer for the length 
of time necessary to get full and complete 
results? 
(9) How do you accurately determine what is cause 
and what is effect?64 
Because of these severe methodological constraints, 
Dr Littner prefers to rely on his own observations of 
the effects of television violence. The most relevant 
of these, from the South African perspective, are 
summarised as follows : 
"l. The vast amount of violence on 
television is basically a reflection 
of the violent interests of the 
viewers;* it is a symptom, not a 
cause; it graphically portrays 
the violence in our souls . . . 
. 2. I do not believe that television 
violence when honestly portrayed,* 
engenders violence in viewers of 
any age who were not violent 
already; and I do not believe 
that it raises violent impulses 
to an uncontrollable pitch in 
*Littner's italics 
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those who are already violent. 
3. I do think, however, that for some 
who are already violently disposed, 
TV violence may provide a model, a 
modus operandi~when they choose 
_to discharge their violent urges. 
However, a book, a newspaper, or a 
radio programme may fulfil the same 
role. 
4. As far as dishonest* (gratuitous or 
uncalled for) television violence 
is concerned, I do think that 
exposure to repeated doses may 
possibly interfere, to a degree 
unmeasurable at present, with the 
normal development of impulse 
control in normal or disturbed 
children; but I do not think that 
'dishonest'* television violence 
has any marked pathological impact 
on the average adult. 
5. Instead of wasting their efforts on 
such red herrings as censorship, 
violence, sex or nudity, I think 
that both the viewing public and 
the television industry would be 
far better off if the television 
industry would devote its consider-
able talents and energies to 
creating conditions that would make 
it possible to develop and screen 
*Littner's italics 
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television shows specialising in 
such qualities as excellence, artistic 
value, creativity, originality, 
honesty and integrity. If these 
were the hallmark of our television 
shows, we would not have to worry 
about possible censorship of their 
violence, sex or nudity." 65 
Commentators like Littner tend to see increasing tele-
vision violence as a reflection of the more violent 
aspects of society and a sign of the times. The 
relaxation of censorship in terms of displays of sex 
and the treatment of moral issues in general also 
include a greater tolerance of violence. The shock 
effect of violence is also recognised as a commercial 
asset working to the detriment of genuine art and 
creativity. 
Some positive effects are also observed. Displays 
of violence tend to present the world as it is, rather 
than in an idealistic way, so there is an educational 
element. The safety valve aspect, previously discussed, 
can help discharge various violent feelings and tendencies 
in the viewer. 
The negative effects of television violence tend to 
*Littner's italics 
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centre around the possible harming of the child, or 
adolescent, who is still evolving behavioural patterns. 
There is a danger that constant exposure to violence 
as a 'television-approved' method for solving problems 
could result in imitative behaviour, particularly if 
violence is also the family way to resolve difficulties. 
The modus operandiiargument is also considered valid 
here in that even though television violence may not 
cause juvenile delinquency, it can contribute techniques 
for a child already delinquent66 • 
It is generally believed the impact of repeated exposure 
to excessive violence depends on at least three 
factors : 
(1) the age of the viewer; 
(2) the maturity of the viewer; and 
(3) the way in which the violence is presented and 
67 packaged • 
When examined in the South African context, these factors 
highlight some of the programming complexities facing 
the television broadcaster. Because television in 
South Africa is a mass medium segmented only as yet 
by language criteria and lacking the socio-economic 
and cultural benefits associated with decentralised/ 
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regional television systems, even greater care has to 
be exercised when dealing with sensitive issues than 
would be the case in a more homogeneous society. 
The regular and recurrent spectacle of violence might, 
according to the ITV Code68 , lead viewers to think 
violence in one form or another has been given the stamp 
of approval. Once violence is thus accepted and 
tolerated people will, it is believed, tend to become 
more callous, more indifferent to the suffering imposed 
on the victims of violence. 
An acceptable minimum of vi lence in each individual 
programme may add up to an intolerable level over a 
period. ITV also places great stress on the time of 
screening of each programme. Adults, it is believed, 
can be safely exposed to more violence than children. 
ITV policy of 'family viewing time' until 9.00 p.m. 
is aimed at 'protecting children from what may be 
considered unsuitable programmes. 
Regarding the presentation of televised violence, the 
ITV Code contains the following statement : 
"There is no evidence that 'sanitised' 
or 'conventional' violence, in which 
the consequences are concealed, minimised 
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or presented in a ritualistic way, is 
innocuous. It may be just as dangerous 
to society to conceal the results of 
violence or to minimise them, as to 
let people see clearly the full 
consequences of violent behaviour, 
however gruesome what may be better 
for society, may be emotionally more 
upsetting or more offensive for the 
· d' 'd 1 · 1169 in 1v1 ua viewer. 
Milton Shulman, with a finely honed logic, presents 
a strong argument that violence and what he terms 
"entertainment - biased" television are related : 
" ••• If a substantial proportion of 
programmes • • . depict violence as 
normal, acceptable and even moral, why 
should not that message be as persuasive 
as commercials successfully selling the 
aphrodisiacal powers of armpit deodorants? 
Entertainment television as organised 
in Britain, America and Canada, relies 
for a large measure of its contents 
upon programmes in which overt or 
concealed violence is a major ingredient 
of their appeal. Is it possible, then, 
that one of the loudest messages of the 
box,- that violence is normal and merely 
mirrors life - has gone unheard when 
other messages • concerning goods, 
politicians, religion, industry and 
trade unions constantly make an impact 
which society_recognizes and acknowledges? 1170 
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Shulman attacks the earlier research findings which 
minimised the effects of television violence, or like 
Littner rejected the methodology and evidence on which 
to form conclusive judgements. Shulman points to the 
accumulation of long-term evidence, mainly in the form 
of governmental investigations into the connection between 
violence and television, stating that : 
"there are Iiow few serious broadcasters 
or social scientists left who would 
stoutly maintain that there is no 
causal relationship between violence 
and the box1171 • 
Much of Shulinan's more detailed examination of tele-
72 
vision and violence in his book The Ravenous Eye , 
reflects the findings of both President Johnson's 
Commission on Violence in 1969 and the U.S. Surgeon 
General's Report in 1972 where the 'cathartic effect' 
argument, whereby violence acted as a safety-valve to 
drain off violence harmlessly, was rejected. On the 
contrary, President Johnson's committee said that the 
vast majority of experimental studies did not support 
the catharsis theory and found that observed violence 
stimulated aggressive behaviour rather than the reverse73 • 
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4.3.1 News Coverage of Violence 
With the almost constant spate of aircraft hijackings, 
kidnappings, hostage takings, etc., certain questions 
are posed. Can television become a tool for individuals 
with a cause to use at will to influence public opinion? 
Is television by reporting the news, actually creating 
it? Is the public being manipulated by a series of 
carefully constructed 'media events'? 
Sam Iker, writing on the controversy and cataloguing 
a whole succession of violent events in the United States, 
each receiving heavy live television coverage, had this 
to say : 
" ••. All it seemed to take to get on 
television was a gun, a sense of 
desperation and a knowledge of how the 
media work. Given the competitive 
nature of the news business, violence, 
or the threat of violence often 
ensured instant local and sometimes 
national and international TV 
attention. 
The phenomenon wasn't new. Television 
thrives on dramatic, action-filled 
pictures. There were the race riots 
in the United States in the 1960's, 
many recorded on f ilrn. Battle scenes 
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from Vietnam brought the war into 
American living rooms ••• n 74 
There is nothing new in television being manipulated 
as a news medium. What was new however was the growing 
use of violence to gain widespread publicity. A world-
wide audience, for example, watched the awful drama 
of the 1972 Olympics' terrorist raid in Munich unfold 
via t~levision satellite. 
t 
In the Netherlands in 1977, 
a band of South Moluccan nationalists seized a train 
and a school-house to publicise their goal of 
independence for their island homeland75 • 
Advances in technology providing instant live coverage 
coupled to competitive pressures to be first with the 
news are believed by many leading journalists to be 
interfering with news judgement. The television news-
man's dilemma is that he recognises that he is, in part, 
glorifying the lawbreaker - making heroes out of non-
h d b . d76 eroes an eing use • 
Fred J. Hacker, an authority on international terrorism, 
claimed that : 
"it can hardly be denied that the news 
media is a major influence in the 
spread of these sorts of incidents •. 
Television is especially a medium of 
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contagion. It is obvious that what is 
being shown is also being imitated. 
Television sells breakfast food. Why 
shouldn't it sell violence?077 
Even if it were desirable, it would be difficult to 
formulate practical guidelines for news policy for live 
television coverage. Certainly any attempt on behalf 
of government bodies to impose official constraints 
is met with universal condemnation and accusations of 
infringement on freedom of the press. The Steyn 
Commission of Inquiry into the M ss Media (Chapter 3) 
and the South African government's subsequent intention 
to form a Media Council, provides evidence of just how 
sensitive these issues are. 
In the late 1960's, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) 
News President Richard Salant told the President's 
Commission on Violence that : 
"the First Amendment (which guarantees 
freedom of the press) has put a 
priority on the importance of the 
right of the people to know. If you 
exclude from your normal news judgement 
a whole area of legitimate news happen-
ings because reporting the truth is 
likely to cause some effects, then 
you're in serious trouble • I 
would argue more vigorously that 
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there never should be anything excluded 
from news if it is legitimate news. 1178 
National Broadcasting Company (NBC) President Julian 
Goodman could almost be referring to the antagonism 
between the South African government and the English 
language press when he states : 
"It has long been a fact of life for 
the journalist that those who do not 
like what they read, or hear, or see, 
are apt ,to condemn him and his 
medium for distorting truth. And 
,it is an easy step from there to 
suggesting that the reporter and 
the medium contributed to problems 
by reporting them. In short, the 
medium is blamed for the message. 1179 
A fitting summary to what many consider to be an 
insoluble problem comes from the highly respected 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) news anchorman 
Walter Cronkite : 
"We cannot control the events that 
need to be reported. All we can 
do is be responsible in reporting 
80 the events that occur." 
Some television news executives maintain that full 
coverage of violent incidents has positive value in 
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. 
that denying terrorists air-time could cause them to 
escalate their violence in order to get publicity. It 
is believed by some that putting them on the air 
satisfies some of their motivation for the act and 
lessens the danger to hostages. This catharsis effect 
can possibly relax tension but many would argue that 
there is a fine line between using television for its 
therapeutic potential and the contagion factor 81 • 
In recent years there has been growing concern regarding 
the level of violence in Western societ~es. This 
concern has been expressed by opinion leaders from all 
sections of the community, church leaders, politicians, 
the police and sociologists. In expressing their 
concern, these opinion leaders invariably link television 
with violence in society. 
In its research report Television and the Public, the· 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal stated : 
"A wide cross-section of people in 
countries around the world have shown 
a continuing concern about the amount 
of violence in television programmes 
and the possible effects on viewers. 
While the public cannot be expert on 
the effects of violence, their concern 
should be taken into account by those 
responsible for programming. 1182 
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In a more recent American overview by John P. Murray 
of what research has to say about television and its 
affects on young people, Television and Youth - 25 Years 
of Research and Controversy, this exhaustive study 
examines the cumulative evidence on the effects of 
televised violence and concludes that it is extremely 
unlikely that research will ever establish a clear and 
concise causal link between viewing violent programmes 
and subsequent acts of aggression but : 
"there is one broad conclusion that is 
quite clear, namely, that there is a 
relationship between violence on tele-
vision and violence in society." 83 
4.4 TELEVISION'S EDUCATIONAL ROLE 
The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Report 
(December 1981) on the amount of time that South African 
children spend watching television was the cause of 
some concern in the light of some of its findings, namely 
that time alloca.ted to doing homework had dropped and 
an indication that there was evidence of negative 
attitudes to study developing. 
Standard Eight pupils, according to the research, 
viewed for about seventeen hours a week and matriculants 
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fifteen hours. The HSRC considered these figures 
'significant' when it is taken into account that high 
school pupils spend about thirty hours a week at 
schoo184 • 
4.4.1 Television's Effects on Reading 
The HSRC report, like a number of overseas studies, 
was unable to establish a clear picture of the effect 
of television on reading but the general trend of 
statistics in the report would seem to indicate that 
the level of reading competence has dropped85 • 
Wilbur Schramm in his classic study of 1961 showed that 
television has had a bigger impact than any other 
leisure-time pursuit on the amount of reading a child 
does 86 . Schramm established, contrary to the thinking 
of pessimists, that elementary school children with 
the highest marks in school, were also the heaviest 
tel·evision watchers. He also concluded that TV helped 
the low achievers develop vocabulary skills that the 
non-television child did not have. According to Schramm, 
children in the early school years are heavy viewers 
of television. At about age ten, however, children 
of better ability (IQ of 115 or higher) reached what 
he called a "saturation point". The middle and lower 
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intelligence groups reached the saturation point some 
time later. In the late 1950's Himmelweit found that 
television not only stimulates reading interests of 
British students, but broadened their tastes87 • 
A more recent study by Busch88 , in 1978, supported 
Schramm's 1961 study in most respects. Busch found 
that educators, realising the impact that television 
has had on students, have begun to integrate the medium 
into their instructional programmes. 
"Teachers use television as a tool for 
teaching instead of denying its 
existence and importance." 89 
Busch concluded, like most other researchers, that the 
future of reading in relation to television remains 
a mystery. 
"Some researchers feel that without 
variety in programming, television 
may be producing a shallow, common-
denominator audience. The children 
affected by this type of programming 
may come to depend entirely upon 
the audiovisual media to gain use-
ful information. Television will 
then truly become the overwhelming 
shaping force in our society." 90 
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Most Americans and Europeans now turn to television 
as their major source of, information. Indeed, a news-
paper readership research survey in America has 
established that the 18 to 34 age group was no longer 
d . 91 rea ing newspaper • 
Does that finding mean that America is becoming a nation 
of illiterates? Hardly. Television became commercially 
active in the United States in 1950, when there were 
97 sta~ions on the air. In that year 8 600 book titles 
were published. 
By the end of 1979, there were 800 commercial television 
stations, plus an additional 275 educational stations. 
That year there had been a five hundred percent increase 
in the number of books published to well over 40 000 
titles 92 • 
Dr T.K. Minter, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Office of 
Education, probably has the right perspective when he 
said : 
"Television literacy has the potential 
for developing other literacies. 
Specifically, critical and active 
viewing of television has the potential 
for stimulating reading." 93 
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This in itself is a strong argument for programme choice. 
It also poses the question will television literacy 
be inhibited in South African viewers by continuing 
to restrict television to a state monopoly broadcasting 
system, offering virtually no channel choice? 
Television is often accused of debasing the English 
language. Eric Savareid, the Columbia Broadcasting 
System (CBS) commentator and a strong defender of 
television in American society, claims that this is 
nonsense : 
". ~ • Until radio, and then TV, tens 
of millions of people living in share-
cropper cabins, in small villages on 
the plains and in the mountains, in 
the great city slums, had never heard 
good ~nglish diction in their lives. 
If anything, this medium has improved 
the general level of diction ..• 1194 
4.4.2 British Educational Broadcasting 
Educational television is now firmly established in 
most Western countries. The UK is a good example of 
its application where the BBC and the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) co-ordinate their efforts 
to the public good. 
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The IBA Act requires ITV to provide such programmes 
as an essential part of its schedules. 
In the 1960's, schools, universities, polytechnics and 
colleges of further and higher education multiplied. 
Educational broadcasting expanded to keep pace with 
these developments. 
The hours of BBC educational broadcasting in 1974 -
1975 on network radio and television are set out in 
Table 4-1 (overleaf). 
The BBC's schools, further education and Open University 
production departments each produced approximately 300 
hours of television programmes in 1975 - 1976. Exclud-
ing local radio productions, BBC school programmes cost 
£3,2 million in 1974 - 1975 and further education 
programmes cost £2,9 million. In addition, the BBC 
received £2,9 million from the Open University for 
producing and transmitting programmes for the University. 
Open University programmes are paid for from a grant 
the University receives from the Department of Education 
and Science : all other educational programmes produced 
and broadcast by the BBC are paid for from its licence 
fee income 95 • 
There is less educational.broadcasting on ITV. The 
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TABLE 4-1 
BBC EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING HOURS, 
1974 - 1975 
(A) Radio Pre-Scmol Primary Secondary Further Etlucation 
First* 
Transmission 7h 213h40m 186h 30m 124h 20m 
Transmissions 
Repeated in 
Sarne Week - 28h - 192h 30m 
Sootland Only 
First - 47h40m 20h 30m -
Repeated - lOh - -
Wales Only 
First 2h 30:n 89h40m 3h 20rn 6h 
Repeated 75m 2h40rn - 6h 
N. Ireland 
Only 
First - 9h20m lOh -
Repeated - - - -
Open 
University 
480h 30m 
480h30m 
-
-
-
-
-
-
*Sare· were prograrrmes which hap been transmitted in previous years 
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Table 4-1 (continued) 
(B) Television Pre-Sch:x:>l Primary Secondary Furth:r Open Filucation University 
First* 
Transmission 8h 24m ?Oh 84h lSm 126h 20m 430h 30m 
Transmissions 
Repeated in 
Sane Week 8h 24m ?Oh 84h 15rn 163h 20m 430h 30m 
Scotland Only 
First - lOh 40m 7h 4h lOm -
Repeated - lOh 40m 7h 4h lOm -
Wales Only 
First - 16h - 8h 20m -
Repeated - 13h 40m - 8h 20m -
N. Ireland 
Only 
First - 4h 40m - - -
Repeated - 4h 40m - - -
*Sane were progranmes which had been transmitted in previous years 
Source : Report of the carmi.ttee on the Future of Broadcasting, 
March 1977 I P• 301. 
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average output of the fourteen different ITV areas in 
1974 - 1975 is shown in Table 4-2 (overleaf): The 
cost of ITV's pre-school and school programmes in 1974 -
1975 was of the order of El,5 million and its adult 
educational programmes about El million. 
The strongest demand for expansion in educational broad-
casting was for post-school education. The Open 
University in its evidence to the Annan Committee on 
the Future of Broadcasting claimed that because of the 
lack of suitable air-time, many of its courses were 
facing the prospect of not having their programmes 
repeated and therefore at least one-fifth of its students 
would not have the opportunity of seeing the programmes 
related to their courses. In 1974 - 1975 the University 
used about thirty hours a week on radio and the same 
number of hours on televi_sion for its courses. By 
1984, by which time it planned to provide eighty-seven 
full credit undergraduate courses, it would need fifty-
one hours a week of television air-time and thirty-
nine radio hours. Many proposals were also made for 
increasing educational opportunities for adults working 
at sub-degree level for an 'Open University' type of 
course. 
The working partnership between the Open University 
and the BBC is highly regarded as the most innovative 
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TABLE 4-2 
ITV EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING HOURS, 
1974 - 1975 
Television First Transmissions Repeat Transmissions 
Pre-School (excluiing 
Channel 'IV) 45 hrs 45 mins 21 hrs 
Prlinary 17 hrs 64 hrs 45 mins 
Middle (9-12 yrs) 28 hrs 15 mins 62 hrs 
Secondary 29 hrs 15 mins 62 hrs 
Adult Edocation 118 hrs 15 mins 36 hrs 45 rnins 
Source Report of the Ccmni.ttee on the Future of Broadcasting, 
March 1977, p.302. 
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development in British adult education of the past half 
century 96 • 
It is known that the University of South Africa (UNISA) 
had a part to play in the setting up of Britain's Open 
University.because of its unique experience over many 
years with correspondence degree courses. 
Many South African educationalists would advocate that 
perhaps the SABC together with UNISA and/or other 
universities, should now, in the short-term, be allowed 
to follow the successful BBC-Open University formula, 
utilizing the current large amounts of spare capacity 
on SABC television. 
Many of these South African educationalists would like 
to see a plural broadcasting system permitting 
independent television to play a part in educational 
broadcasting in the longer term, particularly at a 
regional leve1 97 • 
Currently, educational material accounts for about eleven 
percent of each ITV company's weekly output. There 
are three main categories of audience for !TV's 
educational programmes : young children under five 
years of age, viewing at home, in a nursery.school or 
playgroup; students in school or college; and the 
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adult viewer at home. Figure 4-2 (overleaf) shows 
diagramatically the planning process used by the IBA 
before educational programmes reach schools. 
Great emphasis is placed on trying to meet the needs 
of special groups - the young unemployed, the middle-
aged facing retirement, the elderly, ethnic minorities, 
the disabled, etc. 
Priority topics are also selected. New technology 
and its social implications, alternatives to employ-
ment, adult basic skills all take their place beside 
the traditional subject areas for which there is constant 
demand. 
With the arrival of Channel Four towards the end 
of 1982, ITA has announced that of the new channel's 
initial output of some 50 evening hours, fifteen percent 
will be educational. This means that approximately 
an hour per night will consist of programmes validated 
through an advisory council of educationalists and 
specially produced to further explicit educational 
purposes. In addition, since the channel is expected 
to serve minorities and to seek out innovative ways 
of broadcasting, it is likely to contain many programmes 
of a generally, if less deliberately, educational 
character. As all Channel Four's broadcasts 
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FIGURE 4-2 
PL~NNING fOR SCtiOOL BRO~DC~STS 
'.: ·~ ~udif '. '. ·;j 
'\ ' . 
*BOC Sch:x>l Broadcasting Council 
Source : Television & Radio 1981 - Focus on Independent 
Broadcasting, p.73. 
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will be networked, the IBA will be encouraging regional 
stations to produce more local adult education 
98 progranunes 
In a statement to the press, the IBA gave this general 
indication of its expectations for educational 
progranuning : 
"The Authority hopes that the Fourth 
Channel, in trying to serve fresh 
educational needs, will use to the 
full some new and exciting 
opportunities. We attach special 
importance to reaching individuals 
and not only audiences : and this 
requires connections to be made 
between broadcasts and the means 
which exist outside broadcasting 
to follow up the interest created 
by programmes • . • The power of 
broadcasting resides not only in 
direct teaching but, perhaps even 
more, in its power to stir and 
arouse, to motivate and stimulate. 
We believe that collaboration with 
a wide range of outside agencies 
offers the prospect of a new and 
fruitful partnership to serve the 
audience. 1199 
The new catch-phrase 'television literacy' presents 
an exciting challenge to educational broadcasters. 
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The impact of the medium has only just been felt in 
South Africa. Educational television is said to be 
a high priority with Professor Mouton, Chairman of the 
SABC. South Africa has an enormous educational task 
ahead, complicated by the awesome problems posed by 
a multicultural, heterogeneous population. It is, 
however, fortunate in having a wealth of excellent 
educational television experience gained in overseas 
countries to draw on. 
The Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) investigation 
into South African education contained proposals from 
the South African Chamber of Industries for television 
services to be extended and developed to bring the 
100 
country's best teacher  into contact with the masses 
It is known that the SABC is eager to extend its public 
service role by responding to this educational need 
and educational television is expected to begin in 1984. 
However, the size and economics of the task are such 
that it would be totally unrealistic to expect South 
Africa's existing television structure to be able to 
make the kind of response called for. It is to be 
hoped that private sector involvement in the form of 
an independent television network will be invited to 
share in this historic social challenge. 
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4.5 TELEVISION AND PUBLIC SERVICE 
Where television is under the control of the state in 
. ' 
a monopoly situation like the South African example, 
broadcasting (even if it is commercial, in the sense 
that advertising is a major form of revenue) aspires 
to be a public service. That is, commercial interests 
are, in theory, not allowed to predominate over broad-
casting policy and all citizens are entitled to benefit 
from the services offered regardless of where they live 
and what language they speak. 
This has always been SABC policy and 'public service' 
has always been the motivating force for new developments. 
This philosophy is clearly demonstrated in the developing 
Black channels of TV2 and TV3. Only when a basic 
service has reached the vast majority of the population 
will the Corporation be in a position to consider 
important issues like educational television, regional 
television and alternative channels for entertainment. 
The concept of public service broadcasting in South 
Africa has developed along similar lines to the United 
Kingdom. Priorities have been very much the same, 
with the government attempting to ensure that the 
population is guarded from over-exploitation by 
commercial interests and the 'right' balance in programm-
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ing between information, education and entertainment 
is maintained. 
In the United States the concept of public service broad-
casting is comparatively new. Private enterprise 
organisations, motivated by commercial interests have 
been responsible for the formation of the major networks, 
their affiliates and the hundreds of independent tele-
vision stations across the country. 
In 1967 the Public Broadcasting Act established the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a non-profit 
organisation responsible for distributing federally 
appropriated funds to public broadcasting. In 1969 
CPB in conjunction with the independent public television 
stations established the Public Broadcasting Service 
(PBS) • 
Today PBS is the national membership organisation of 
independent television stations. It operates a 
satellite-interconnected system for the distribution 
of programmes to 292 stations across the United States. 
PBS provides a wide range of public service programmes, 
divided into three separate national services : PTV-1 
is responsible for the presentation of prime time, 
general audience programmes. Drawing from many sources, 
such as public television stations, independent producers, 
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American and foreign distributors, PTV-1 features major 
first-run drama productions, public affairs programmes, 
outstanding stage, concert hall and festival performances, 
and programmes on science and the universe. 
PTV-2 is designed to provide special interest programmes 
to specific audiences. This includes target minority 
and women's programming, skills and self-improvement 
series, sports events coverage, and special events 
public affairs programming. 
PTV-3 is responsible for educational programmes 
including : children's programmes, adult learning and 
post-secondary enrichment and in-school instructional 
. 101 programming Table 4-3 (overleaf) shows how PBS 
was financed in 1980. 
PBS is a uniquely American solution to public service 
broadcasting. In an ingenious yet extremely practical 
way government and private funding is put to work using 
the new technology of satellite broadcasting and the 
existing network of independent television stations. 
The immediate question then arises : could public 
service broadcasting in South Africa be enhanced by 
drawing ·on this model? 
No-one would expect the range and depth of public 
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TABLE 4-3 
HOW THE PBS NATIONAL PROGRAMME SERVICE WAS 
FINANCED - 1980 
The 1980 PBS schedule of original broadcast prograrrunes 
(averaging 5! hours per day) cost $102,8 million for 
the year. Funding sources for original prograrrune hours 
distributed as part of the 1980 PBS National Programme 
Service included : 
PTV Stations 
Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting 
(Congressional 
Appropriation) 
Federal Government 
(Arts & Humanities 
Endowments, Office of 
Education, National 
Science Foundation, 
et al.) 
Foundations 
Corporations/Businesses 
Other* 
$29,6 million 28,7% 
$11,1 million 10,8% 
$21,2 million 20,6% 
$5,5 million 5,4% 
$27,7 million 26,9% 
$7 I 8 million 7,6% 
$102,8 million 100,0% 
*Includes absorption of production costs by producers 
and underwriting from such sources as individuals, 
clubs, societies and state government agencies 
Source PBS Fact Sheet, June 1981 
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service television as broadcast by PBS's three national 
programme services to be a reality in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that private sector 
organisations would consider making donations from their 
public relations appropriations to sponsor informational 
and educational television programmes as part of their 
corporate social responsibility programmes, particularly 
if they could broadcast these programmes through an 
independent regional television system, working on the 
basis of an established partnership between the state 
and the private sector. 
4.5.1 The FCC Ascertainment Doctrine 
Since 1960, broadcasters in the United States have been 
required by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
to conduct periodic, systematic surveys of opinion 
leaders and other residents in their communities and 
service areas. 
This requirement, known as the FCC's Ascertainment 
Doctrine, was intended to encourage greater responsive-
ness by broadcasters to the problems and needs of the 
residents of their communities. 
Since the late 1960's the Ascertainment Doctrine has 
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been employed as a weapon by citizen groups interested 
in influencing programme content. More recently, it 
has also been used as a defensive weapon by broadcasters 
in confrontations with citizen groups. The use of 
the doctrine by both antagonists has resulted in 
considerable controversy over its effectiveness as an 
instrument for improving programmes. 
102 Byron B. Renz , in a detailed analysis of the doctrine, 
concludes however that it is in fact an effective 
instrument in regulating broadcasting so that it operates 
in the public interest and in accordance with the 
proscription against censorship of programme content. 
He considers the doctrine has made a significant 
contribution to broadcasting regulation. 
In any future regional television system in South Africa, 
a local version of the FCC's Ascertainment Doctrine 
could be a valuable contributer to providing more 
meaningful and satisfying television services. Indeed, 
because of the heterogeneous nature of South Africa's 
population and regional differences, it is difficult 
to imagine how a regional service could be effective 
in terms of public service without this type of periodic 
and systematic research. 
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4.5.2 Public Access Television 
In many countries where the public service component 
in television is paramount, access to the medium is 
now granted as a right. This can take the form of 
utilising off-peak capacity on conventional over-the-
air channels or, as is happening increasingly in the 
United States, by means of cable television. In 
essence, citizen groups with a cause or grievance can 
appeal to a wider audience. 
In practice, research tends to indicate the results 
are disappointing. Programmes were thought to be often 
103 boring and badly presented • However, if the users 
of the service fail to use the medium to its maximum 
potential, through lack of capital and expertise, this 
does not detract from the public service broadcasting 
concept of allowing minorities or others with a cause 
access to television. 
In concluding this chapter on the social implications 
of television broadcasting, it is necessary to note 
that public service broadcasting in general has a dis-
appointing record with mass audiences. 
Although progress in converting viewers to watch at 
least some public service programmes is encouraging, 
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CHAPTER 5 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE STRUCTURE, 
OPERATION AND CONTROL OF TELEVISION BROADCASTING 
5.1 TELEVISION AND CONSUMER WELFARE 
When the South African researcher examines the structure 
and performance of the television industries in 
America, Australia and, to some extent, the United 
Kingdom, while leaving aside the comparatively recent 
developments of cable television in the United States, 
he is struck initially by the range of programme options 
(channels) • On closer examination, however, the 
Shulman criticism "more of the same"l (see Chapter 4) 
comes to mind, i.e. most programme contractors appear 
to be catering for the mass market with programme fare 
designed to appeal to the lowest common denominator. 
However, television, particularly in the United States 
and Australia, where it is supplied at no cost to the 
viewer (unlike South Africa and the United Kingdom, 
where the state corporations gain revenue from receiver 
licences) generates consumer satisfactions that far 
exceed its costs in employed resources. Even so, a 
substantial demand for many types of television programme 
remains unsatisfied. This was a major finding of The 
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Brookings Institution study of American television (Noll 
19732 ). The requirement for a broadening of programme 
options and greater diversity is becoming a reality 
through the new technology of cable and domestic 
satellite broadcasting. The United Kingdom, too, expects 
to go some way in broadening its television offerings 
with Channel Four, awarded to the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority, which entered service in late 
1982. Australia successfully launched Channel 0/28, 
in 1981, a service for ethnic minorities that all 
Australians will eventually be able to watch through 
a system of (excellent) sub-titling, and is actively 
considering the implica~ions of domestic satellite and 
cable television. 
In all these countries, television has developed beyond 
the national and regional stages and, although there 
is a demand for more programme options and diversity, 
government agencies and broadcasters are anxious not 
to seriously erode existing levels of consumer 
satisfaction, by alterations to the present structure, 
bringing in new resources and finding the means of 
paying for.them. Advertising revenue is a finite 
resource in any economy where television innovations, 
such as cable, have to be funded by advertising and, 
increasingly, by viewer subscriptions. 
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Today, 40 percent of American homes are wired for cable3 • 
Even in 1963, Americans of all income groups were prepared 
to pay for additional television services, but particularly 
the middle-income group as Table 5-1 (overleaf) 
illustrates. 
Noll et al. 4 contend that low income households (world-
wide) have traditionally been the highest consumers 
of television probably, in part, because f greater 
sensitivity to prices of other entertainment. The 
Hartford Subscription TV (STV) experiment5 suggests, 
but by no means proves, that middle-income groups would 
be willing to pay much more for the present system than 
either the rich or the poor. 
The Brookings Study, by assuming that the value of 
television is proportional to the expenditures on 
increments to viewing, indicated in Table 5-1, weighted 
by the amount of free TV each income group watches, 
indicates the estimated $20 billion value of free tele-
vision is distributed by income groups as shown in 
Table 5-2 (page 5-5). (The estimate of $20 billion 
for free television was based on a conservative estimate 
that the value of the service was worth at least $25 
per month per TV household, or about four percent of 
after-tax household income. This represented approxi-
mately seven times the revenues of television.) 
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TABLE 5-1 
RESPONSE OF HOUSEHOLDS TO HARTFORD SUBSCRIPTION 
TELEVISION EXPERIMENT, BY INCOME GROUP, 1963-65 
% of us % of Average Weekly Annual Income Households Subscribers STV Purchase 1965 
Under $4 000 1,5 33,6 $0,99 
$4 000-6 999 40,8 25,2 1,25 
$7 000-9 999 43,3 20,6 1,23 
$10 000 + 14,4 20,5 1,18 
All groups 100,0 100,0 1,22 
Source Econcxnic Aspects of Television Regulation, Noll et al., 
p.25. 
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TABLE 5-2 
ESTIMATED VALUE OF FREE TELEVISION TO CONSUMERS, 
BY INCOME GROUP, 1965 
Based on Based on Selected Incane Elasticities 
Hartford 
Annual Incane Data 0,5 1,0 2,0 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Under $4 000 240 13 3 980 210 2 520 130 650 34 
$4 000-6 999 8 310 580 6 940 480 5 160 360 2 000 140 
$7 000-9 999 8 680 740 6 810 580 6 390 540 4 430 380 
$10 000 + 2 770 240 8 610 730 11 380 970 17 030 1 450 
All groups 20 000 350 20 000 350 20 000 350 20 000 350 
Key: 1 =Total (tmusands); 2 =Per housemld 
Source E.concmic Aspects of Television Regu1ation, Noll et al., 
I p.26. 
\ 
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This would tend to indicate that countries with a large 
relatively affluent middle-income group are probably 
more than willing to pay for additional television services 
far in advance of existing offerings. 
For purposes of comparison, Table 5-2 also has estimates 
of the distribution of television benefits by income 
according to various assumptions about the relationship 
of income to the willingness to pay for television. 
In each case the, income elasticity of demand for tele-
vision is assumed to be equal to a particular value -
if, for example, the income elasticity is assumed to 
be equal to e, then a p percentage increase in income 
increases the amount a household is willing to pay for 
television by ep percent. The first case assumes an 
income elasticity of 0,5, the second an elasticity of 
1, and the third an elasticity of 2. (An elasticity 
of zero suggests that all groups, regardless of ~ncome, 
are willing to pay the same amount per household for 
TV.) 
These calculations are estimates of what each income 
group would pay rather than have free TV disappear, 
not of the amount of income viewers would lose if it 
did. For low-income households especially, the latter 
is probably much larger than the former. 
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The Brookings Institution study argues that the existence 
of free television considerably augments the real income 
of all viewers, but especially the poor. The amount 
a low-income household would be willing to pay for any 
commodity (including television), if its real income 
in that form were taken away, is almost certain to be 
less than the payment that would be necessary to compensate 
for the loss, since at a lower income they would be 
forced to cut back on their consumption expenditures. 
The study stresses the stake the viewing public (US) 
has in the structure of the television industry in that 
changes in the broadcast delivery system can cause changes 
in the real income of consumers. As the value to viewers 
greatly exceeds the stake industry has in television, 
any proposed changes to the system creates a strong 
rationale for weighing the effects on income redistri-
bution 6. 
Unfortunately, in the South African context, the Brookings 
Institution analysis breaks down. In South Africa 
television services are subsidised by advertising 
revenue but viewers are, in addition,obliged to pay a 
television receiver licence fee, so the service is not 
free in the American sense. In addition, the equivalent 
middle-income group is confined to a relatively small 
percent of the total population. The vast majority 
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of South African households could probably not afford 
to subscribe to additional services. 
If this is the case, then any additional television 
services will have to be subsidised by the government, 
or will have to rely on private sector involvement, 
utilising the current, acute (excess demand) situation 
of television advertising. 
It seems unlikely that government priorities of defence, 
education and Black housing needs will permit any mean-
ingful subsidy towards television innovations. 
It is to be hoped, however, that the· government will 
see the social and economic advantages of permitting 
private sector involvement in the next stage of the 
country's television development. 
Where private sector involvement has been tolerated, 
e.g. the video industry, the response has been remarkable. 
The phenomenal growth in video cassette recorder (VCR) 
sales now places South Africa second only to Japan in 
terms of VCR penetration of TV homes - five percent 
7 
compared to the US's four percent • 
Although the numbers of South Africans who are prepared 
to pay for the VCR option are insignificant compared 
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with other Western societies, the exponential sales 
curve for VCR's illustrates the South African demand 
for viewing diversity. Vid.eo mail order firms are 
now supplying country districts with packages of sixty 
films - a year's supply - for Rl20 8 • The VCR 
phenomenon is considered in more depth in Chapter 7, 
Evolution, Innovation and New Technology. 
The present system for delivering televisi n programmes 
in South Africa creates two major inefficiencies in 
economic welfare terms. It severely restricts 
programme diversity (or viewer choice) and makes little 
attempt at satisfying regional requirements. 
The present national structure of TVl, TV2/TV3 produces 
programmes for mass audiences differentiated only by 
language. It is true that language differentiation 
must imply the integration in programming of certain 
cultural components, but the centralised nature of exist-
ing services deprives viewers of genuine regional 
flavour. 
It has been argued that a broadcasting monopoly can 
actually produce more programme diversity as the 
monopolist is interested in maximising the audience 
of the entire television system, not of that particular 
9 
channel • The monopolist has no need to compete with 
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"more of the same" but can use second and subsequent 
channels for speciality programmes .thus satisfying the 
consumer requirement of true programme diversity. 
Leaving aside, for the moment, the traditional criticisms 
levelled at monopolies, this argument has some merit. 
Its major flaw, however, is the inherent assumption 
of population homogeneity. 
South Africa as a developing country, has still a 
considerable way to go before it reaches, if it ever 
does, population homogeneity comparable with that of 
-Western Europe or the United States. Television has 
a role to play in developing national identity, but 
it should also cater for the special needs of the 
geographic segments comprising the heterogeneous whole. 
It follows, then, that future television development 
should be in the form of a structure that complements 
the existing national services as well as meeting the 
special information entertainment and educational 
requirements of the regions. 
The Brookings Institution study of the structure of 
American television showed that television is capable 
of generating consumer satisfactions far in excess of 
costs in resources. Yet even with the US's multiple 
viewing options compared with South Africa's two channel 
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system, there remained unfulfilled demand for many types 
of television progra.rnrnes. Although the two systems 
are not comparable for a number of socio-economic 
reasons, the evidence in the study indicated that 
America's advertiser-supported, free broadcasting system 
creates an enormous benefit for the middle- and lower-
income groups. 
The system was also seen to harbour a number of 
inefficiencies, among these being : an insensitivity 
to intensely felt demands of a large minority for 
particular types of programmes; a scarcity of the 
most popular mass-audience programmes; an absence of 
incentives to be alert to the social consequences of 
programming and advertising; anti-competitive effects 
on the markets for advertised products; and less 
advertising than demand and cost conditions justify10 • 
While these economic welfare imperfections are 
apparent in the American television system, they are 
magnified considerably on examining the South African 
system, with the possible exception that South Africa's 
state controlled television does not need incentives 
to being alert to the social consequence's of progra.rnrn-
ing and advertising. Advertising is carefully 
regulated 'for the public good'. In programming, 
however, the SABC has tended to prefer non-controversial 
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( 
often bland formats 11 . 
Where commercial television has become established it 
is usually accompanied by shifts in advertising 
revenues from other media, implying a concomitant 
decline in resources committed to other advertising 
media that may or may not offset the benefits of 
television. 
Naturally, the South African press is sensitive to any 
proposals aimed at changing the structure of the tele-
vision system. The realisation that the growth of 
television in South Africa is inevitable, brings 
pressures from the press to be allowed to diversity 
into television ownership. Some press representatives, 
mainly Afrikaans, see some justification for consider-
ing some kind of subsidy system to preserve the structure 
of the South African press, where this is thought to 
be socially desirable. 
in Chapter 6. 
These issues are considered 
In considering the welfare implications of advertiser-
supported television, the Brookings Institution study 
concluded that an examination of the alternative 
structures of the television industry should allow for 
one important point : 
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"The nature of a television broadcast 
precludes a solution that meets all 
of the efficiency criteria as satis-
factorily as does a perfectly 
competitive industry producing a 
private good. Leaving aside the 
problem of income distribution, no 
structure will both ensure equality 
of price and marginal cost and produce 
the socially most desirable mix and 
number of programmes. And no system 
will be free of fairly high costs of 
collecting the revenues necessary to 
reward the resources committed to 
television. Consequently, a 
significant number of viewers will 
always be dissatisfied with the 
performance of the television 
industry, regardless of its structure 
and of public policy toward it .• " 12 
5.2 TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND MARKET COMPETITION 
In the United States television advertising and its 
alleged effect on the structure of markets, has become 
an important anti-trust issue. Probably the best known 
example was the 1960 ruling by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) that a merger between Clorox and 
Procter and Gamble should not be permitted, as, accord-
ing to the FTC, the merger would confer an unfair 
competitive advantage since the enlarged corporation 
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could purchase national television at a lower price 
than its competitors. The decision was subsequently 
upheld by the Supreme Court, and has been cited as a 
precedent in several subsequent anti-trust actions 13 . 
The basis for the FTC ruling was the network policy 
of granting 'volume discounts' to firms purchasing large 
amounts of advertising in a particular television year. 
Television advertising can also reduce competition by 
creating a cost barrier to firms and industries that 
depend on advertising. N 11 t 1 14 . t t th t o e a . . po 1 n ou a 
because the number of television viewers is so large, 
even a low per-viewer cost means high total expenditures. 
In an industry in which television advertising is 
particularly effective, firms must have a large advertis-
ing budget - and hence a large volume of business to 
compete. This situation exactly mirrors the South 
African case where major national and international 
corporations have almost exclusive use of the medium. 
While it is true that a cost barrier is present in all 
forms of advertising, it is most pronounced in television, 
particularly in South Africa where firms are forced 
by channel limitations to buy national coverage for 
their advertising regardless of differing regional 
marketing objectives. As the Brookings Institution 
study points out, this high total cost of television 
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advertising could be overcome only by fragmenting 
viewers through a vast increase in the number of tele-
. . t t. 15 vision s a ions . 
5.3 TELEVISION AND TOTAL ADVERTISING 
Another important economic welfare consideration is 
the extent to which television advertising increases 
the total amount of advertising in the economy. It 
is well known that television drains advertising 
revenues from other media (a major reason why the 
Newspaper Press Union (NPU) would strongly resist any 
increase in the existing eight percent of advertising 
in television programme? by the SABC) • It is not so 
well understood, however, that television increases 
total demand for advertising. This implies that 
television does not just siphon off advertising that 
previously would have been allocated to other media, 
but, because of its unique characteristics, it is able 
to generate more advertising revenue than would exist 
if there was no television. 
There are a number of reasons for this. The direct, 
pervasive nature of the medium, utilising both vision 
and sound, is able to demonstrate product benefits like 
no other advertising medium. Whilst it is relatively 
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easy perceptively to screen out most other forms of 
advertising, the intrusive nature of television advertis-
ing makes it difficult to ignore it. In most Western 
countries watching television is now the major form 
of leisure activity. Television is regarded as the 
most believable communication medium. Individuals 
also demonstrate a high degree of interest in television 
commercials. In a public opinion survey, carried out 
by the Department of Business Science at 
the University of Cape Town in September 1982, tele-
vision emerged as the most believable medium, confirming 
similar findings by international research organisations 
such as Roper (see Chapter 4, reference 3). Regarding 
commercials, seventy-five percent of the South African 
respondents were prepared to tolerate even more 
advertising on television, provided it resulted in more 
16 
and better programmes . 
In a similar American study by Steiner in 1964 17 , an 
average of only fifteen and a half percent of viewers 
were found to pay no attention to commercials (see 
Table 5-3, overleaf). 
The Brookings Institution study concluded that there 
was no obvious best test of how much television advertis-
ing substitutes for other media as opposed to how much 
it adds to total advertising : 
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TABLE 5-3 
ATTENTION OF VIEWERS TO TELEVISION PROGRAMMES 
AND COMMERCIALS, 1964 SURVEY* 
Level of Behaviour Just Before Behaviour During 
Attention Commercial Conunercial 
Full 71,0% 48,0% 
Partial 21,6% 36,5% 
None 7,2% 15,5% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 
*The viewer survey was oorrlucted arrong the families of 325 
Chicago-area oollege students 
Source ~ted fran Eoonanic Aspects of Television 
Regu1ation, Noll et al., p. 40. 
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.. To estimate this division requires 
a reasonably accurate specification of 
the relationship between advertising and 
sales, which is very difficult to 
establish because it need have no 
particular functional form. Certainly 
income is important in determining 
responsiveness to advertising, since 
higher income groups spend much more 
on discretionary consumer goods, whose 
purchase is heavily influenced by taste 
and style. Yet education and security, 
which also rise with income, probably 
dampen the effectiveness of advertising 
,.18 
By exploring relationships between household character-
istics and media advertising expenditures, the Brookings 
Institution study was able to estimate that nearly 
half of television advertising in the United States 
is a net addition to total advertising. The study 
showed that its estimates were roughly consistent with 
the effect of the ban on broadcasting cigarette 
advertising in 1971. Of the $211 million spent on broad-
cast cigarette advertising in 1970, about sixty-three percent 
was shifted to other media in 1971, while thirty-seven 
percent went to a reduction in total advertising 
d 't 19 expen 1 ures • 
In South Africa it is possible to observe television 
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advertising as a contributor to total advertising in 
another way. As there is a critical under supply 
situation brought about by state monopoly and channel 
limitations, many adveitisers have their applications 
for advertising time allocations rejected or severely 
reduced by the SABC,which has drawn up a formula with 
the object of making allocations of this scarce 
resource in an equitable way. Where funds have been 
allocated for television advertising and not realised, 
it is rare for these funds to be diverted to other 
advertising media. 
Dr Jan Swanepoel, former director-general of the SABC, 
addressing the South African Society of Marketers, said 
television had boosted the advertising business in South 
Africa rather than affecting it detrimentally. He 
claimed that total advertising expenditure before the 
advent of commercial television in 1978 was relatively 
static. However, from 1978 advertising grew at an 
annual rate of twenty-five percent20 . 
Television's share rose between sixteen and nineteen 
percent a year. Dr Swanepoel said : 
" ••• this made a myth of the accusation 
that television was solely to blame for 
the increases in advertising costs of 
periodicals and their subsequent decrease 
in circulation because of their higher 
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retail prices. Increased competition in 
the media industry had had a stimulating 
effect on the advertising industry as a 
whole . • . " 21 
Critics'of media monopolies would be greatly encouraged 
by these sentiments. They can, too, perhaps be forgiven 
for wondering whether Dr Swanepoel's stout defence of 
competition in the media would be proclaimed so lustily 
had there existed an independent television service 
competing for advertising alongside the SABC. 
5.4 THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK AND NON-NETWORK PROGRAMMING 
The Brookings Institution study, in examining the 
American television industry's potential for improved 
performance, concluded that the FCC had contributed 
to making the networks enormously profitable by shield-
ing them from competition. The study contended that 
the FCC had failed in its stated goal of increasing 
local programming through greater use of the ultra high 
frequency (UHF) band. It had also (according to the 
study) discouraged the development of new broadcast 
technologies. The study concluded that the best means 
of increasing viewer benefit was through a combination 
of more local stations entering the market and the 
utilisation of the new technologies 22 
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The existing South African television system is a 
centralised one, beaming the same signal nationally 
with simultaneous receiving in all reception areas. 
Programming, of necessity, is national and even inter-
national in orientation and flavour, the only 
concession made is to the major languages. 
National coverage is the obvious first objective of 
any country implementing a television service. 
Ultimately, in the interest of consumer welfare, the 
broadcasting system expands to cater for the important 
needs of regionalism and/or localism. 
In evaluating the next-ste~ in the development of tele-
vision services for South Africa, an examination of 
the economics of networking is necessary, assuming the 
next stage will involve the state and the private 
sector in the provision of an independent or regional 
television network based on the major metropolitan 
centres. The individual stations (television companies) 
should be inter-connected providing a means of distribut-
ing programmes from a central source, either for 
simultaneous broadcasting in all regions, or for 
/ 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
5-22 
recording, storage and re-broadcasting, at the discretion 
of the local station. Advertisers would be able to 
arrange regional coverage by contracting with the local 
television company, or national coverage by dealing 
with the network. 
The individual television companies serving the regions 
would be able to achieve economies through centralised 
programme procurement for high cost entertainment and 
information (films, national and international news, 
sport, etc.) , whilst originating a :rrodest range of individual 
programming to suit regional requirements. 
Advertising would range from the sophisticated thirty 
second live action commercials to simple slide present-
ations' with voice-over commentary lasting for ten seconds, 
as used in cinemas. Television would cease to be the 
exclusive preserve of the large national and multi-
national companies, as thousands of small and medium 
sized companies and organisations with regional markets 
shared in the economic benefits of television 
advertising. 
A centralised regulatory body could be named, say, the 
South African Broadcasting Tribunal (SABT). This state 
department would be responsible for the regulation and 
administration of the network, arrangements for the 
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networking of programmes and advertising, and the 
awarding of franchises to operate the transmitters to 
the independent television companies. This arrange-
ment would be similar to the British Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) model, except that in the 
British case the transmitting facilities are government 
owned. 
If the South African government was reluctant to invest 
capital in setting up a network of regional transmitters, 
perhaps preferring to concentrate public expenditure 
on SABC developments :dt could, for example, insist 
that all capital investment for the network should come 
from the private sector~. But if the government, like 
its British counterpart, should wish to retain owner-
ship of all broadcasting transmitters in a pluralistic 
system, the development of an independent television 
network could be held up indefinitely due to low 
priority in the allocation of public funds. 
In considering network and non-network programming in 
the South African context, it is important to be 
realistic regarding indigenous programmes. Although 
an independent television network would encourage 'local' 
or regional flavoured programmes, their overall 
contribution in terms of broadcasting hours per regional 
station would, initially, at any rate, be small. This 
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highlights a severe problem encountered when examining 
the state of South African television, namely, the 
shortage of creative skills in the mediwn. The SABC, 
to its credit, sees it to be its duty to initiate a 
reasonable proportion of home-grown programming. 
The corporation would probably admit that this policy 
has after seven years of television had only limited 
success. The Afrikaans Service seems to be more 
consistently successful than the English Service, but 
the lack of professionalism in programme production, 
brought about by the lack of skilled and experienced 
personnel, is a major cause of public criticism. 
To expect an independent regional television company 
to suceed where the might of the SABC has so often 
failed, may seem unrealistic and it must be said that 
the quality and public acceptance of much locally 
initiated programming in countries like Australia, 
Britain and the United States is still low, leaving 
advertisers with little option but -to try to buy into 
peak viewing time-slots featuring the hugely popular 
national and international prograrnrne offerings. Few 
countries, if any, can yet offer the quality and quantity 
of local television generally thought desirable. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that if South Africa had 
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more television in the form of competition- for the SABC 
on a national (network) and a regional or local level, 
more good people would be attracted to careers in the 
industry and standards in domestic programming could 
be expected to improve considerably. Regardless of 
quality of programmes, commercial television is a very 
lucrative business anywhere in the world, because it 
has the potential to fill the need for mass entertain-
ment, information and education so well. 
Assuming the development of an independent television 
network was officially encouraged in South Africa, 
subject to suitable controls, it is logical to conclude 
that professional television personnel from overseas 
countries would almost certainly be attracted to what 
they perceived as an industry with good growth and 
career potential. It goes without saying, that it 
would not only be the independent television companies 
that would benefit from this influx. Such stimulation 
to the industry would also benefit the SABC. 
As things stand, the creative and production sectors 
of the South African television and film industries 
appear almost static when compared with industry develop-
ment in other Western countries. Indeed, many media 
commentators would consider the term 'industry', when 
applied to South African television, to be something 
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of a misnomer. 
For these reasons, it would be realistic to expect 
independent television in South Africa to be composed 
mainly of networke~ mass-audience entertainment, national 
and international news, sport and documentaries of 
general interest. Local or regional programmes will 
almost certainly be initially restricted perhaps to 
about fifteen percent of output with the aim of 
increasing this by about five percent per year, as 
experience is gained. 
Advertising content, on the other hand, could have a 
large local component from the commencement of the service. 
The author of this dissertation recommends that local 
advertisers should receive advantageous treatment from 
the regional television companies in order to encourage 
maximum participation. 
The American experience with local television demonstrates 
quite clearly that however noble the vision of 
decentralisation of programming is, audiences are always 
attracted to the high budgeted national programmes. 
Cox and Johnson 23 in their examination of US television 
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stations, found that local prograrruning accounted for 
less than twenty percent of prime time and about ten 
percent of daytime hours. Half the total, and almost 
all of the prime time local hours was news, weather 
and sport. 
The reason why the welfare concept of localism has only 
had limited success in the United States is demonstrated 
24 by Noll et al . 
" . It is simply not as profitable 
for station owners as national programm-
ing. A programme of the same quality 
shown nationally is obviously much 
cheaper per viewer. A typical half-
hour evening network show costs at 
least $90 000 (at 19?2 prices*) to 
produce but, with an average share 
of the nationwide audience, this 
amounts to less than one cent per 
viewing home. At the same cost per 
viewer, and with the same share of 
the local audience, the individual 
station in a market with a million 
homes can afford only $1 500 for 
programme costs - an amount sufficient 
to produce only a low-quality talk 
show with minimum salaries for 
production and performing talent 
and with guests who are generally 
volunteers. For the most part the 
viewing audience prefers highly 
professional talent - professional 
*Author's italics 
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football rather than local high school 
games, for example. Locally produced 
programmes, therefore, have low 
audience ratings, and the advertising 
revenues are correspondingly low. 
Consequently, they must operate on 
very small budgets - which act further 
to_ reduce their audiences ... " 25 
This same situation is evident regarding local programm-
ing in Britain and Australia and is bound to be an 
important factor in any private sector television 
enterprise in South Africa. It is therefore probably 
unrealistic to expect locally produced programmes ever 
to exceed twenty-five percent of programme content in 
the South African context. One would- expect, however, 
that South African originated programming, as opposed 
to imported programming, could quickly rise to around 
forty percent with the establishment of an independent 
television network, even though a relatively small 
component of this was of local or regional flavour. 
In Britain, a committee of the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority (IBA) meets on a periodic basis to consider 
the network part of the programme schedules. The IBA's 
Director of Television serves on this committee along 
with the programme controllers of the five network 
companies and the Director of the Network Programme 
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Secretariat, representing all fifteen ITV companies. 
The group puts together the first prototype schedule 
outline covering three months of broadcasting. This 
outline is then offered to each of the programme companies 
as a basic framework on which they can build their own 
schedules by the addition of their own or acquired 
material and various embellishments and finishing 
touches to appeal to their local audiences. Not all 
the companies accept the basic plan in its entirety 
every time, preferring to rebuild parts of it to their 
own specifications. 
Two or three months in advance each television company 
must submit its detailed schedule for the Authority's 
approval. Each schedule must meet certain established 
criteria. Informative programmes are expected to 
occupy at least one-third of the total output. There 
must be a "proper proportion" of UK and other EEC 
produced material - this now amounts to at least eighty-
six percent, almost all of which is produced in the 
UK. Only fourteen percent at a maximum may be produced 
in the US, Commonwealth or other non-EEC countries. 
There are limits on the number of full-length feature 
films, and local-interest material must reach certain 
minimum figures (not specified in IBA literature) 26 . 
Where the Authority feels that a company's proposed 
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schedule is deficient in some way, discussions take 
place to see how the pattern can be improved. On the 
rare occasions when serious differences of opinion aris~, 
it is the Authority which under the terms of the IBA 
Act has the ultimate responsibility and the final 
word27 • 
The IBA claims that three encouraging developments are 
discernible when examining the development of ITV 
programming over the years 
(1) More 'informative' or 'factual' material is being 
broadcast by the ITV companies. More local news 
and current affairs programmes are being made 
by the individual programme companies specially 
for their own (local and regional) viewers. More 
network documentary series have also been made. 
(2) Less acquired material is being shown; in 
particular there are fewer programmes from the 
US and fewer feature films. 
(3) The source of ITV's own production is widening 
and more programmes from the larger 'regional' 
companies are being seen in other part of the 
country28 . 
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Table 5-4 (overleaf) shows the 1977 - 1980 balance of 
prograrruning typically offered to the public. Of the 
103 hours of prograrruning provided each week by the 
average ITV company, half are produced by the five net-
work companies (fifty-one hours), about eight hours 
are networked prograrrunes made by the ten regional 
companies, about eight hours are purely local prograrrunes 
and seven hours comprise news material from ITN (the 
national news company which is owned by all the 
independent television companies). The remaining twenty-
nine hours come from a variety of sources outside the 
ITV companies. 
Factual and informative programmes represent over one-
third of ITV company output. About 166 hours of 
prograrrunes are produced each week in the programme 
companies' own studios, of which about two-thirds is 
informative material (see Table 5-5, page 5-33). 
Table 5-6 (page 5-34) shows programme content for 
SABC's dual language TVl channel. The figures are 
not strictly comparable with the average ITV company's 
figures in Table 5-4 owing to time represented and 
different terminology and categories of programme type. 
Nevertheless, certain similarity of pattern seems to 
be present in drama, news, youth and children's 
prograrrunes. It must also be borne in mind that the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
5-32 
TABLE 5-4 
WEEKLY TRANSMISSION HOURS OF THE AVERAGE ITV COMPANY 
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 
hrs.mins hrs.mins hrs-.mins 
News and news magazines 10.23 10% 10.27 10~% 10.42 10~% 
Current affairs, 
123/4% documentaries, arts 12.20 12% 13.17 13% 13.04 
Religion 2.50 3% 2.24 2!% 2.28 2~% 
Adult education 3.08 3% 3.07 3% 2.52 23/4% 
School programmes 6.29 6!% 6.11 61/4% 6.24 61/4% 
Pre-school education 1.27 1~% 1.27 1~% 1.16 11/4% 
Children's informative 2.06 2% 2 .10 2% 2.19 2.1I4% 
1 INFORMATIVE 1 38.43 38% 39.03 38 3/4% 39.05 38% 
Plays, drama, TV movies 24.12 24% 22.54 22 3 /4% 25.35 24 3/4% 
Feature films 8.27 8% 8.00 8% 8.27 81/4% 
\. NARRATIVE 1 32.39 32% 30.54 303/4% 34.02 33% 
Children's non-factual 8 .17 8% 7.57 8% 7.32 71/4% 
Entertainment and music 13.19 13% 12.13 12% 13.30 13 1/4% 
ENTERTAINMENT 21.36 21% 20.10 20% 21. 02 20!% 
r SPORT > 9.27 9% 10.34 10!% 8.28 1 ' 8 /4% 
TOTAL ALL PROGRAMMES 102.25 100% 100.41 100% 102.53 100% 
Miscellaneous transmissions account for an additional 
16 minutes included in the total for 1979-80 
Source Television and Radio 1981 IBA, London 1981. 
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TABLE 5-6 
SABC'S TVl AFRIKAANS & ENGLISH SERVICES 
Progranune Content Percentages 
(Figures in brackets are the 1981 percentages) 
Progranune Type Afrikaans English Both 
Drama 29,5 (30,0) 29,5 (31,0) 29,5 (30,5) 
Sport 15,0 (11,0) 17,0 ( 13 I 5) 16,0 (12,25) 
News 12,0 (11,0) 11,0 (11,0) 11,5 (11,0) 
Youth & Children 10,5 ( 8 I 5) 8,5 ( 7 I 0) 9,5 (7 ,25) 
Variety 6,0 (8,0) 10,0 (9,0) 8,0 (8,5) 
Advertisements 6,5 ( 6 I 5) 6,5 ( 6 I 0) 6,5 (6,25) 
Magazine 5,0 ( 5 I 0) 7,0 (7 I 0) 6,0 ( 6 I 0) 
Documentary 5,5 (9,0) 3,5 ( 6 I 5) 4,5 (7 I 7 5) 
Religious 4,5 (4,0) 4,0 (3,5) 4,25 (3,75) 
Serious Music 4,1 ( 4 I 0) 1,5 (2,5) 2,75 (3,25) 
Weather & 
Presen.tation 1,5 ( 3 I 0) 1,5 (3,0) 1,5 ( 3 I 0) 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Source SAOC Annual Report, 1982. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
5-35 
average ITV company broadcasts over one hundred hours 
of programming per week, almost twice that of SABC's 
TVl channel. The other major difference is the 
approximately thirteen percent of programme time devoted 
to various types of educational broadcasting by the 
ITV companies. The SABC intends to begin educational 
television in 1984. 
Tables 5-7 to 5-9 (pages 5-36 to 5-38 respectively) 
provide statistics on TVl's local content percent for 
1982 (figures in brackets are the 1981 percentages) 
and the time allocated to TVl broadcasting. 
5.5 LOCALISM IN TELEVISION - MYTH OR REALITY? 
The objectives sought for localism in broadc~sting are 
summed up in a statement by Cox and Johnson 29 in 
discussing American television structures : 
II 
. . A system of locally based 
stations was deemed necessary to 
ensure that broadcasting would be 
attentive to the specific needs 
and interests of each local 
community. It was also considered 
a guarantee to local groups and 
leaders that they would have 
adequate opportunity for expression 
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TABLE 5-7 
AVERAGE LOCAL CONTENT PERCENTAGES 
(Figures in Brackets are the 1981 Percentages) 
Prog:rarrune TyEe Afrikaans English 
Drama 16,0 (16,7) 14,5 (13,7) 
Documentary 38,4 (19,4) 59,3 (18,8) 
Magazine 99~1 (98,5) 90,9 (76,7) 
Youth and Children 48,1 (54,7) 41,0 (42,0) 
Variety 78,0 (63,4) 57,3 (57,8) 
Sport 88,7 (92,1) 71,3 (62,0) 
Serious Music 77,2 (42,1) 37,2 (18,8) 
Religious 93,8 (96,3) 96,0 (96,8) 
Weather 100,0 (100,0) 100,0 (100,0) 
Source SABC Annual Report, 1982, p.54. 
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TABLE 5-8 
AVERAGE LOCAL CONTENT PERCENTAGE PER SERVICE 
Programmes Only 
Including News & 
Presentation 
Including 
Advertisements 
(Total Time 
Transmitted) 
Afrikaans English Both 
52,9 (46,8) 48,9 (39,5) 50,9 (43,3) 
59,7 (54,6) 56,0 (48,3) 57,,8 (51,5) 
62,4 (57,5) 58,8 (51,5) 60,6 (54,5) 
Source SABC Annual Report, 1982, p.54. 
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TABLE 5-9 
TIME ALLOCATED TO TVl BROADCASTING 
Afrikaans English Both 
Total Hours 
Transmitted 1 216 1 256 2 472 
Programmes Only 972 1 012 1 984 
Local Content 514 (52,9%) 495 (48,9%) 1 009 (50,9%) 
Source SAOC Annual Rep:?rt, 1982, p.54. 
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Ultimately, our broadcasting 
system is premised on concern that 
the very identity of local states 
and cities might be destroyed by a 
mass communications system with an 
exclusively national focus ..• ,, 3o 
A fundamental tenet of this dissertation is the premise 
that some localism in television broadcasting is a worthy 
objective and the needs and interests of local, regional 
and national communities should form a high priority 
in examining new proposals for alternative television 
in South Africa. 
Confirmation of this concept is obtained from an opinion 
survey carried out by the Department of Business Science 
at the University of Cape Town in 1982, where viewer 
opinion appeared to confirm this need31(see Chapter 8, 
South African Opinions and the Television Debate). 
In Britain, Australia and the United States, television 
regulation is designed to promote the principle of 
localism and discourage television systems with an 
exclusively national focus. 
In reality, the situation is very different in all of 
these countries, where programming seldom reflects any-
thing more than national and international fare. 
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In the United States, the network affiliates, which 
constitute the vast majority of VHF stations, rely on 
the network for eighty-two percent of their prime-time 
programming. Of the remaining eighteen percent, a 
high proportion is devoted to non-network films and 
other national programming. Outside of prime time, 
the reliance is less but the pattern is much the same. 
Few local programmes other than local news, weather 
32 
and sport are offered . 
The American independent stations are much the same, 
broadcasting mainly new or rerun syndications and 
movies and many, particularly in the UHF band, go off 
the air in the daytime and late evening rather than 
broadcast local programmes 33 . 
The other ratio ale for local television stations is 
that they serve as an effective advertising medium for 
local industry. The Cox and Johnson study showed that 
here the rule of localism is somewhat more important 
but it pointed out that broadcasters still earn eighty 
percent of their revenue from either network or spot 
messages of national advertisers 34 . This is almost 
certainly true of other countries offering national 
and regional television coverage. The reason is fairly 
obvious. The large national advertisers have large 
investments in television advertising. They spend 
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huge sums on the production and exposure of their 
commercials. They also appreciate the benefits of 
marketing techniques such as market segmentation, so 
they are constantly looking for exposure through a 
combination of national and regional media. 
In a South African scenario, one could expect the same 
situation. For this reason, it would be desirable 
to afford a measure of protection to local advertisers 
and those with relatively small turnovers. The 
easiest form of protectionism would be through the 
pricing mechanism, with preferential rates for local 
advertisers as practised by the British independent 
television system. 
5.6 DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Many economists, sociologists and media commentators 
support the premise that localism in television broad-
casting serves the public interest. Research carried 
out by the Department of Business Science at the 
I 
University of Cape Town (see Chapter 8, South African 
Opinion and the Television Debate) among opinion leaders 
and the general public endorsed this view. However, 
where viewers are able to exercise progranune choice, 
their actual behaviour shows that national programming 
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is the clear favourite by a consideiable margin. 
Because local programming is seen to be in the public 
interest, there is considerable concern that viewers 
often reject it in favour of national programming. The 
Cox and Johnson Report had this to say : 
"The greatest challenge before the American 
people today is the challenge of restoring 
and reinvigorating local democracy. That 
challenge cannot be met without a working 
system of local broadcast media actively 
serving the needs of each community for 
information about its affairs, serving 
the interests of all members of the 
community, and allowing all to confront 
the listening public with their problems 
and their proposals. 1135 
An effective way for broadcast regulatory bodies to 
ensure that large proportions of the population watch 
local programming would be to insist that competing 
channels set aside time during peak viewing hours in 
which all channels must carry local programming. 
This autocratic approach by regulators would be seen 
by the viewing public as an attempt to dictate viewing 
patterns. In the South African context it would 
probably be seen as a restrictive measure almost as 
unpopular as monopoly broadcasting. In any case, the 
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dictatorial powers of regulating authorities have 
already been considerably weakened by technological 
advances such as video and cable developments which 
do not lend themselves· easily to restrictive legislation. 
In order to compete with these innovations, conventional 
broadcasting corporations and authorities will be forced 
to defer more to consumer sovereignty considerations. 
In other words, they will, to a much larger degree, 
give viewers what they want. In the South African 
situation this will almost certainly mean much greater 
emphasis on entertainment of international standard, 
with some measure of local content to serve community 
needs. 
5.7 REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT TELEVISION 
Government regulation of the broadcast media has always 
been an area of he~ted controversy and deep conflict. 
In South Africa broadcast regulation, like so much else, 
has strong political connotations. In countries like 
Britain, Australia and the United States politics too 
are a factor, but the real conflict is between the 
government and the organisations licensed to broadcast. 
A great deal of the debate in these and other countries 
centres around the issues of public access to the media 
and the accountability of the media to the public. 
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In comparing different regulatory systems for broad-
casting one is struck by the apparent indifference, 
comparatively speaking, with these issues on the part 
of the South African public : a passivity which might 
be construed as acquiescence, or even resignation. 
Regulation of television broadcasting in South Africa 
is governed by the Broadcasting Act No. 73 of 1976 
amended by the Broadcasting Amendment Act, No. 61 of 
1982. 
This legislation provides the framework within which 
the SABC operates, as well as stipulating the respons-
ibilities, duties and composition of the corporation's 
Board. 
The Act confers upon the SABC broadcasting rights any-
where within the Republic and certain countries or 
territories outside the Republic. Due regard to the 
interests of the English, Afrikaans and Black cultures 
must be evident in programming policy. 
The general powers of the SABC conferred by the Act 
include : 
- erecting broadcasting stations 
- entering into agreements on the supplying of 
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programmes, news, etc. 
- canvassing and broadcasting advertisements, subject 
to the approval of the Minister* in accordance with 
conditions and requirements determined by him 36 • 
Regulation of South African broadcasting still bears 
a resemblance to the British system on which it was 
modelled. Although British broadcasting had changed 
dramatically since 1954 when Independent (commercial) 
Television was established, the original control 
mechanism is still basically the same. The Home 
Secretary is responsible to Parliament for the proper 
functioning of the BBC and the IBA. 
The structure has remained flexible enough to adapt 
to the arrival of the IBA's and BBC's regional radio 
networks, and a fourth television channel, awarded to 
the IBA. It is expected that the system will also 
incorporate the control of three satellite television 
channels expected to be operated jointly by the BBC 
and the IBA from 1988 37 . The regulatory mechanism 
is currently being reviewed in order to accommodate 
cable television, now that the Hunt Report recommend-
. b . 1 d 38 ations are to e imp emente . 
*'Minister' means, at the present time, Minister of Foreign 
Aff~r~ 
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Although the regulatory mechanisms for broadcasting 
in South Africa and Britain are similar in many respects, 
the BBC and the IBA undoubtedly enjoy in practice far 
greater operational autonomy than does the SABC. The 
British government is always reluctant to interfere 
in programme matters for fear of weakening the broad-
casting system, but there is a case on record where 
a former Director-General of the BBC, Sir Hugh Greene, 
was threatened with the ultimate deterrents of forbidding 
a programme transmission or of refusing to grant a 
39 
change in the licence fee . (It must be remembered 
that unlike the SABC, the BBC is non-commercial, in 
that it does not broadcast advertisements and is thus 
totally dependent upon licence fees and government grants 
for its income.) 
The top level of management of the BBC take the line 
that they are prepared to stand up to government 
pressure because what really matters is 'what the 
k f l ,4o E b f th programme ma ers ee . ven so, mem ers o e 
Association of Directors and Producers are also on 
record as saying that 
" •.. the BBC had failed dismally to 
resist pressure . . . and was the 
primary target for politicians because 
41 it was the softer target" • 
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Naturally this was not the view of many politicians, 
because just as in South Africa, many resented the fact 
that they could not more easily get access to the 
electronic media. 
The Independent Television Companies Association (ITCA), 
the body representing the interests of the IBA's 
franchised television companies, took the view that 
"if the Minister responsible for the 
financing of broadcasting was 
responsible for the health and 
standard of broadcast1ng, he could 
not represent the views of the 
government either on programmes or 
on the way in which a particular 
part of one of the broadcasting 
. . . "42 
organisations was operating . 
Lord Annan's Committee on the Future of Broadcasting 
(1977) concluded that 
"in the last resort, the government, 
not the broadcasters must make 
d . . b . 1 . "43 ecisions a out nationa security . 
.I 
Significantly, the committee also concluded that the 
power of the Minister to veto the transmission of a 
programme gave the broadcasters greater security from 
undue pressure than they would have it if were 
removed : 
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" .•. in the last analysis, the govern-
ment alone can judge and decide whether 
a programme (such as The Question of 
Ulster), constitutes a threat to 
national security, or is likely to 
lead to riots or other grave disorder. 
If that responsibility is taken from 
the government, it must be transferred 
to the Broadcasting Authorities : and 
how much easier it will be for a 
Minister to paint a picture of the 
devastating consequences, and how much 
more difficult for the Authority to 
stand out against his judgement. In 
the present system a Minister can 
state his grave objections the 
Broadcasting Authority can then reject 
these objections and can inform the 
Minister that under his powers he is 
at liberty to ban the programme : but 
if he does, they will tell the public 
that he has done so. We believe that 
this is the best way of reconciling 
the freedom of the broadcasters with 
the legitimate concern of the govern-
ment and of placing the responsibility 
for prohibiting programmes in the 
national interest precisely where it 
belongs . • . we recommend that the 
government's power of veto should be 
retained. 1144 
In considering regulation for an independent television 
system for South Af ric~ due regard needs to be paid 
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to existing legislation and control governing the 
operation and continued operation of the SABC. 
Additional regulation would, therefore, have to be 
compatible with the existing regulatory framework so 
that the SABC and the new independent system were subject 
to basically the same controls and thus shared similar 
definitions of broadcasting, in the public interest. 
The following reports and publications have served as 
the basis for analysis in considering the major features 
of a regulatory framework which should permit the SABC 
and an independent television network to co-exist 
(1) The Broadcasting Act No. 73 of 1976, Statutes 
of the Republic of South Africa. 
(2) The Report of the Committee on the Future of 
Broadcasting, 1977 (UK). 
(3) The Federal Communications Commission, various 
' 
publications (US). 
(4) The Australian Broadcasting and Television Act, 
1942, amended to 1979. 
(5) The Australian Broadcasting Tribunal Annual Report, 
1980 - 1981. 
( 6) Self-Regulation for Broadcasters Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal, 1977. 
( 7) Television Programme Standards Australian 
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Broadcasting Control Board, 1981. 
(8) Government White Paper on Broadcasting, 1978 
(UK) • 
From a synthesis of the above references, and bearing 
in mind the characteristics and special requirements 
of television broadcasting in South Africa, a number 
of recommendations were formulated : 
(1) South African broadcasting services should 
continue as public services and should continue 
to be the responsibility of public authorities. 
Both the SABC and any additional independent 
broadcasting organisation should be independent 
of Government in their day-to-day operations. 
The broadcasting authorities would be respons-
ible for programme content and ensuring that 
the services are conducted in the general public 
interest, in accordance with the requirements 
and objectives laid down by Parliament. 
(2) The broadcasting authorities should prepare annual 
reports on their services and activities for 
presentation to Parliament, as is current practice 
with the SABC. 
(3) A Broadcasting Complaints Commission should be 
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established to consider complaints against the 
broadcasting authorities of misrepresentation 
or unjust or unfair treatment in broadcast 
programmes. This body should work closely with 
the proposed new Media Council, the independent 
self-regulatory body formed by initiatives from 
South Africa's NPU as a consequence of the -
Report of the Steyn Commission of Inquiry into 
the Mass Media, 1981. 
(4) Whenever an authority has a responsibility for 
allocating broadcasting franchises (as could 
be the case with the implementation of an 
independent regional or local television net-
work for South Africa) a public hearing should 
form part of the normal procedure for awarding 
contracts. The hearing should also take place 
in the area in which the franchise will be held. 
(5) The present powers of Government over programming 
(to prescribe the hours of broadcasting, to 
require the broadcasting of announcements or 
any other matter in an emergency, to veto any 
particular broadcast and to prevent the making 
of exclusive arrangements for the broadcasting 
of sporting or other events of national interest) 
should be retained or acquired. 
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(6) The Board of the SABC and members of an additional 
Broadcasting Tribunal (to be styled 'Independent' 
or 'Regional') should continue to be appointed 
by the State President. 
(7) The SABC should continue to be the main national 
instrument of broadcasting in the Republic. 
(8) The SABC should continue to be financed from 
the revenue of television receiver licences, 
plus advertising revenue, for which it would 
have to compete with the proposed regional 
television companies. Because of its special 
responsibility as the main national instrument 
of broadcasting, the SABC should be permitted 
to retain the income from receiver licences, 
exclusively. 
(9) The Independent Television Tribunal should be 
responsible for a single service, serving the 
needs of the major population centres. It 
should also be capable of networking programmes 
nationally. The service should be provided 
by regionally based private sector companies 
under contract to the Tribunal. 
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Assuming a state body such as an Independent 
Television Tribunal is created to be responsible 
for an independent television service for the 
Republic, operating state-owned transmitting 
facilities, a method of funding such an organis-
ation will need to be found. The British IBA 
system, whereby rentals are paid to the IBA for 
use of the state-owned broadcasting facilities 
by the programme companies, appears to solve 
this problem. Furthermore, the television 
companies are called upon to make an additional 
payment via the IBA into the Exchequer. This 
takes the form of a 'levy' on advertising revenue. 
When this levy was first introduced in 1963, 
after a storm of criticism regarding the high 
profits being made by many of the television 
companies, it was a flat rate charge on television 
advertisements. This proved unsatisfactory 
as it left the larger companies with what are 
still considered by Parliament to be 'excessive' 
profits but penalised the smaller regional 
companies. The flat rate was therefore changed 
to a sliding scale on advertising receipts, and 
this proved to be more flexible. The rates 
were changed three times after they were first 
introduced, as shown in Table 5-10 (overleaf). 
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TABLE 5-10 
IBA LEVY RATES 1964 - 1974 
Effective Dates 
Net Advertising 
Revenue 
(£ Million) 
1. 1964 to 1st July 1969 0 - l! 
l! - 7! 
Over 7~ 
2. 1st July 1969 - April 
1970 0 1 2 
' 
- l! 
l! - 4 
4 - 10 
Over 10 
3. April 1970 - 26th Feb. 
1971 0 2 
2 6 
6 9 
9 - 12 
12 - 16 
Over 16 
4. 26th February 1971 -
23rd June 1974 0 2 
2 6 
6 9 
9 - 12 
12 - 16 
Over 16 
Rate of 
Levy 
( % ) 
Nil 
25 
45 
Nil 
7 
25 
35 
47! 
Nil 
20 
35 
40 
45 
50 
Nil 
10 
17! 
20 
22! 
25 
Source Rep:>rt of the camuttee on the Future of Broadcasting, 
1977, pp.176-177. 
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It seems reasonable to assume that such a system, 
combining rentals for use of state-owned facilities 
with a levy on advertising revenue, could be 
readily adapted to fund a South African Broad-
casting Tribunal. 
(10) The practice in the United States and Australia 
where it is common to find press interests owning 
or controlling television companies, is not thought 
to be a good model for South Africa (as, in the 
view of the author, it could work against the 
public interest in that one type of monopoly 
is merely replaced by another. Cross-ownership 
of media is now carefully regulated by broadcast-
ing authorities in many countries because of 
possible monopoly implications.*) It is considered 
important, however, that the South African press 
be permitted to diversify into the elec.tronic 
media, particularly television, as this represents 
a logical development for communication specialists. 
This need was recognised by the Annan Conunittee 
which, in the light of British ~perience, con-
sidered it to be undesirable for any newspaper 
to have more than ten percent voting shares in 
*Author's italics 
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any television company and for the total press 
interest in any company to be more than twenty-
45 five percent 
In considering press participation in regional 
television company ownership in South Africa, 
particular attention should be given to the 
aggregate holding of any one press interest in 
the total broadcasting system. 
Foreign investment in South African television 
companies will also need strict controls. 
There is certain to be intense pressure to 
resist foreign holdings and statutory provision 
will have to be made for this. 
I 
(11) The present basic statutory requirements on 
broadcast advertising should be retained, but 
the current SABC practice of no progranuue 
interruptions should be reviewed as there are 
possible disadvantages to both viewers and 
advertisers with the present system. 
A number of countries with considerably more 
television experience than South Africa, are 
seeking tighter control over advertising 
targeted to children. Many are reviewing the 
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policy of advertising in children's programmes 
and the British inquiry into broadcasting led 
by Lord Annan,recommended that advertisements 
promoting products or services of particular 
interest to children should not be shown before 
46 9.00 p.m. . 
(12) The broadcasting authorities should ensure that 
an adequate proportion of the programmes on their 
services are of South African origin, with a 
view to increasing this local content as the 
services become more established. 
(13) The broadcasting authorities should monitor the 
amount of violence in their programmes and should 
regularly publish their findings. 
The SABC and any new broadcasting entrant)should 
continue to operate a policy of not showing 
television programmes which may be unsuitable 
for children, during the early evening. 
(14) The broadcasting authorities should, as far as 
possible, treat controversial subjects with due 
impartiality, but this should not preclude 
committed public affairs programmes from having 
a recognised place on television. 
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(15) The major political parties should, as far as 
possible, be given equal exposure. 
(16) Although the main thrust of educational broad-
casting should be the responsibility of the SABC, 
an additional independent television service 
would be expected to make a positive contribution 
in this area. An Independent Broadcasting 
Tribunal would be responsible for ensuring that 
franchisees met their educational broadcasting 
obligations. 
The broadcasting authorities would be responsible 
for the co-ordination of educational programming, 
with the SABC having overall responsibility. 
The broadcasting organisations and the educational 
authorities should devise research projects 
to test the effectiveness of structured educational 
programmes. 
(17) The broadcasting authorities should not duplicate 
the broadcasting of the same event thereby wasting 
scarce resources and reducing viewer choice. 
They should agree to share the coverage of such 
events. 
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In the present circumstances and for the foreseeable 
future, the South African broadcasting authorities 
should make provision for programmes introducing 
immigrants to their new country. There should also 
be programmes on the cultures of the immigrants which 
would enable South Africans to understand and 
appreciate these cultures. The Australian Channel 
0/28 is an excellent example of this endeavour (see 
Chapter 9, The Aspects of Overseas Television Systems 
of Possible Relevance to Future Developments in South 
Africa) . 
In framing regulatory requirements for future South 
African broadcasting developments, one is struck by 
the growing emphasis being placed in other Western 
countries on the accountability of the broadcasting 
authorities. The spotlight falls on the Government's 
powers and responsibilities as well as the respons-
ibilities of the broadcasting organisations. 
South Africans can be judged fortunate in that the 
Republic can draw on the vast experience accumulated 
abroad with television regulation, in formulating future 
broadcasting plans. The policymakers could do worse 
than to heed Anthony Smith when he said : 
" •.. A broadcasting industry is 
healthy only when it is free to 
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hold discourse with its society and 
when that society is free to influence 
it, to criticize it and to be 
challenged and at times affronted by 
't .. 4~ J. • • • 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ADVERTISING 
Advertising services contributed sixty-two percent to 
the SABC's total revenue of R316,4 million in 1983. 
Television advertising is now established as the 
corporation's single largest source of income, generat-
ing revenue of Rl41,6 million (forty-five percent of 
total revenue) in 19831 • 
It is difficult to obtain accurate estimates of the 
extent to which SABC-TV is oversubscribed but officials 
have admitted to an undersupply situation of at least 
one hundrend percent for TVl. Other South African 
media commentators place oversubscription as high as 
two hundred percent and higher. 
This is an important economic consideration·in con-
templating new television entries to the market. 
An independent network capable of regional coverage 
would quite obviously soak up much of this advertising 
but would in addition, generate considerably more 
additional advertising from small and medium sized 
companies which cannot afford the cost of existing 
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national television exposure. 
Using the only available published source for international 
comparisons, South Africa is seen to spend considerably less 
on all forms of advertising when compared with other Western 
countries. Table 6-1 (overleaf) shows an underestimated 
figure of $342 million for 1981 advertising expenditure 
($13,11 per capita) to be by far the highest in Africa, but 
compared with some Western European countries, South Africa's 
total expenditure exceeds that of Norway ($291 million), 
Belgium ($294 million), Ireland ($60 million), Portugal ($69 
million), Greece ($62 million) and Turkey ($254 million). 
Using the better criterion of per capita expenditure, South 
Africa is seen, at $13,11 to be ahead of Italy ($10,69), 
Portugal ($7,24), Greece ($6,7) and Turkey ($6,32). 
Using advertising expenditure as a measure of economic 
activity, it can be seen that although South Africa is 
ranked higher than the conventionally defined 'poor and 
developing' countries, it still has considerable ground 
to make up before it comes up to the levels of the more 
industrialised economies. 
Another method of evaluating the importance of advertis-
ing to a country's economy is to relate advertising 
expenditures to the gross national product (G.N.P.). 
Table 6-2 (page 6-4) shows how South Africa compares with 
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TABLE 6-1 
GLOBAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES ($) 
Total 
(In 
mllllons) 
Per 
capita Country 
·Total 
(In 
mllllons) 
Per 
capita 
---·--·-------------
Western Europe 
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507 
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 753 
Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 
Netherlands 
Norway ................. . 
Austria ...................... . 
West Germany ............... . 
France .................. . 
United Kingdom .............. . 
Spain ....................... . 
Iceland ...................... . 
Belgium ..................... . 
Luxembourg ................. . 
Ireland ..................... . 
Italy ................... . 
Malta ................ . 
Portugal ....... . 
Greece ............... . 
Turkey ................ . 
Africa 
South Africa ....... . 
Libya ............. . 
Rhodesia ......... . 
Zambia .......... . 
Mauritius ......... . 
Egypt .................. . 
Sudan .. , ... . 
Kenya .................... . 
Nigeria .......... . 
Morocco ................ . 
Liberia ............... . 
Ghana ........... . 
Ethiopia ......... . 
1,122 
291 
421 
2,986 
2,502 
2,250 
1,322 
294 
11 
60 
601 
3 
69 
62 
254 
342 
11 
2 
58 
13 
53 
1 
3 
Middle East 
Bahrain 
Kuwait .......... . 
Israel ......... . 
Lebanon ...... . 
Saudi Arabia ... . 
Syria ........ . 
)o-:dan ........ . 
Iraq .......... . 
UAE .. . 
United Stat~ .. 
Can~rla .... 
North America 
12 
18 
58. 
35 
89 
21 
54,600 
. . 2,378 
,, . 
109.59 
99.41 
91.81 
82.19 
81.28 
72.73 
56.13 
48.56 
47.31 
40.25 
36.73 
35.50 
29.73 
28.25 
18.69 
10.69 
8.00 
7.24 
6.70 
6.32 
13.11 
4.36 
2.79 
2.24 
1.89 
1.52 
0.95 
0.93 
0.82 
0.71 
0.39 
0.25 
0.03 
41.00 
17.70 
16.74 
11.63 
9.63 
2.72 
2.46 
1.70 
156.69 
103.40 
South Asia 
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
India......................... 138 
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Bangladesh .................. . 
Nepal ....................... . 
Afghanistan .................. . 
Bhutan ...................... . 
Southeast Asia 
Singapore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
Taiwan....................... 169 
Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 
Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
Indonesia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
Australasia 
Australia .................... . 
New Zealand ............... . 
1,116 
122 
South America 
Venezuela ................... . 
Argentina .................... . 
Brazil ....... . 
Peru ........................ . 
Chile ...... . 
Uruguay .............. . 
Ecuador ..................... . 
Colombia ................... . 
Surinam ..................... . 
Bolivia ...... . 
Paraguay .... . 
240 
432 
1,260 
95 
57 
35 
93 
2 
Central America 
Bermuda .................... . 
Puerto Rico .. 
Jamaica ..................... . 
Costa Rica ................... . 
Trinidad & Tobago ....... · ... . 
Mexico ... . 
Panama .... . 
Dominican RPpublic .......... . 
Nicaragua ............... . 
Guatemala ............ . 
El Salvador ............ . 
Honduras 
7 
96 
36 
20 
11 
480 
13 
31 
Northeast Asia 
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,856 
Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 
Source : BOVEE C.L. & ARENS W.F. Contemporary Advertising 
Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, l I lino1s : 1982, p.30 
1.58 
0.33 
0.23 
0.20 
0.13 
0.05 
22.04 
20.00 
10.36 
3.42 
3 04 
1.35 
0.45 
82.06 
39.52 
i9.36 
16.80 
11.54 
5.89 
5.4-! 
5.07 
4.78 
3.79 
3.75 
1.79 
1.30 
110.00 
30.09 
17.24 
9.95 
9.91 
7.71 
7.47 
6.38 
2.50 
1.95 
1.20 
1.03 
43.05 
5.21 
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TABLE 6-2 
ADVERTISING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP (1980) 
Rank 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 •· 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Source 
Country 
United States 
Australia 
New Zealand 
United K:i,n<;Jdom 
Chile 
Canada 
Japan 
Brazil 
Venezuela 
W. Germany 
Belgium 
South Africa 
Spain 
France 
Central America 
Austria 
Malaysia 
Peru 
Sweden 
Italy 
% 
1,60 
1,48 
1,37 
1,34 
1,15 
1,00 
0,97 
0,95 
0,73 
0,64 
0,59 
0, 58 (0,8 for 1983) 
0,54 
0,51 
0,49 
0,47 
0,46 
0,43 
0,42 
0,36 
Managenent, September 1982, p.17 
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a number of other countries in this regard. 
An examination of the American experience of advertis-
ing and G.N.P. shc:Ms that prior to 1940, the level of 
investment in advertising averaged close to three per-
cent of G.N.P. During World War II with its shortages 
of consumer goods, the ratio fell to slightly over one 
percent. The figure now stands at an even two percent. 
Products are apparently being sold in the United States 
today with relatively less advertising support than 
in the 1930's. Rising costs of advertising may be 
one factor, as well as greater efficiency of advertis-
ing. Furthermore, the character of the G.N.P. has changed 
and now has a substantial governmental segment and a 
very high service industry quotient, neither of which 
is as advertisable as the traditional components of 
2 G.N.P •. 
Advertising in America is seen by Wright et al. as 
representing a declining part of the consumer sector 
of the economy. Advertising-to-sales ratios are 
diminishing for national manufacturing companies, 
especially in the package~ goods field. Leo Bogart, 
a leading American advertising commentator believes 
that : 
"this ~ay reflect the fact that we are 
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approaching the limits of consumers' 
capacity to absorb additional 
advertising communication" 
and that 
"it may mean a shift in the balance 
of advertising and other forms of 
sales promotion 11 • 3 
6.1 MORALITY AND CRITICISM OF ADVERTISING 
Supporters of advertising's social and economic role 
constantly use high advertising expenditure, usually 
expressed as _a percentage of G.N.P. or in per capita terms, 
as indicators of the range of economic choices avail-
able to consumers. They also argue that where 
advertising expenditures per capita are very low, media 
freedom of expression is threatened. The views 
expressed by Torn Dillon, Chairman of BBDO, in an 
address in 1963, are still the basic arguments supported 
by the US advertising industry 
" ... some countries like Great Britain 
and Canada have advertising operations 
very much like our own, but there are 
other countries where advertising 
expenditures per capita are very low. 
There you will find the freedom of 
the press tends to be a fiction 
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radio and television must be supported 
by the state, and they become the 
official propaganda organs of the party 
in power. Indeed the last thing that 
these parties want to see is commercial 
television. For commercial television 
is free-speech television . And 
what happens to newspapers? • in 
the majority of cases, because 
circulation revenue can't possibly 
support them, these newspapers are 
official organs of various political 
parties and get their revenues from 
party funds . • . . . the fact of 
the matter is that, in the absence of 
advertising revenue, the concept of 
freedom of the press is a joke • . 
... Without the financial support of 
advertising, not only would there be 
no practical freedom of economic 
choice, but there is also a very 
serious question whether there would 
be any practical freedom in politics 
d 1 . . .. 4 an re 1g1on . . . 
That advertising contributes to economic welfare and 
benefits society is not nearly as well documented as 
the reverse argument. The phenomenal growth of the 
consumerism movement, particularly in the United States, 
can, in some measure, be attributed to advertising's 
excesses. Fraudulent and misleading advertising has 
become the target of informed and fearless exposure. 
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Television in Britain and America is making superstars 
out of consumer watchdogs as the networks realise the 
tremendous audience appeal that consumer protection 
programme formats offer5 . 
American public concern regarding television advertising 
is also reflected in the fact that an organisation 
called Action for Children's Television, started by 
a group of concerned parents and now a nationwide body, 
has called for the barring of all advertisements aimed 
at children under the age of twelve. Their concern 
is that commercials for food, toys and other items 
aimed at children under high school age are inherently 
deceptive because they claim, at that age viewers do 
not understand their purpose. Most attention in recent 
years has been paid to food commercials because they 
allegedly encourage bad eating habits, harming 
children's health. Advertisements for products high 
in sugar content have drawn most of the public criticism. 
The television networks naturally oppose a total ban. 
They argue that a ban would reduce their revenues, and 
thus the amount of money available for producing better 
programmes for children. At least one network, ABC, 
has voluntarily limited the number of advertisements 
aimed at children. Another network, NBC, indicating 
sensitivity to the subject, has been running brief 
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announcements during peak children's viewing hours, 
encouraging them to eat properly. 
American children between the ages of two and twelve 
years watch an average of 20 000 television commercials 
a year, or fifty to fifty-five on a typical day6 . 
Television advertising has been the catalyst for forcing 
an examination of the societal aspects of advertising, 
although the economic and aesthetic aspects of 
advertising have been the subject of debate and con-
troversy for many decades. Advertisers are accused 
of creating dissatisfaction with the status quo. They 
portray fantasy images to the young and the less 
affluent segments of society. Because advertising 
is seldom truly selective, the less affluent sections 
of society, e.g. South Africa's Black population, are 
exposed to images of lifestyles that many cannot even 
hope to aspire to. The resulting frustrations are 
believed to have a social price. Heilbroner 7 , 
commenting on the phenomenon of advertising, states : 
" ... But is not advertising also 
testimony to the changing character 
of consumer wants? In the nineteenth 
century, those wants were basically 
focused on the basic requirements of 
simple existence : food, clothing, 
shelter. In the rich nations of the 
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mid-twentieth century, however, these 
basic wants have been largely 
satisfied. Consumer damand is no 
longer driven to essentials, but 
hesitates before a whole range of 
possible luxuries and semi-luxuries. 
Thus the fact that producers can 
manipulate and create these wants 
testifies to the much more important 
fact that the wants themselves are 
now amorphous and vague and 
susceptible to influence. Curiously, 
then, we can view the rise of 
advertising as an attempt to introduce 
orderliness and intensity of demand 
into a society where purely 
spontaneous demand would no longer 
firmly indicate which patterns of 
economic activity producers should 
follow • ". 8 
Heilbroner's thinking may offer a possible explanation 
of advertising in advanced economies like those of the 
United States and Western Europe, but the 'goodness 
of fit' can be seriously questioned when applied to 
developing and mixed economies like South Africa's, 
where the vast proportion of the population is still 
\ 
pursuing the basic requirements of simple existence. 
Galbraith's view is rather similar to that of Heilbroner 
when he states : ~ I 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
II 
6-.11 
.. the social difficulty in which 
advertising finds itself is that while 
a shop-window presents goods for sale, 
the shop-window of advertising presents 
'satisfactions' to buy. This indeed 
is far more helpful to the public who 
do not buy 'things' but the satisfactions 
- the utility, the pleasure, the 
prestige, the performance - delivered 
by those things. Things are. objective 
and unarguable, but satisfactions, with 
their subjective implications, are 
different for different people . . . 
we are in the realm of ethical and 
social prejudices and judgements and 
the intellectuals and the elders tend 
to have different views from the masses 
and the younger • 119 
'/ 
Hobson comments that whatever satisfaction it portrays, 
advertising is certain to be in trouble with somebody, 
and because it is, by its nature, obtrusive and 
ubiquitous, it tends to attract to itself the blame 
for all the conflicts of modern society1~ 
Advertising is frequently accused of debasing culture. 
Wright et al. ask how realistic is it to assume that 0\ 
advertising has a responsibility to raise or even 
maintain cultural standards, pointing out that the 
function of advertising is to persuade : "In attempt-
ing to persuade some, it is almost sure to offend others 1111 • 
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A major cultural criticism, previously discussed in 
Chapter 4, relates to advertising supported mass 
appeal information and entertainment provided by the 
mass media, particularly television. Although popular 
'low-brow' fare is often preferred to the more aesthetic 
and culturally significant type of offering, it is 
possible to go too far in criticising the mass media 
for giving the public what it obviously desires and· 
enjoys. The important factor is that it is only 
through advertising that the consu.mer can benefit from 
choice, be it in newspapers or television channels. 
As advertising has proliferated in the media, the 
criticism of advertising in South Africa has also 
intensified. Detractors claim that the Afrikaans 
and English languages and cultures are being debased. 
They argue that advertising's mass promotion of a 
materialistic society leaves the majority of Blacks 
and the less affluent feeling helpless and frustrated. 
Some religious leaders, educationalists and community 
leaders are convinced that advertising manipulates 
people unethically. Other South Africans claim that 
advertising is not only excessive but also offensive 
and in bad taste. 
The traditional defence of advertising is the claim 
/ 
that it is misused and its manipulative power in society 
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is often exaggerated. However, such is the force of 
the criticism that a large body of legislation and other 
control mechanisms has emerged to ensuE~ that the South 
African advertising industry takes a more responsible 
and professional stance. Regulation has come in a 
number of forms : voluntary self-regulation by 
advertisers; regulation by the advertising agencies. 
and the media; government regulation in the form of 
legislation designed to protect consumers; self-
regulation by industrial associations and a keener sense 
of South African societal problems by the business 
community; and the emergence of South African consumer 
protection organisations such as the Consumer Council. 
Certainly, the image of South African advertising is 
a prime issue with professional and business organis-
ations such as the South African Society of Marketers, 
the Association of Accredited Practitioners in 
Advertising (AAPA), the Newspaper Press Union (NPU) 
and the SABC. With all sectors of South African 
advertising actively supporting a more responsible and 
professional approach to advertising, one can expect 
to see the modest but impressive efforts of the 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) to involve the 
South African public in reporting untruthful, mislead-
ing and offensive advertising bearing fruit. The result is that 
the traditional social criticisms of advertising are, 
at least, being re-examined in a more informed way 
/" 
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(see Appendix C, Examples of Advertisements for the 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) Appealing to the 
South African Public to Become Involved in Improving 
Advertising Content) . 
6.2 SOCIAL USES OF ADVERTISING 
The major source of criticism regarding advertising 
is centred on commercial campaigns for fast moving 
consumer goods and also consumer durables. In countries 
like Britain and the United States ever increasing amounts 
of money are being invested in public service uses of 
advertising. 
The Advertising Council in the United States is a private, 
non-profit orga isation which conducts public service 
advertising campaigns in the public interest. In 1979 
it received free space and time by US media to the value 
of $600 million, making it the largest single advertiser 
in the United States. 
It is argued that in South Africa a high proportion 
of newspaper advertising space is devoted to the recruit-
ment of personnel, fulfilling a definite social need 
as far as job seekers are concerned. 
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Recruitment advertising in the Republic is becoming 
highly specialised with a number of recruitment service 
agencies developing out of conventional advertising 
agencies. South Africa has also witnessed the 
establishment of the large international advertising 
agencies, specialising solely in recruitment. 
Supporters of advertising would further argue that 
classified advertising overall fulfils a useful social 
function with only a comparatively small proportion 
being purely commercial or of little social use. 
Essential public services such as teaching, hospitals, 
police, local government, etc. all rely heavily on 
advertising. 
Advertising also permits individuals and organisations 
to state their views on particular issues that concern 
them. It may be an industry, or a university appealing 
against intended government legislation, or a statement 
from a political party. 
Providing the message is considered not to of fend 
against good taste and decency, the South African press 
is free to carry virtually any advertisement. In the 
case of the state controlled broadcasting service, the 
SABC; restrictions on advertising are more severe. The 
SABC has its own stringent code and advertising clearing 
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system whereby all advertisements are scrutinised and 
no advertisement that is deemed to be of a political 
or religious nature is permitted. In this and other 
regards, the SABC's code is similar to that of Britain's 
Independent Broadcasting Authority's Code of Advertising 
Standards and Practice. 
Advertising can provide a freedom from interference 
with a particular message which cannot always be counted 
on in editorial columns. \ At the national level press 
---. 
advertising can be prohibitive to all but the large 
organisations, but South Africa's regional press brings~ 
advertising within the reach of local groups and 
associations and places at their disposal a valuable 
means of communication, at reasonable cost. 
In comparing the amount of public service advertising 
used by government departments in different countries, 
it becomes apparent that relatively little use is made 
of advertising by the South African government. This 
has probably more to do with the complexity of the socio-
political make-up of the country and its state as a 
developing country. The dilemma facing the government, 
which must be well aware of the benefits that advertising 
can bring to social issues and public information, is 
that much of the information issuing from government 
sources tends, in the special circumstances applicable 
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to South Africa, to appear to be interpreted as 
propaganda. This is a troublesome factor which could 
negate, or at least dilute, much good communication 
of real social value. 
A possible solution to this problem, which is not 
unique to South Africa, would be to encourage the form-
ation of a non-profit, private sector organisation along 
the lines of the American Advertising Council to promote 
issues of national concern like health and social 
security, conservation of energy, crime prevention and 
the like. 
The Advertising Council is supported entirely by the 
advertising-communications industries and American 
business, on behalf of the American people. Its 
advertising campaigns are geared to promoting voluntary 
citizen actions to help solve national problems. 
Approximately 400 requests from private organisations 
and government agencies are received annually by the °'\ 
Advertising Council requesting campaign support. These 
requests are analysed and reviewed by the Council's 
Director and senior executives, obtaining clarification 
and any additional information from the requesting 
organisation. The information is then forwarded to ~ 
the Campaign Review Committee which makes recommendations 
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to the Board of Directors of the Advertising Council 
who vote on whether or not to accept the proposal for ~ 
a campaign. 
A Public Policy Committee, an independent committee 
made up of leaders from many walks of life, recommends _) 
areas of concern and advises the Board of Directors 
about their importance to the public, acting as the 
Council's 'conscience' and reviewing ongoing campaigns 
and new proposals. 
The Council is also assisted by an Industries Advisory 
Committee, composed of leading business executives who 
advise on financial and other support· areas. 
A Media Committee working with outside consultants 
maintains liaison with all media to ensure maximum 
co-operation and campaign exposure. 
When a campaign is accepted, a volunteer advertising 
agency is appointed by the American Association of 
..,,/ 
Advertising Agencies (AAAA, South Africa's equivalent 
is the Association of Accredited Practitioners in 
Advertising, AAPA) to carry out the creative effort 
j 
for all media to be used. The agency donates its skills 
free, charging only for out-of-pocket expenses. 
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At the same time, a volunteer co-ordinator - usually 
an advertising or marketing executive from a major 
advertiser - is appointed by the Association of National 
Advertisers (South Africa's equivalent body is the 
Society of Marketers) to co-ordinate all aspects of 
the approved campaign. 
The Advertising Council also appoints a campaign manager 
from its staff to facilitate the progress f the 
campaign and maintain liaison with client, agency and 
co-ordinator. Staff media managers prepare the public 
service advertisements for mass duplication and 
distribution to the major media which each year donate 
time and space worth over half a billion dollars 12 
(see Appendix D, Recent Examples of Public Service 
~ 
Advertising Campaigns Conducted by the American Advertis-
ing Council Press and Television). 
There is little doubt that public service advertising 
has a part to play in educating the public in major 
social issues and to some extent helping to solve 
problems. In South Africa this kind of advertising 
although established with both press and television 
/ 
is still in its infancy as a tool for social good. It 
is to be hoped that as the South African advertising 
industry grows and more media outlets become available, 
particularly television, private organisations 
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and government agencies will utilise advertising to 
a far greater extent in its public service role. 
It is necessary to strike a cautious note when consider-
ing the application of public service advertising to 
social issues in the South African context. Most 
research into advertising's effect on attitude change 
""----~ 
indicates the need for the message to be_received in 
--
sufficient quantity relative to all other messages on 
, "'--· 
the topic. Even given the co-operation that currently 
'-..._ 
exists in the South African advertising industry, the 
repetition of messages and the media combinations 
'----
necessary would put a high price on the participants. 
---
J~-H_. Rayburn investigated the effects of televised 
public~neuncements in a media campaign 
targeted towards th~can middle-class, middle-
.____ 
-----------
aged female who either abused drugs, or-Was-a-potential 
drug abuser. The campaign was examined under the 
assumptions of the 'Linear Force~ggregation Theory', 
"-.... 
a deterministic theory postulating that an individual's 
"-
' 
·attitudes are the mean of all discrepant information 
..... 
he or she received relevant to a particular t~'pic 13 
Rayburn was able to show that the small amount of 
information contr~ted by the public service advertising 
~ 
campaign was unable to 'a+.ter attitudes previously formed 
·, 
" by the comparatively large ·~aunts of prior information 
received from a variety of sources. This indicates 
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that unless impressive resources in terms of media 
repetition, funding and labour are forthcoming, at best 
all that could be achieved will be a certain degree i_/ 
of awareness of the problem. Attitudes will remain 
unchanged. 
6.3 REGULATION AND CONTROL OF TELEVISION ADVERTISING 
The regulation of television advertising is strictly 
controlled in the interests of South African viewers. 
The SABC, with due regard for the growing amount of 
legislation designed to protect consumers, has evolved 
vetting and advisory procedures which set standards 
as high as any to be found in the world. The 
corporation remains alert and sensitive to public 
criticism of television advertisements and policy 
dictates that because of the heterogeneous nature of 
South Africa's television audiences and the fact that 
it is impossible to be selective with a truly 'mass' 
medium like television, it is better to err on the side 
of caution. To the outside observer this restraint 
might imply that television advertising in South Africa 
is dull, unimaginative and lacking in innovative creative 
flair. Nothing can be further from the truth. The 
South African advertising industry has achieved high 
standards in the production of television commercials, 
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a number of which have won prizes at international 
conventions. Furthermore, research shows that the 
South African public appears to quite like television 
advertisements and, in many cases,would be prepared to 
tolerate more, if it meant an improvement in programme 
services (see Chapter 8, South African Opinion and the 
Television Debate). 
The SABC's comprehensive controls over advertising extend 
to the frequency, amount and nature of the advertisements. 
Sponsorship of programming by advertisers is not 
permitted and advertisements must be clearly distinguish-
able from programmes in which they are contained. 
Television commercials are only permitted at the 
beginnings and ends of programmes, an exception being 
the broadcasting of lengthy sporting events, when 
natural breaks in the programme are utilised for 
advertising. These arrangements, designed to minimise 
viewer irritation, are, for obvious reasons, not popular 
with advertisers. But the SABC, being in the first 
instance a public service institution, insists that 
the public interest must be the dominating factor. 
The British IBA, also an excellent model of advertising 
control in the public interest, takes a different view. 
Its policy is to permit advertising at the beginnings 
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and ends of programmes and also "in natural breaks 
therein" 14 . 
The Authority argues that this arrangement allows an 
even spread of television advertising and does not 
militate against long programmes which might otherwise 
be followed by impracticably long periods of advertis-
ing 15. It does not add that this arrangement is also 
most acceptable to advertisers. To be fair to the 
IBA, it is worth noting that of the 180 television 
programmes broadcast in a typical week, over half have 
d t . . . th 16 no a ver ising in em . 
The SABC's approach to the control of television 
advertising and the maintenance of high standards 
obviously owes much to the fact that it was able to 
benefit from the experience of advertising control, 
both good and bad, in countries like Britain , the 
United States, Australia and Canada. The sensitive 
areas are much the same : politics, religion, 'good 
taste', appeals to fear, description and (exaggerated) 
claims for products and services, testimonials, 
guarantees, alcoholic drinks, advertising and children, 
advertising of medicines and treatments. These and 
many othere sensitive areas are covered in great detail 
in codes of standards and practice. 
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The SABC has the additional burden of examining all 
advertising proposals that might, in some way, 'offend' 
against government policy of apartheid (sep~rate develop-
ment) for the different racial groups. Depending upon 
circumstances, commercials depicting mixing of the races, 
particularly in a social context attract intensive 
scrutiny. In practice, what tends to happen is that 
through experience, the advertising agencies have 
learned just how far their creative licence extends 
in this regard and there is seldom any major disagree-
ment between advertisers and the SABC. The corporation 
claims that it closely monitors changes in the behaviour 
of South African society and adjusts its policy on 
advertisements featuring racial mixing, in line with 
what is acceptable. 
There is also a close parallel between South Africa 
and Britain in the way the advertising industry exercises 
self-regulation in the form of the Advertising Standards 
Authority (ASA). The same name applies in both countries 
and the modus operandi is virtually identical. 
Essentially, all sectors of the industry, i.e. advertisers, 
agencies and medi~ subscribe to a self-regulatory code 
dedicated to improving the image of advertising in society 
by making it more responsible and professional. The 
general public is encouraged, through advertising, to 
report to the ASA advertisements they consider to be 
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offensive, illegal, dishonest or indecent. Radio and 
television advertising complaints are not dealt with 
by the ASA but referred to the SABC (see Appendix C 
for examples of ASA advertising appeals) . 
In the United States the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
is the leading federal regulatory agency for advertis-
ing practices and is the subject of the greatest 
criticism from the advertising agency sector. Regu-
lation takes many forms in the United "States. In 
addition to the FTC, there are many other government 
agencies responsible for enforcing legislation concern-
ing advertising such as the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and many more. 
The actions of the FTC have been criticised so much 
that Congress limited its jurisdiction in 1980. How-
ever, the growth of consumer advocacy groups in the 
last decade almost ensures continued pressure on 
advertisers 17 . 
The most effective body for self-regulation has been 
the National Advertising Review Council which represents 
advertisers and agencies and investigates complaints 
received from consumers through its investigative body, 
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the National Advertising Division (NAD). Advertisers 
who refuse to comply with NAD recommendations are 
referred to the council's appeals body, the National 
Advertising Review Board (NARB), which may uphold, 
modify or reverse the NAD's findings. It may also 
direct the advertiser to modify or withdraw the advert-
isement in questionl8. 
It can be seen that there are close parallels between 
South Africa's and Britain's ASA system of self-
regulation and the United States' National Advertising 
Review Council, the chief difference being one of 
development, brought about by the burgeoning force of 
consumerism in both Britain and the United States. 
6.4 ADVERTISING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The lack of comprehensive statistics from an official 
source on the amount of advertising in the South African 
economy hinders independent research into advertising's 
economic effects. 
Market Research Africa (MRA) monitors above-the-line 
advertising media for its ADINDEX Report 19 . Using 
this source (which is generally recognised by the South 
African advertising industry as the most authoritative}, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
6-27 
the amount of advertising in the economy is seen, in 
Table 6-3 (overleaf), to.be in the region of R715 million. 
The figures in the table ignore 'below-the-line' advert-
ising expenditure, i.e. promotional material that does 
not bear media commission, but nevertheless appears 
on the advertising budget. This latter type of 
'advertising' activity is the most difficult to estimate 
expenditure for, but it is generally accepted that it 
at least equals the amount spent on above-the-line, 
or commission bearing advertising. 
It is interesting to see the impression commercial 
television has had on the distribution of above-the-line 
advertising since its arrival in 1978. Fig. 6-1 (page 
6-29) shows this effect diagrammatically 20 . 
All other media have suffered, in relative terms, with 
the press worst hit of all. There can be little doubt 
that, were it not for the NPU's remonstrations to the 
government to restrict the amount of advertising in 
TV programming (currently set at eight percent), and 
the still relatively low numbers of broadcasting hours 
per channel, the press would suffer further losses in 
advertising share. 
Should the SABC be allowed to develop its existing 
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TABLE 6-3 
TOTAL SOUTH AFRICAN ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, 1983 
Source 
Press 
Radio 
Cinema 
Outdoor (poster) 
Television 
Rm 
430,3 
76,3 
12,5 
25,1 
170,7* 
714 '9 
MRA's ADINDEX, December 1983. 
*The discrepancy of R29 million between MRA's estimate 
for television and the SABC's Annual Report 1983 figure 
of Rl41,6 mi~lion {previously mentioned) is due 
to the fact that the SABC pays a 16,5 percent 
commission to the advertising agencies on its gross 
advertising income of Rl70,7 million. 
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FIGURE 6-1 
TRENDS IN SHARE OF TOTAL ADVERTISING 
EXPENDITURE, 1977 - 1983 
1977 (no commercial TV) 
Press 76,0% 
Cinema 2,1% 
Outd or 5.1% 
1983 
Cinema 1,8% 
Outdoor 3,5% 
Adapted from Management, September, 1982, p. 10. 
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monopoly services to their full potential, without the 
entry of an independent, press-related competitor it 
is difficult to see how the South African press could 
survive in its present form. 
The entry of regional television would inevitably lead 
to a rationalisation of the South African newspaper 
industry. Only through diversification into television 
and perhaps some form of subsidy system (discussed later 
in this chapter) could the existing framework survive, 
but even then, the evolutionary process as it affects 
the communication industry will alter the type, range 
and role of newspapers in the future. 
It can be seen then, that the lack of official statistics 
referring to advertising forms a barrier to economists 
and others concerned with studying this controversial 
and somewhat neglected economic activity. 
Advertisers recognise the importance of advertising 
within their marketing mix but they find it extremely 
difficult to arrive at a scientific approach to defining 
how much to spend on advertising in given circumstances. 
A number of pragmatic, rule-of-thumb procedures have 
been developed, but overal~ advertising appropriation 
decisions still remain one of the biggest problem areas 
of marketing. 
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In addition to the lack of reliable data on advertising 
expenditures and effects, a central problem is the 
difficulty of isolating the effects of advertising from 
a variety of other marketing activities affecting sales. 
Added to thi~ is the inevitable lag in the effect of 
advertising on sales. Most advertising models have 
suffered from avoiding these issues or simplifying them 
so much 1 that their practical utility has become 
negligible21 (see Appendix. E for South Africa's twenty-
five largest advertisers). 
The amount of advertising in industrialised economies 
has traditionally been criticised in economic welfare 
terms, in that advertising's persuasive component is 
unacceptable, while recognition is given, in part, to 
the 'information' component in advertising such as 
that contained in most classified, financial, trade 
and technical advertisements . 
.Modern demand theory, which places greater emphasis 
on consumer behaviour, suggests that the conventional 
distinction between informative and persuasive advertis-
ing is misplaced. According to Professor Alderson22 : 
"All effective communication is 
persuasive • . . both information and 
recommendations must be presented 
persuasively if they are to have any 
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ff t h • d • • II 23 e ec on pure asing ec1s1ons . 
The most commonly voiced economic criticism against 
advertising comes from Professor Kaldor 24 woo argues that 
because advertising is supplied jointly with goods and 
services, consumers are forced to pay for more advertis-
ing than they want, and are thereby unwilling accomplices 
in a waste of resources. The amount of advertising 
supplied exceeds that demanded and by this method 
advertisers are able to maximise their profits. This 
departure from marginal-cost pricing leads to an over-
supply and a consequent waste of resources, which is 
financed by consumers who are forced to pay higher 
25 prices for advertised goods . 
This type of reasoning by economists such as Kaldor 
and Steiner26, clearly supports the contention according 
to Doyle, that consumer information requirements are 
not large enough to justify the level of advertising 
expenditure, therefore excessive advertising takes place 
and more may be spent than can be passed on to consumers 
because producers are out to maximise their profits. 
For evidence they suggest the predominance of advertis-
ing in non-competitive industries where firms employ 
advertising in an attempt to increase their share of 
k . b . f f. 27 a mar et, or to raise arriers to entry or new irms • 
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Telser2~ however, criticises Kaldor' s reasoning. He 
questions the assumption that consumers have a limited 
choice between advertised and unadvertised goods. If 
unadvertised goods are cheaper, then the result of 
purchasing advertised goods may be an approximation 
to the marginal-cost pricing of advertising. Secondly 
he argues that there may be important savings in the 
joint supply of advertising with goods and services 29 . 
The most fundamental criticism of the Kaldor-type thesis 
must, however, rest on modern consumer demand theory. 
Doyle argues that conventional economic theor~ modelled 
on 'perfect competition', is inadequate in analysing 
advertising issues, as it is based on assumptions 
regarding given tastes, complete knowledge or simple 
technical information requirements, which permit straight 
comparison between a limited number of alternative choices. 
The most valuable contribution of behavioural science 
to modern demand theor~ according to Doyl~ has been 
"in showing the unreality of these assumptions 1130 • 
6.5 ADVERTISING AND MARKET CONCENTRATION 
Another important economic question is does advertising 
lead to increased market concentration? Again the 
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issue is contentious with economists ranged on either 
side. There is reason to believe it might increase 
market concentration through the mechanism of scale 
economies and entry barriers. Economies of scale of ten 
exist because a certain saturation threshold must be 
reached for best results and because many media offer 
discounts to high volume advertisers. Also it takes 
time to build strong brand preference and this gives 
the heavy advertiser an advantage over the smaller firm. 
The cost advantages large firms enjoy make it more 
difficult for small enterprises to survive ceteris 
paribus. 
If advertising is able to reduce unit cost of goods, 
through the benefit of scale economie~ this is obviously 
to the consumers' advantage bu~ if this results in the 
smaller firms being eliminated it makes it possible 
for large firms to continue monopolistic restrictions. 
These restrictions are not, however, inherent in bigness. 
In South Africa the small firm is denied the use of 
television because of the medium's high cost and the 
solely national nature of the service, making it the 
exclusive preserve of the major national and multi-
national companies. 
The new entrant into an industry where advertising is 
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important may be forced either to charge a price much 
lower than established selling prices to compensate 
for its inferior image o~ to advertise heavily in the 
hope of building an image quickly where the products 
are highly substitutable. In either event, sellers 
enjoying a well-developed brand reputation can maintain 
their prices persistently above costs without making 
entry attractive to newcomers. This in turn can spell 
the perpetuation of a particular oligopoly structure 31. 
To determine whether a relationship existed between 
intensity of advertising and market concentration,H.M. Mann 
et al.32 obtained data for a sample of forty-seven firms 
operating primarily in fourteen advertising-prone four-
digit (US nomenclature*) industries. They observed 
fairly substantial and statistically significant positive 
correlations, ranging from 0,41 to 0,72, between the 
ratio of advertising outlays to sales and four-digit 
t t . t. 33 concen ra ion ra 10s • 
In an earlier study of thirty-three British non-durable 
I 
34 
consumer goods,P.K.Else found that the advertising/sales 
ratio was negatively correlated with the total sales 
volume of a product line, and positively correlated with 
*Author's italics 
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the number of specific products within the line35 . 
The former relationship suggests that smaller industries 
must advertise relatively more to achieve the most 
advantageous level of medium saturation. The latter 
suggests that variegated, complex product lines require 
the transmission of more messages to secure an equivalent 
consumer response. After taking these factors into 
account, Else found a sligh~ but not completely uniform 
tendency for the intensity of advertising to increase, 
with a crude index of market concentration 36 • 
The limited evidence appears to suggest that advertising 
expenditures may gravitate towards slightly higher levels 
in oligopolistic than in atomistically structured 
industries, but the relationship is weak and erratic. 
If a positive correlation does exist between concentration 
and advertising intensity, at least over some range, 
the direction of causality remains to be established 37 . 
6.6 ADVERTISING AND PROFITABILITY 
The question of whether or not heavy advertising leads 
to unacceptably high profits- a prime manifestation 
of monopoly power - has proved to be impossible for 
economists to answer unequivocally. If entry into 
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advertising-prone industries is easy, the profits gained 
through image differentiation alone should be eroded 
away as newcomers are drawn by the profit lure, to play 
the same game. 
High advertising may also contribute to the breakdown 
of an oligopolistic pricing discipline by increasing 
the dimensionality of sellers' rivalry. On the other 
hand, if firms, by advertising heavily can erect barriers 
to new entry, they may be able persistently to earn 
monopoly rents. 
Screrer38 suggests that successful product differentiation 
through advertising, is an important source of exception-
ally high industrial profits. Quoting from the most 
prominently profitable firms on Fortune's list of the 
five hundred largest US industrial corporations, he 
attributes their success performances in large measure 
to massive advertising39 . 
Comanor arrl Wilson40 provide a more general perspective. 
In their major statistical study using multiple 
regression techniques, they analysed the effect of 
advertising expenditures on the average 1954 - 1957 
after-tax return on stockholders' equit~ in forty-
one three-digit consumer goods industry groups, taking 
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into account also the influence of market concentration, 
scale economies in production, the absolute amount of 
capital required to enter the industry and the rate 
of growth of demand41 . 
They discovered a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the ratio of advertising to sales 
and profit returns. Industries with high advertising 
outlays were found to command profits roughly fifty 
percent higher on average, than industries spending 
modest amounts on advertising. Profits were also 
correlated positively with concentration, however, when 
concentration ratios, a measure of scale economies and 
a measure of absolute capital requirements, were all 
included with the advertising/sales ratio as independent 
variables to explain profitability, the concentration 
variable proved to be statistically insignificant. 
(It is recognised that there could be auto-correlation 
here.*) This was so because concentration is 
positively correlated with the extent of scale economies 
and the magnitude of capital requirements 42 . 
The Comanor and Wilson study supports the conclusion 
that intensive image differentiation through advertis-
*Author's italics 
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ing is an important source of monopoly profits, allowing 
its practitioners to hold prices above marginal costs 
without encouraging the competition of new entrants. 
An important corollary in the South African context, 
given that television advertising time remains a scarce 
resource, oversubscribed, according to various estimates, by up to 
250 percent, with no facility for regional coverage, is that the large 
companies with national markets will continue to_dominate 
the medium as the high cost and high wastage (in terms 
of market coverage) will in itself form a barrier to 
market entry and will contribute to maintaining the 
status quo, with the small-to-medium sized firms 
constricted in terms of economic development. 
6.7 ADVERTISING AND THE PRESS 
Dependence on advertising for both the press and tele-
43 
vision entails distinct social costs. Doyle argues 
that advertising makes the press extremely vulnerable 
to an economic recession, or to a change in the pattern 
of advertising. This is evident in the South African 
context by the large inroads being made by television 
into what was until comparatively recently the news-
papers' share of total advertising. Fig. 6-1 (page 
6-29) (previously discussed) illustrates this trend 
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from 1977 to 1983. 
Mr Dawid de Villiers (then*) managing director of 
Nasionale Pers in an address to the Economic Affairs 
Comittee of the President's Council 44 reported that 
more than half of South Africa's daily newspapers are 
running at a loss and of the six Afrikaans dailies, only 
one showed a profit in the last financial year (1982). 
It is interesting to note, however, that although news-
paper circulations are steadily falling, magazines are 
comparatively bouyant as Figure 6-2 (overleaf) illustrates, 
using the January/June 1978 ABC circulation figures 
as the index base. 
Mr de Villiers said that since its inception, SABC TV 
had made huge inroads into the profitability of all 
newspapers, but especially the dailies. In its first 
year, commercial television had taken just over sixteen 
percent of the total available advertising in the country. 
Last year (1982*) it had taken twenty-one percent and 
in 1983 it was expected to boost its share of available 
45 
advertising to twenty-five percent of the total • 
*Author's italics 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
' ~ • • I 
• I • . ; 
: I -
. ~ . . . 
. I 
---<---.-----
-----r--- .•. ----;------
: : : : 1 .. ' 
f . 
. . . I . r . 
' i ' 
I
. -. ! .. 
' i 
· t · - - · · · · I - - - - · · i · · -I :t:::I ·::.!: 
-.--- t ·-·------ ---- -··--+-·----+----
! · · : · . : : • : · . i : .. : r: : 
.. ! 
.. 
. 
. I 
j 
I : : : 
i 
. I 
. - . r.-. -+-------
- ~ ---l 
JRE 6-2 CIRCULATION 1978 to 1981: MAGAZINES Vs NEWSPAPERS 
. I 
I 
i 
----1------
. I 
I 
I 
j . 
: ' I I . I . - ' ., I 
r- ... --- --j .. • . -~i-. :-~~ -+--· '.-: _,__: --+-: _· -- ~~- -- --ii· 
! · · ; !
1 
- - · · : · - - Weekly-
~~1 -----f-------'-------+1---,---+1--~--+--- Magazines __ __, 
. . I ! . ! l l I . .. -t . - - - .L' ,;...;- -------:--
. l 
l!O I 
I 
I 
. t 
__ ·_· ___ +------.--- __ .;_ _______ ·-+-- -~ -~-~- -~- L----=~_:__:_ _ _.:_ __ ··-+----;....-=---'-----~---jl 
I - .. :_·1 : __ · . ·. · ... t l.. ' : -i I • . . 1 . ; • < : j -_: ~ . I 
.. . . . . - - - l . -·· - . l -- . - - ,_ - - . -. - 1 - - ' - ·- - - • - - .. 
' . 
. ~ . . j : J: 
- ; ' . ·1 f. 
---+-\ ------+-------~--·--, ----r---
.. , ___ . , _ ... 1 . . . i . - . - . - -- I 
1. - -
. : : , . : : : i : ~ : : j : : · I 
- - - - - - • - + - - . l - - - - l. Bi-Weekly 
Magazines -ti&-·-4--~~---"i----+----+----~--+---,----..,...,.-----.-----< 
: t : ! . 
- f ' 
.:__-. j__.:__:___· ;_.:__· +.:.--· ;_-_ _J_ - __ · ~ . --
. . . - 1 . t 
- - - .. . - - . - - . - - . 
- . - . - - . . . -
- • • ~ - - • t 
T Monthly Magazines - ' . I i· I - - j 
---+----------
. l 
! 
. j 
.. I 
l 
! 
.,~--:i. -· . :/ . --...;. .t·. . -.... -. •"""··..-. - . - ..... ~ - - -·-·· ) .. ~ ::- .. ___ !,,.-_.I··...- ! . ......... . . . . . j - . l ......... , . --·j•. -.. "~- .... ·:. ---.,.~---
. : : :~ . ! .. .:.---'." _: • 1 ~-:--t--_"".'"' .. : i: :~·~ ('~- - Sunday . I.· ----+-------~~--: --- - ~--·-------·f : ~-. · r -- Newspapers 
I · ! · 1 t · · · .... '. . . - t -
. : : : I : . : . . : I I : ; . : :·i-, l' - -
. ' , - · I t - ! ", . l -~ _..>-. • ..;.._. 
I i ~ _.. --· I ; - . + - _. ~~- - ---1 
. - . I I . . I . . . . . - - . I .• I~+--->---_-: -ti ~~ - _--~ ·· ---+--- J_\'. ····· +--~-·--t--- -- ~!~~~apers l ____ _ 
- f· ··--- ' ·• -- I . ·1· ..... I -
· - · . - - ] I 
1 110 Arapted: from :oresight, June, 1982 . '. · · ·• i . • : • ---~ 
I . ! . . - i .. - -. . . - . . • . . . . . : ..• I· .. - . 
. ..:· .·. ·,· __ __J__ _j_----+----+----~-------
. . ' - . ~ t - - - - t - - - t 
. - i ; . . - ! . - - -
I - . . ·T·;-· - . ---
1 .. 
' . ! 
. ·- t 
! '5't.. Ya-.. " . ~4k ; l ~ u,.. . 
, .... /.' ... ·-- .. r -· 
; - -'~ .. _' - . '.I. J 
l : ; - I 
i 
-~jw\: .. 
·7""' l)ec. 
: : : : : : : : : : : - . : : : : : . : . I 
. . . i . 'Ju.\ /f)f<. . : : ;Ja·*u.f\ . : :-l'v.L f 
. - j . - - - ' v...z' ' ~~ -- " - -- : . . . --.. ~--··-~ 
. ~ • . - - - ' . . J ' ' 
·- l. i.. . . 
-- l . . i - . 
J - - - J 
• 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
I 
6-42 
The share of advertising in English-language newspapers 
had dropped from nearly twenty-five percent of the total 
in 1977 to seventeen percent last year (1982*). 
Afrikaans newspapers had dropped from 8,3 ·percent of 
the total in 1977 to 5,8 percent last year (1982*). 
Mr de Villiers emphasised the need to preserve the news-
paper industry pointing out that in other Western countries 
governments had recognised the vital need for newspap~rs 
as both an essential part of the free democratic process 
and of the free enterprise system : 
"In West Germany, the two commercial 
channels were allowed to broadcast 
a daily total of not more than twenty 
minutes of advertising. In Holland 
only fifteen minutes per day for each 
of the two channels was permitted. 
In Britain and the United States, 
newspaper groups were free to invest 
in commercial television networks 
and could thus share in their profits. 1146 
Mr de Villiers outlined a seven point plan which he 
said would go a long way towards assisting South Africa's 
newspapers to survive in the era of commercial tele-
vision : 
*Author's italics 
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(1) Increased television licenses, "which have been 
pegged for years", to enable the SABC to get 
more of its revenue from this source than from 
advertising. 
(2) Limit the amount of time the SABC can devote 
to advertising, along the lines applied to West 
Germany, Holland and France. 
(3) Give newspapers more say in the control of SABC 
tariffs so that there can be a better balance 
between the interests of the SABC and the news-
papers. 
(4) Financing the SABC's additional capital needs 
with state money since "the SABC is a state 
monopoly and its capital needs should not be 
obtained at the expense of the private enterprise 
press". 
(5) The press should have the right to invest in 
new television developments such as cable tele-
vision. 
(6) At least during the present recessionary period, 
the envisaged sales tax on advertising should 
be suspended. 
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(7) The ban on importing newsprint should be revised 
to encourage price competition on the domestic 
. k t47 newsprint mar e . 
In practice, it seems unlikely that the government would 
encourage higher licence fees beyond the rate of 
inflation, as reverting to a revenue system where licence 
fee income was greater than advertising revenue would 
be interpreted as an unacceptable penalty to the tax-
payer/viewer. 
In limiting the amount of time the SABC can devote to 
advertising, the NPU already has considerable influence 
on the government. However, it seems inevitable that 
the government will permit the corporation even higher 
percentages of broadcasting time for advertising, in 
line with many other countries, depending upon public 
acceptance. The University of Cape Town study showed 
that, on the whole, the public would be prepared to 
tolerate considerably more advertising .if this led to 
48 better programmes . (See Chapter 8, South African 
Opinion and the Television Debate.) 
It is estimated that this tolerance might be breached 
should advertising increase beyond twelve to fourteen 
percent of broadcasting time. 
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of television and its adverse effect on other media, 
it is interesting to note the apparently healthy state 
of magazines, as is already apparent from Fig. 6-2 
above. 
6. 8 THE QUESTION OF PRESS SUBSIDY 
It has been a traditional argument that newspapers must 
retain their independence in an open market, depending 
solely on circulation and advertising revenue. Editorial 
policy regarding information (news) and entertainment 
has determined circulation and type of readership, which 
in turn has determined advertising revenue. Newspaper 
audiences are only large because the advertising 'subsidy' 
had disguised and reduced the true cost of newspapers 
by enabling the newspapers to balance increased 
circulation and advertising revenues against production 
costs and the price of the newspapers. 
Through dependence upon advertising, newspapers have 
become extremely sensitive to economic conditions. The 
South African newspaper business is highly competitive 
and therefore cost sensitive. 
The crisis in the newspaper industry has been caused, 
to some extent, by the loss of readers and by the 
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diversion of some advertising to television as Fig. 
6-1 indicates. What is probably even more signi'ficant, 
however, is the changing pattern of South African news-
paper readers : the move away from morning newspapers 
to afternoon papers and increased readership of the 
highly profitable weekend newspapers. 
The impact of television, the services it provides, 
and the demands on viewers' time, are important factors 
in considering the changing pattern of newspaper 
readers. It can be argue~ that there is now a current 
over-supply of both Afrikaans and English language 
newspapers (there are eleven dailies trading in the 
Johannesburg-Pretoria area alone) and it see.ms inevitable 
that some form of rationalisation is bound to occur, 
particularly in view of the public's growing demands 
for more and better television services. What seems 
to be happening is that the lif tstyles of South Africans 
are being changed by television. This change will 
accelerate as television increases its media dominance. 
The traditional response of many European countries 
to the threatened extinction of the press has been to 
initiate a system of government subsidies to sustain 
the newspapers in their traditional form and structure. 
Where this subsidy policy has been implemented it has 
usually been accompanied by much heart--searching lest 
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it defeats its own objective and creates avenues of 
governmental or official interference in the content 
of the newspapers. 
In a detailed study of subsidies and the press in Europe, 
Anthony Smith 49 concludes that : 
" •• In no country, however, in which 
such subsidies have been introduced, 
has anyone complained that governments 
have interfered or tried to interfere 
more afterwards than before. In fact 
the countries with the most elaborate 
subsidy systems have often the 
strongest laws protecting journalism 
and the press against government 
interference ••• ,.SO 
However, in providing direct help to newspapers whose 
survival is threatened, a government could be deemed 
to be making a political statement about the kind of 
society and the political viewpoints it wants to 
preserve. In trying to escape this charge of 'bias', 
European countries have looked instead for automatic 
forms of subsidy payment. Newspapers are therefore 
given subsidies on the tonnage of newsprint consumed, 
or on postal and telephone charges, or relief on taxation, 
etc. Table 6-4 (overleaf) is a chart summarising these 
various forms of indirect subsidy. 
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CHART SUMMARISING FORMS OF SUBSIDY BY COUNTRY 
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Smith points out that these indirect subsidies help 
the fortunate more than the unfortunate. The bigger 
the pagination, or the greater the circulation, the more 
the newsprint consumed, the more is saved from tax relief 
and from subsidies on the cost of news collection : 
" in other words it has been found 
necessary to protect newspapers which 
are losing the battle for life in the 
marketplace, to provide aid in such a 
way as to arrest the forces of the 
market, not to spread a general largesse 
which tends to accelerate the market 
forces the more the authorities 
try to reach down to aid the least 
successful the more c mplex and inter-
ventionist t.he approach has to be •• " 51 
Newspapers are essentially low-margin, labour intensive 
products; they require concentrated populations to 
minimise distribution costs. News is difficult and 
expensive to collect. They are vulnerable to the 
economy's effect upon advertising. Nearly all 
industrialised countries have set themselves unrealistic 
expectations from newspapers that their economies can 
no longer sustain. In South Africa, as elsewhere, 
the threat that the death or severe rationalisation 
of the press will lead to the destruction of political 
freedom is widely felt. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
. 6-51 
Smith, considering the European situation regarding 
press subsidies, asks whether these are not merely 
supporting an instit~tion whose day is done. 
"Are we subsidising horses in an effort 
to make them compete with steam engines? 
Are we trying to preserve an army of 
blacksmiths when we need a small group 
of trained engineers? • • • Is it 
democracy which disappears with small 
newspapers, or one particular form? 
While subsidies are appearing at one 
end of the scene, cable television, 
local radio, community papers are 
appearing at the other - perhaps these, 
rather than what we call 'the press', 
are the heirs of the printers' sheets 
which sustained the politics of the 
last hundred years?1152 
In theory, the subsidies applied to the European press 
could be adapted to the South African situation. It 
is debatable, however, that such measures would be well 
received by the South African public. 
The University of Cape Town survey of public opinion 
found little support for press subsidies (see Chapter 8, 
South African Opinion and the Television Debate). 
It is equally contentious to assume that the newspaper 
industry itself would be united in welcoming a system 
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of subsidies, given its highly politicised and partisan 
history and make-up. 
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